





THE CHESS MIND



*By the same Author*

**TEACH YOURSELF CHESS.**



# THE CHESS MIND

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ENGLISH UNIVERSITIES PRESS LTD.  
ST. PAUL'S HOUSE, WARWICK SQUARE  
LONDON, E.C.4



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## ERRATA

Page 52. *Diagram 34.* Add White Rook on Q1.

Page 53. *Diagram 35.* White Rook at Q6—not QR1.

Page 60. *Diagram 45.* White King at KR1: White Queen at QB4: Add Black Pawn at KKt5.

Page 88. *Diagram 89.* White King at KKt1.

Page 190. For 'Blumenfeld' read 'Budapest'.

Page 151. *Diagram 165(a)* is based on a generally accepted score of the game, which is now believed to be incorrect.



## PREFACE

THE Author is greatly indebted to those who have helped him with advice and criticism in the course of this work. In particular : Mr. H. Golombek, himself a Chess master and writer of distinction ; Miss Eileen Tranmer, the talented lady international ; Dr. Richard Nairn, of the Liverpool Chess Club ; and Mr. J. H. Williams, of the Manchester Chess Club.

It has been impossible to give acknowledgement to the many books and periodicals to which all Chess players and writers are indebted. On more important issues, the Author expresses the combined influence of Immanuel Kant and Emanuel Lasker. For the rest, the selection of examples has only been governed by a feeling of appropriateness, and must appear arbitrary. Since every Chess position is interesting to the Chess player, it is obviously impossible to be other than arbitrary in choosing games and positions for analysis. In many cases the writer has drawn, for illustration, on his own experiences (most of the anonymous diagrams) and on the experiences of unambitious amateurs of his acquaintance. For in Chess the position matters more than the player. If any player makes a move that shows insight, then, as the great poet said of the lesser poet, he too, " derives his light from Heaven ".

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## INTRODUCTION

THE Chess Mind is an important Mind, and important to more than Chess players. In Chess, human intelligence achieves a creativity which cannot be explained away in terms of conditioned reflexes or the formation of habits. One of the Author's contentions in this essay is that mental habits and memory are elements in the Chess mind as a knowledge of his language is part of the equipment of an orator, or as a technique is essential to the musician. Beyond that equipment training ends, and the mind creates from its own resources and material. What a good Chess player does is comparable, as a mental act, to what the inventor does, be he scientist or poet ; an act of free imagination, which changes its own surroundings by the revelation of latent possibilities. His efforts, when he is applying his mind to the Chess task, are not controlled by any factors other than the complexity of the position before him and the limits of his own capacity. Other factors, such as a temperament, which is the result of heredity, experience and environment, undoubtedly affect the growth of the Chess—or any—mind to maturity. Other factors—anxieties and hopes—undoubtedly affect a player's will to win. But once the mind is harnessed to the task, then it performs freely, unaffected by the outside world. If, then, there is mental or volitional freedom to be found in human activity, here it is in Chess ; and the Chess player comes as near as any human being to demonstrating its reality.

It follows, then, that the Chess mind is of interest, not only to Chess players—many of whom play very well without knowing anything about it—but to any philosopher or psychologist who is interested in the intellectual background of the present age. For it so happens that this impalpable mental freedom, which the Chess player manifests, is one of those rock-like facts on which some of the most elaborate constructions of modern deterministic materialism suffer shipwreck. If it be clear, in any context, that a mind can succeed in completely controlling its subject matter, and in advancing far beyond its earliest restrictions, then there is a principle of activity in being which cannot

be explained away as a mere epiphenomenon of material forces in collision. That mind achieves this freedom, and this creativity, is then, a datum, and perhaps the only datum, which gives scientific substance to the philosophical traditions of a liberal society. A belief in this—the reality of the mind—is the principle which distinguishes a liberal society, even in its decadence, from the considerable—and successful—forms of slavery to which deterministic thinkers can reconcile themselves. Indeed, freedom of mind, that slight degree of independence and control, which so easily loses scope and reality under the pressure of economic difficulties or political powers, is the only luxury that is lacking in a regimented society, where all predictable behaviour is harnessed to economic effort or military struggle. If those theorists are right who say that this mental freedom is an illusion, in a reality which offers no leisure for dreaming, then there was no ultimate value to justify the world conflict of Democracy against a regimented and brutal Fascism. It is the Author's belief, however, that those mental activities (whatever their limitations of scope) in which the mind experiences freedom, are more than a trivial skill at games and more than the luxuries of the effete. Free society—nay, any society—relies on free unmalicious thought, as masses of human beings rely on the skill of the builders, engineers and aviators to whom they trust their lives. Not all Chess players will deduce from this their own social importance, because not all intellectuals are conscious of responsibility, or even intelligent. But those who do think about themselves and the world objectively may realize that the refinements of thought, the delicate tentacles of mentality, are the slender threads from which depend the hanging gardens of modern civilization.

The present work, however, is not concerned with working out the philosophic implications of the Chess mind, although the Author has worked on the basis of a critical Theory of Knowledge. The Author's purpose has been to show Chess players how their minds work. The awareness of what is going on in his mind is not a *sine qua non* of success to any Chess player, or any scientist or artist. But in fact the good performers are conscious of, and interested in, their mental processes. Moreover, through analysing their own efforts and performances in

the light of this self-consciousness, Chess players achieve, not, perhaps, greater incisiveness, but a rich maturity of thought. It is to be observed, in the history of Chess, that those who have attained eminence, and certainly those who have preserved their strength longest, have been men equipped with a philosophy of the game—and, usually, with abilities in other departments of thought. They have been able to give Chess its proper place in their mental perspective. Their other activities have in this way been enriched ; so has their Chess.

This book, be it emphasised, is primarily of interest to Chess players. But in describing the growth of the Chess mind, one is also describing that subtlest and most difficult of all human undertakings—Education. In Chess, one realizes that all education is ultimately self-education. Every Chess player teaches himself Chess. In this book he is shown, how, in doing this, he is giving his mind stimulus and direction. If the theories underlying this book are right, then the student of it will develop the Chess aspect of his mind intelligently and successfully. The Author, who, along this path, endeavours to guide him, offers no guarantee of success, and makes no claim to perfection of theory or treatment. His only claim is to have undertaken what nobody seems to have undertaken before—a study of what happens when Chess players think. Since the essence of a Chess player is his thought, it seems obvious that such a work cannot be irrelevant to Chess. On the other hand, it should be very useful. *En passant*, it is hoped that the examples chosen to illustrate the argument will be independently interesting and instructive. To write about Chess is automatically to teach it, but no attempt has been made to provide in these pages any substitute for the many excellent text-books that cover the many departments of Chess. Rather, the aim has been to give the reader a synoptic view of Chess, which will enable him to draw from that wonderful game a greater degree of the inspiration and consolation that a human being can derive from intellectual activity for its own sake.




## CHAPTER I

### VISION IN CHESS

THE most important mental activity in Chess is vision, by which is meant the unforced intuition of possibilities by the mind's eye. A capacity for apprehension of this type, the capacity of the mind for making a path through time and complexity, is the essence and the moving edge of any intellectual process. But whereas in many intellectual processes the mind is assisted by conceptual methods—i.e. by abstract ideas—in the mental activity which is Chess such assistance is at a minimum. Consequently in Chess the mind comes as near as possible to pure vision, to that spontaneous act of intuition which apprehends and controls processes and relationships without being forced to do so. With it we get the illusion (because it is an illusion) of passivity and calm as the normal state of the Chess player's mind. It is as if his mind lay open, and facts and ideas were flowing into it. That apparently passive receptivity is due to our unconsciousness of the provident activity of imagination, working as it does in darkness to create light. The calmness is as superficial as the calmness on the surface of a waterfall.

A useful analogy that may help the reader to appreciate the basic mental process that is involved in Chess is afforded by the common, unmetaphysical, notion of "understanding", as that word is employed when a person is said to "understand" what he is reading. The person who is reading a book in a language with which he is familiar is doing something similar to what the Chess player does when he looks at the Chessboard. Now clearly there is as big a variety of understanding as of readers. There is the reader who spells out words with great difficulty, and does not understand them very well, like a player who is not too familiar with the moves. Then there is a reader who reads easy words easily, but has difficulty with the meanings of harder words, or, more important, with any complex or abstract ideas that the words express. Similarly, acquaintance with the moves, like acquaintance with the meaning of easy words, carries some appre-

ciation of relatively simple realities, forks, pins, elementary mating processes, and some of the easier " idioms " of Chess—not more. The Chess player who cannot see the significance of a quiet move (i.e. not a check or a capture) over a short range, or cannot distinguish between a real and an apparent threat, is at this level. He sees the relatively immediate—not the mediate or complex. After this comes (as it were) recognition of the meaning of sentences without reference to phrase-books ; the perception of threats and manoeuvres without laborious remembering of the



I.

*Functions of the Pieces*

To the threat 1. R × P, Q—B2 is not a defence because of 2. R × P.

The inexpert attach an exclamation mark to such a move, though it is very easy. If 1. . . . B—B3, 2. P—K4 merits a mark of approval.

powers of pieces. Then the mind is on a path ascending from elementary understanding to advanced understanding : through the ability to apprehend instantaneously the meaning of an involved sentence, or (in Chess) the imminence of a tactical process : through wit and the perception of clevernesses : through the ability to see the point of an argument (logical consequences or cause and effect) explicitly stated : then the grasp of arguments only suggested to the reader's understanding (this is analagous to seeing the obscurer points of a line of play) : until we reach a level where difficult propositions and series of consequences are worked out, and the understanding has to be actively exercised indeed for the purpose of full comprehension.

The diagrams show the transition from the apprehension of the immediate to the apprehension of the mediate—from the awareness of the powers of the pieces to the awareness of their functions and the manoeuvres they can execute.


The first diagram shows a Rook attacking a Pawn. The Queen can move to defend it. But further inspection shows that this is not a good defence because of the Knight's power. The player who sees any latent possibilities can, if he is moderately well equipped, see the following consequences.

- |              |       |
|--------------|-------|
| 1. . . .     | Q—B2. |
| 2. R×P       | Q×R.  |
| 3. Kt—Q6 ch. |       |

This is not different in degree from the perception that, if a pawn e.g. be captured, the capturing piece can be pinned.

EUWE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

ALEKHINE

2.

### *Functions of the Pieces*

Under time-pressure Black plays

25. . . . Q—K4? and White

26. B—Kt2.

Both players overlooked the quite easy

26. Q—R8 ch.      K×Q.

27. Kt×BP ch.

In cases such as these the player must be acquainted with the Knight's fork, or the process of pinning, as the case may be; and more, must have the ability to recognise that the instant situation involves its use. That is, he must not only know the phrase, but understand its use in a sentence, and be able to use it himself. An element of memory is implied in the prior know-




ledge of Chess, as of language ; and the knowledge must be of generalised functions—for meanings—not specific moves ; as one knows that a word like “ operation ” means more than “ surgical operation.” But from this memory, as memory, or by inference from the knowledge of detail and generalities, one does not apprehend a move. Always the important need is spontaneously to recognise the actual, practical, function of a piece in the given setting.

Looking further into the first diagram position, one sees not only that Q—B2 fails as a defence, but that B—B3 is met by P—K4 because that square (as well as QB4) is affected by the Knight's check at Q6. Without analysing further let it be said that Black's position is very bad.

The second diagram (p. 13) illustrates the truth that in haste or under fatigue very good players can be lacking in awareness of the relevance of some functions of the very pieces in the use of which they are so expert.

The third diagram shows a position in which a very fine British player exploited his awareness of the possibilities available to his pieces several moves ahead.



3.

*An Unusual Function of the Pieces  
concealed in a Combination*

20. P—QKt3! inviting :

20. . . . B—K2.

21. R—Q3. B×P.

22. Kt—K5. Q—R5.

(Better was 22. . . . R×Q P  
sacrificing the exchange.)

23. R—R3. Q—K2.

24. Kt—Kt5. resigns.

Because if

24. . . . Q×Kt.

25. R—R8 ch., etc. and so if

24. . . . P—B3.

25. R—R8 ch.

The threat meanwhile is  
Kt×BP.

If

24. . . . R—KB1.


25. Kt(Kt)×BP. R×Kt.

26. Kt×KtP wins.

The fourth diagram shows some very good and advanced

Chess in which the player who wishes to control the situation must see a series of unobvious manoeuvres following each other. This brings us near to the highest level of Chess.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

4.

*Complex of Unusual (Sacrificial)  
Functions of the Pieces*

(Study by Moravec)

White to Play and Win

The apparent winning manoeuvre is not P—Kt7 (met by K—B3) but

1. R—Q8 ch. K × R.

2. P—Kt7.

At first sight this seems conclusive. White will make a Queen. There is, however, a very clever answer.

2. . . . R—QKt5.

3. K × R. P—B4 ch., and the Black King has had created for it the possibility of stopping the KtP. But this is not the last word. There follows :


4. K—Kt5 (not K × P),

K—B2. 5. K—R6, K—Kt1. 6. K—Kt6, P—B5. 7. P—R4, P—B6. 8. P—R5, P—B7. 9. P—R6, P=Q. 10. P—R7 mate.

And here we may revert to the parallel between Chess and general understanding. We know that at the upper intellectual level there are persons who can read a difficult statement about, say, the effects of a rise in prices of specific commodities on certain classes or groups of people, or about the effect of a certain proposition in physics or chemistry on the generally accepted theories in those fields, with less, or easier, concentration than others would require. So the mind of a good Chess player follows complex lines of play from the originating or preparatory move to a definite conclusion. Just as the minds of intellectuals are so developed, in particular fields or generally, that even a succinct reference—a phrase like inflation or entropy, for example—is sufficient to enable them to apprehend the reality of a complex process, so the good Chess player, glancing at significant points, can assess the tactical and strategical possibilities of a difficult position with relative ease. Among, and rising above, these educated minds are those who, while reading, are not only understanding, but

criticising, agreeing or disagreeing, or, better than that, re-constructing, and improving upon, the thoughts that they are absorbing with ideas of their own—ideas that perhaps the writers of what they are reading have not grasped. These are the men of constructive imagination—by which is meant more than wit, and more than fancy, more than cunning or any narrow cleverness ; and they correspond to the Chess players of imagination, who see the position whole, and see into possibilities that the ordinary experience of even an able player would not be sufficient to suggest. These are creative in a degree above the average of intellectuals. They discover and invent ideas : which is more than to understand argument, or translate from recondite languages.

At this level, whether of Chess or of reading and thinking, apprehension is not necessarily instantaneous. Not all the great musicians are Mozarts, grasping a symphony in a comprehensive instant. To all (whether intuitive Mozarts or slow-building Beethovens or less) an effort of concentration is necessary, which may come harder or easier, according to the kind of brain that is being applied. What is important to observe is that the same human understanding is operating on the high levels, just as it operated at the low levels, only with a much greater range and efficiency, and a much firmer and more comprehensive grasp,



5.

*Creative Imagination in Chess*

(Study by

Somov—Nasimovitch)


White Wins

1. B—Q6 ch. P×B.
2. K—B3. K—R7.
3. R—Kt2 ch. K—R6.
4. R—Kt7!. K—R7.
5. K—B2. K—R6.
6. R—R7 ch. K—Kt5.
7. Kt—B6 ch., and White wins easily.

Here we have the perception of a series of consequences. But in the course of the moves played new situations are created, which can only be appreciated in advance by a rich imagination. (See next diagram.)



(BLACK)



(WHITE)

5(a).

*Figure in the Marble*

One stage in the process from the previous diagram position. White had to see this situation (and the move Kt—B6) as well as the fact that it can be brought about by an inevitable series of threats.

a more penetrating insight, than lesser understanding affords. To this efficiency there is contribution from experience, which, being absorbed, constitutes education, and from natural ability (that mysterious thing) without a high degree of which education achieves less than the maximum ; and the process is made more complex by the fact that interest in different problems stimulates different approaches by the mind, sometimes so different as to suggest qualitatively different capacities, so that we speak of differences between logical and imaginative, and between different types of imagination. But always there is a common denominator of understanding, of apprehension by the mind. In effect the person who starts Chess at the lowest level, like the child who is taught to read, is commencing a process from which normal development is capable of leading to great heights, if not to the highest peaks of mental achievement. It requires only to be added that, whereas in ordinary thought more than three or four steps in an argument are rarely called for,\* in Chess the mind quite often finds itself travelling further.

The common denominator in Chess, then, is vision, free intuition of possibilities within a framework of rules and limitations. But the rules and the limitations do not cause the vision, only occasion it, and restrict its scope. Within these rules and

\* Bosanquet : *Implication and Linear Inference* (Macmillan, 1920).


limitations (which are really the Chessboard and pieces) the mind moves free. That some see more than others, or differently from others, is commonplace. But all players see something—and always there is something to see—and that position is barren indeed in which the good player will not see further, more widely, and more clearly than the inferior player. What a poor player perceives he sees fragmentarily, broken reflections in a dark glass. What he grasps are disconnected parts which he must laboriously synthesise, revealing in the process something of the machinery of the mind, which is only present to consciousness before the mind achieves smoothness in its operations. What a master sees he grasps in an act of mental illation, in which a series of moves or manoeuvres is grasped as a unity. That much of the difference between the two is difference of degree only is evidenced by one's experience of learning Chess ; and that same process is recapitulated in concentration over a difficult position, as the mind searches for ideas. When the mind is operating as it should, then ideas reveal themselves in an expanding light, and the limits of the mind seem to stretch like the legendary walls of the city to admit much that earlier it did not seem able to contain.

Even at the highest level there is an effort of concentration constantly in action, often unconsciously in action. The apparently timeless vision conceals a struggle in time. Moreover, the purpose of the game involves struggle, and the conquest of the material by the mind is struggle, as Lasker has pointed out. The endeavour by the players, each to achieve control by means that vision reveals, is, in reality, a struggle by each mind against its own limitations. Always the Chess player is playing against himself (as always the scientific arguer is arguing against himself). The nature of the effort is most easily recognised whenever the mind fails to grasp the whole completely. Then we have error—the grasp of the insufficient—and because of the wealth of possibility in the matrix of the Chessboard, a degree of error is almost always manifesting itself, even in the play of the greatest masters. In practice, much of what the master does not see is beyond practicality, and the omission is not usually called error ; but every player is always conscious of his fallibility. That is why, even when seeing much, the master is always endeavouring to see more.

It follows, then, that from the very beginning of the game, and at all stages of Chess activity, the player is looking at something, searching for something, seeing something. He may at the same time also be remembering, or judging, or (very rarely) calculating ; but always his principal activity is concentration, and the mental process that he is striving for intuitive. Always it is the seeing of possibilities, of consequences, of process and counter-process, just as in argument one sees, or tries to see, a point and an answer to it, and the answer to that, and an alternative approach, or just as the sculptor projects, as he traces through the difficulties of the material, the forming of the figure in the marble. (See diagrams 5 and 5(a) ).

CAPABLANCA

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

RUBINSTEIN

6.

White to move

Should he play Kt x QP ?

A classical Chess position, shown in diagram 6, is interesting as an illustration of the degrees of vision (some would say kinds of vision). Imagine several players, each with a different capacity, looking at this game. One sees that the Knight is in a position to capture the Queen's Pawn, but cannot do so for practical reasons because that Pawn is guarded by a Pawn. At that point mental habits operate to prevent him thinking further about the capture, if indeed they have not prevented him from thinking about it at all. A second player (less inhibited) sees that

the Knight can capture the Pawn, because, on the recapture, the Queen can capture again, giving check, and at the same moment attacking a Bishop. That same player, or one more slightly advanced, may also see that Black's Rook, as well, will be attacked after the capture of the Knight, and can be taken before or after the Queen captures the Pawn, or before or after the Queen captures the Bishop. And a slightly better player may be drawn into speculation as to whether, if the Rook be captured first, Black can play  $B \times P$  ch., which actually only recovers a Pawn out of the wreck; and, of course, that same player is capable of seeing that the capture of the Bishop is also safe before the capture of the Rook, though not so good. Already we are seeing how the perception of one manoeuvre is inadequate without the perception of following manoeuvres, and how the mind is encouraged, if not magnetically drawn, to the seeing of further consequences.

Now our last player has seen quite a long way ; but he has not seen a shorter, but clever, counter process. In answer to White's  $Kt \times P$  attacking the Queen, Black is not obliged to recapture. He can gain a move by playing, . . .  $Q-R_3$ , attacking the Bishop. That perception is not very useful unless it is accompanied by the idea that, after the Bishop has retreated, or been guarded by the King (not by the Knight with  $Kt-B_4$ , because  $R \times Kt$  wins two pieces for a Rook and two Pawns), Black can play  $R-Q_1$  pinning the Kt. Thus, if 2.  $K-Kt_2$ ,  $QR-Q_1$  ; or if  $B-Kt_2$ ,  $KR-Q_1$ . In the latter case, if then 3.  $Q-B_2$ ,  $Kt-Q_5$  ; or if, instead 3.  $Q-B_1$ ,  $Q \times Q$ , 4.  $R \times Q$ ,  $B \times P$  ch., followed by  $P \times Kt$ , with a playable game. At this point we have a player seeing clearly through some complexities. What he may not have seen, however, is White's  $Q-B_1$  in a slightly different setting. What happened in the game from which this position is taken was that after  $Q-R_3$  White played the relatively unexpected  $K-Kt_2$  ; then, on  $QR-Q_1$  he played  $Q-QB_1$ , which is the only move to make impossible  $R \times Kt$ . The player who saw that was one of the greatest of Chess masters, Rubinstein, and the player who did not see it far enough in the distance to avoid it was no less than Capablanca, his opponent at San Sebastian. Be it added that we are not in a position to say whether or not, at the stage represented in the diagram, Capa-

blanca saw, or failed to see, Rubinstein's brilliant *dénouement*. His play was the best defence, in any event, but he evidently did not see  $Q-B1$  on the moves immediately preceding the diagram position, when he Castled and when he replied to Rubinstein's  $B \times Kt$  with  $Q$  (from  $K2$ )  $\times B$  instead of  $P \times B$ . At that stage he undoubtedly would have seen  $Kt \times P$ , and would have relied on  $Q-R3$  for its refutation. It remains to be added that thereafter, for the rest of his life, Capablanca never ceased to acknowledge (justly) the greatness of Rubinstein. (For the full game see Illustrative games, p. 221.)

The purpose served by the illustration on page 19 is to show how, given one position, different people respectively see fewer and more possibilities in it. Some see few and short variations; others see long variations and many variations. The different people that we have conjured represent degrees of insight ranging from commonsense to constructive imagination. They also represent stages in the mental process; and in doing so they show that mental progress is not along a simple line from the shorter vision to the longer, because there is development not only in distance of vision but in variety of vision; and besides variety there are degrees of clarity and exactitude; and on the higher levels there are differences due to the idiosyncrasies of the constructive imagination.

It is also interesting to observe, looking back at the processes of thinking that could take place in the appreciation of the position above considered, how they resemble a process of argument about the merits and defects of the move  $Kt \times P$ . The move is suggested, apparently refuted, re-established, refuted again, and finally demonstrated to be a good move. One is reminded of what often takes place in objective discussion, and in the development of ideas, as when, for example, one thinks through the pros and cons of a policy like Free Trade or Protection, starting, say, with what are now regarded as the elementary arguments of the Macaulay Liberals and their opponents, through the restatement of the issues in Imperial and Socialistic terms or periods, and then the representation of the old arguments at a more sophisticated level. At the end much more thinking, and much richer experience, is involved, even if it comes to be accepted that what was desirable in the 1840's is



equally desirable in the 1950's. This movement of argument, as it were in ascending spirals, is typical of the intellectual process and the growth of intelligence in practically every department of thought. What happens there happens also in Chess. Chess is not mysterious ; and it is probably true to say of every department of thought, as of Chess, that there is nothing that cannot be understood by the normal human mind if only it follows the processes. Where the mind normally fails is in the effort of concentration. Greater concentration and clearer grasp distinguish the good Chess player from the bad, the powerful mind from the weaker.

Now nobody, since the days of Socrates, has succeeded in explaining, in causal terms, how the mind apprehends in the first place, or why it fails to apprehend, whether in Chess or in any department of mental activity. The working of the mind is a fact common to intelligent human beings ; and Chess has no exclusive claim on vision ; for an element of vision, or intuition, however slight, is involved in any mental process which is distinguishable from reflex action. But Chess is important because in it the functions of the mind are relatively clear and the mental process is less assisted than in most other activities by positive rules. Within limits set by the material (the pieces, the board, and the matrix of paths available to pieces on the board) the mind is moving free. Its scope is the possibility of the material, limited only by the degree of vision available to the player. Its methods, whatever they are, do not resemble the mechanical use of formula, which is the essence of mathematics.\* Of its training more will be said later. Suffice it here to say that the appearance of simplicity that characterises effective mental action is as deceptive in Chess as it is in any other department of science or art. Imagination traces its own paths and develops idiosyncrasies. The imagination can be moulded through being directed to manifestations of imagination. Through seeing a clever manoeuvre an improving Chess player may find himself quicker at apprehending an analogous idea ; and, more remarkably, quicker at apprehending a different clever possibility in a different setting. Where Chess differs from many other activities (and where it most resembles spontaneous original

\* See note at end of chapter.

thinking about any fresh subject matter) is in that, in Chess, the mind is "influenced" by notions and ideas that it has appreciated, rather than "stocked" with them, or guided by them as one is guided by a signpost.

As to Chess ability, at the present stage of psychology, the nature of imagination remains obscure. Therefore, it is impossible to speak about special faculties for Chess, or even to establish any cognate relationship between skill at Chess and other abilities. Certainly, famous Chess masters have excelled in other, and various activities—from the music of Philidor and the Shakespearian researches of Staunton to the medicine of Tarrasch and the engineering of Vidmar. Nor is there evidence of the transmission of Chess skill, innate or acquired.

That certain groups include a higher proportion of good players than others is, however, easily explicable. If the Chess player is analogous to an orator who masters a language and expresses ideas in it, then those who acquire the Chess language early obtain some advantage. Hence the Chess success of those groups (the Slav and the Semitic for example) in which there is early maturity. The Chess player who can read the board at the earliest stage of his mental development, has obviously a tremendous scope as his mind grows. This, however, is not the whole of the story, for large Chess powers have been known to develop in later life, as many great British masters—notably Burn and Yates—have proved. The fact is that the canons of imagination have still to be discovered and stated. Why some persons are good at Chess, and others bad at it, is more mysterious than anything on the Chess board.

#### NOTE ON CHESS, MATHEMATICS, AND INFERENCE

The Chess process, being intuitive, is not mathematical in the normally accepted sense of that term. The fact that the Chess player is controlled by rules makes him comparable to the user of a language with a grammar rather than to those who explicitly use rules and formulae deductively.\* There are of course, applications of mathematics which involve intuition. There are also

\* Those who group Chess with mathematics and music, as one of the three fields in which infant prodigies are found, forget the numerous unrecorded instances of child genius in the learning of speech, languages, and self-expression in prose and poetry.

stages in advanced mathematics where the operator uses an act of creative imagination in order to restate relationships or to apprehend a different set of terms from that in which he and others have been thinking. The modern generalisation of geometry (in Relativity Theory, in which Emanuel Lasker was an advanced researcher) is a case in point. But this thinking is more than mathematical, and, in any event, is concerned with a different purpose, i.e. with the generalisation—or restate-ment—of notions. If intuitive it is intuitive of the general, not of the particular. When the mathematician wishes to deal with particulars, then he works mechanically. In most practical mathematics, it would be agreed, the operator is carrying out operations with the aid of formulae. He is, as it were, putting something into a machine and turning a handle. The symbols that he uses save him from the effort of intuition, yet give him the result. There is nothing analogous to this in Chess. Aliter, the rule of “the move” in Draughts, by which a player can calculate arithmetically whether he is in a position to have the last—i.e. the winning—move.

It is also worth stating (and the thought is another aspect of the view stated about Chess and mathematics) that in Chess the mind is not determined by any logical inference from the known to the not already known. Given a knowledge of the moves of the pieces I can see a number of paths that they can follow and I am controlled by my knowledge of what they cannot do. But this equipment no more enables me to appreciate their functions in the interplay of forces, than does a knowledge of words enable me to construct or follow an argument along the lines of conduct and consequence. Indeed the modes of inference, as generally understood, being principles of classification (inclusion and exclusion), are inappropriate to any argument involving consequences in time, or any kind of “construction”. Nor is the apprehender of effects on the Chess board concerned to prove a causal relationship, or the inherence of any Chess phenomenon in the matrix of rules. He is not thinking in “Universals”; rather in individual occurrences, specific purposes, or processes too individual to be deducible from the laws of Chess. His thinking, therefore, appears to be as far removed from abstract ideas as is the thinking of a practical engineer

from the elementary laws of motion. He must "see" the operation he contemplates before he conceives it as a logical argument. The fact that experience of the game (knowledge of facts about the pieces—and the habit of using them) facilitates his apprehensions, does not make the Chess player's mental process into a process of calculation. The experience and the knowledge are causal factors in the growth of his mind—not the process of thinking within his mind. Nor does awareness of the powers of the pieces logically lead to the discovery of any specific possibility. Without the rules the move would not be significant. But the rules are only a matrix of moves within which the mind freely selects.

From the cultural standpoint, the difference between Chess thinking and inference is vastly important. In inference, and in the use of symbols generally, a machinery is in use to economise consciousness, or awareness, or mental effort. In Chess the mind undertakes effort—the effort of intuition—not the saving of effort. Strategy sometimes limits the objective, but the effort remains the same. Given only an equipment with the power of the pieces, and an experience of their elementary functions, the mind sets out to find what it can find, and to see clearly all that there is to be seen. Given, further, experience in isolating the significant, the Chess mind is in a position analogous to that of the medical man who makes rapidly a differential diagnosis, and, then, on further synthesis, constructs his final interpretation of the signs and symptoms. Probably the medical man is more conscious of his mental processes than is the Chess player, more dependent on, and conscious of, his knowledge of facts and his memory of other cases. The Chess player is sometimes in a position to be aided by learning and memory. But essentially each Chess act is a fresh application of mind to data. Than which nothing is less mathematical or less inferential.\*

\* The electronic calculator plays Chess as well as it can be played on mnemonic and arithmetical lines: i.e. not very well. One feeds into the machine the symbols (pieces) and the rules as to their scope: also the relative values, and certain important reactions (such as Check). On this basis the machine works out, and assesses, arithmetical possibilities with great accuracy. Obviously, it is limited by its memory—i.e. the rules with which its circuits are fed—but, with the aid of the binary numeral system, quite an enormous equipment can be "invested" in it. What it cannot do is "plan"—and, of course, it can only disregard values under check. All the nutrition in the world cannot enable it to "combine".

## COMMON-SENSE AND THE INTRUSION OF IDEAS

At this stage it will probably occur to the reader who has any Chess experience that a great number of Chess situations are very much easier than the positions that have just been examined, and that a great deal of Chess is more "obvious" than might be thought by a stranger to the game. To take an example: if in the last diagram position Black's King were at R1, instead of Kt1, White would have much less scope; and it may be said that there would be much less to think about. In general, there is almost an infinity of positions in which the opposing forces are much less integrated than in the Rubinstein—Capablanca game, and much has to happen before a long tactical line requires to be worked out. In the easier positions it may be profitless to endeavour to find long and difficult variations. Instead the player requires to perceive the elementary and relevant features, e.g. what (if anything) is attacked and how it is defended, and to make what may be called "logical" or "common-sense" moves (to use plausible terms), developing moves, increases of force in obvious directions, strengthening of weak points, improvement of the pawn position, prevention (by such a move as P—QR4) of pawn advances or of the flanking of a strongly placed piece. And there are many other examples.

Logical play is hard to describe, because the word logical—like the word common-sense—is a variable. Everything is logical within limits (e.g. to prefer the stronger move to the weaker), just as everything is common-sense to somebody. Most Chess players, however, know what is superficial and obvious, and what is new or profound, without being able to frame a definition.

Roughly, most moves that seem to follow each other by way of challenge and answer within a narrow and immediate compass, and in the most familiar way, are obvious because the seeing of them is made possible (not necessitated) by the learning of the moves and very little more, just as a certain amount of understanding goes with knowing the meaning of words. If a player




can play at all, then there is much that he can see ; and that is, for want of a better description, " the obvious ". As he advances, every stage he passes represents a time at which he had difficulty in seeing what is now obvious. This intellectual history is recapitulated in most positions that a player is called upon to " analyse ".

Always there is before the player something " given ", some threat, some possibility of capture, some need for development, which steady contemplation clarifies. The mind looks for, and finds, answers and continuations along the line of thought from the obvious move. Even here, in a small way the mind is

## RESHEVSKY

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

KASHDAN

7.

*Profundity in Chess*

9. . . . P×P.  
 10. P—Q5. Kt—K4.  
 11. Kt—Kt5. O—O.  
 and now 12. B—Kt5 does not win a piece !

Thus :

12. B—Kt5. Q—QKt3.  
 13. B×Kt. R—K1.  
 14. P—Q6. P×P.  
 15. Q×P. Kt—Q6 ch.  
 16. B×Kt. P×B.

with a very strong attack.

White actually played

12. Kt×P. R—Kt1.  
 13. B×RP. B—Kt5.  
 14. B×R. R×B.

and Black proves to have much more play.

creative, analysis in Chess never being mechanical (if indeed it is so anywhere). But the better mind has a wider " given ", entertains more possibilities to work through ; adds more to the " obvious " given, is more evidently synthesising as well as analysing.

We have already seen an example of the difference between the powers of individual players to " construct " or to " select " possibilities that are beyond the range of others.

In the diagram position (No. 7) many players would play

B—K<sub>3</sub> for Black, being interested mainly in the defence of the QP, and of the point QB<sub>2</sub>, with some thought being given to the situation of the Queen after P—K<sub>5</sub>.

Reshevsky, however, playing against Kashdan, made the move 9. . . . P×KP and had seen something very profound.


There followed play in which White can apparently win a piece, but it is eventually recaptured with advantage.

Reshevsky's opponent Kashdan (one of the strongest of the modern masters) saw the possibilities early enough to refrain from the adventure, but had by that time slightly unbalanced the game in his opponent's favour. He won a pawn and the exchange, but Black was able to extract more from the game.

From a later stage in the game we find Kashdan refraining from an attack on the King's Pawn for a clever reason (No. 8).

### RESHEVSKY

(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
KASHDAN

8.

*Clever Perception*

If

- |                         |                       |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| 16. Kt—B <sub>3</sub> . | R—K <sub>1</sub> .    |
| 17. Kt×P.               | Kt—B <sub>6</sub> ch. |
| 18. P×Kt.               | B×P.                  |

wins.

If

- |                         |                    |
|-------------------------|--------------------|
| 16. P—K <sub>R</sub> 3. | B—B <sub>6</sub> ! |
|-------------------------|--------------------|

From the standpoint of combative, or combinative, Chess the whole game is worthy of study (see Illustrative Games, p. 229).

The player at the level of the obvious, however, sees much without seeing ideas of this class, and the player of common-sense Chess avoids complexities in which he is likely to be out of his depth.


At an average level most players of any skill at all know when ordinary obvious play is adequate for the maintenance of control. If, he reflects, no tempo has been lost, it is unlikely that the opponent can launch any decisive attack at any point. If one is declining a King's gambit, for example :

- |            |       |
|------------|-------|
| 1. P—K4.   | P—K4. |
| 2. P—KB4.  | B—B4. |
| 3. Kt—KB3. | P—Q3. |
| 4. P—QB3.  |       |

one is, at Move 4, in a position that can be very deeply analysed. The same problem can almost be solved by the knowledge or feeling that, since Kt—KB3 or Kt—QB3 does not lose tempo, either of these is playable.

## TARRASCH

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

LASKER

9.

*Need for Effort*

Black to Win

The win is not easy.

37. . . . B—K3 ch.

38. K—B8. B×B ch.

39. K×B. B×P.

40. P—R4

and Black will eventually win with Pawns against Bishop.

Lasker played :

37. . . . KB×B.

38. B×B. K×B.

39. K×B. P—R4.

40. P—R4. K—Kt5.

41. K—Kt6!. K×P.

42. K—B5. K—Kt6.

43. K—K4. K—B7.

44. K—Q5. K—K6.

45. K×P. K—Q6.

46. K×P. K—B7.

47. K×P. K×P.


drawn.

Emanuel Lasker, one of the greatest players who ever lived (if not the greatest) endeavoured to reduce most of Chess to common-sense. That was an over-simplification, as was later the attempt of Nimzovitch (and possibly Capablanca) to reduce most of Chess to technique. All these great players seem to have overlooked, in their theorising, the fact that their own logic,

their own common-sense, their own technique, flowed from—not preceded—their own remarkable vision.

Common-sense is manifest whenever a player chooses an easy way of preserving an advantage rather than a difficult way. When depths require probing the Laskers of the world probe them to the utmost. Good players do, however, relax, on occasion—often at the wrong time. Thus Lasker himself (lazy at times like many other great players) missed a win against Tarrasch by assuming that common-sense was adequate where a refinement of thought was necessary (No. 9).

Another endgame analysis by Lasker (No. 10) shows in contrast,



10.

*Study by Lasker*

White Wins

1. K—Kt7. R—QKt7 ch.
2. K—R7. R—QB7.
3. R—R5 ch. K—R5.
4. K—Kt7. R—QKt7 ch.
5. K—R6. R—QB7.
6. R—R4 ch. K—R6.
7. K—Kt6. R—QKt7 ch.
8. K—R5. R—QB7.
9. R—R3 ch. K—R7.
10. R×P! wins.

Move 7 is Zugzwang.

If

7. . . . K—Kt6.

8. K—Kt7.

If

7. . . . K—R7.


8. R×P.

that great master's fertility in ideas beyond the range of the normal. And here (No. 11) is a position at the end of a game by Capablanca (for the text of which see *Illustrative Games*) in which Black's counter chances (of perpetual check) require to be accurately worked out, and not taken for granted.

The reader will realise that there are almost infinite similar occasions when the effort of analysis, including imaginative construction, cannot be avoided. Who then, of Chess players, would be content to rely, without some mental effort, on making the move which at first sight seems safe and right according to the criteria of common-sense? If they ever rely on any imperfect

## ALEKHINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

CAPABLANCA

11.

*Failure of Perspicacity*

36. R(Kt4) × KtP.

Q × P ch.

37. K—B1. Q—B8 ch.

38. K—B2. Q—Q7 ch.

draws by perpetual check.  
Capablanca had apparently  
assumed there was nothing  
better. But 38. K—K2 wins.

Thus :

38. K—K2. Q × P ch.

39. K—B3. Q—Kt6 ch.

40. K—B2.

If then :

40. . . . Q—Kt3 ch.

41. K—B1 wins.

If :

40. . . . Q—Kt7 ch.

41. K—Kt1 wins.

apprehension, it is on a judgment (the peculiar common-sense of good players) which will be considered later. Suffice it here to say that judgment is anything but unsophisticated, and is always inseparable from mental effort.

That common-sense—even in a sophisticated Chess sense of the word—can be both adequate and inadequate is well illustrated in the following position (p. 32) reached in a game played in the 1920's between Vajda (a Hungarian master, and then police chief of Hungary) and that considerable expert Sir George Thomas.

Vajda played P—QB4, a good move—but as we shall see, not meritorious in the important subjective sense.

Thomas promptly seized the advancing pawn. Vajda arrested the capturing piece and obtained, momentarily, a free game. So far common-sense ; good enough to draw.


But had Vajda, instead of recapturing, played Kt—B5, he would have won at least the exchange ; and the move P—QB4 would have been a manifestation of real vision instead of sound judgment.

What Vajda missed was an "idea". Ideas intrude at all stages of the game. Here is one example, out of thousands,



VAJDA

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

THOMAS

12.

*Inadequacy of Common Sense*

- |                       |                       |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. . . .              | P—QB <sub>4</sub> .   |
| 2. P×P.               | Q×P?.                 |
| Best is :             |                       |
| 2. . . .              | Kt—B <sub>5</sub> !   |
| 3. R—K <sub>1</sub> . | Kt—K <sub>7</sub> ch. |
| wins.                 |                       |

where the early opening is (in the correct sense) speculatively played.

- |                         |                      |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. P—K <sub>4</sub> .   | P—K <sub>4</sub> .   |
| 2. Kt—KB <sub>3</sub> . | Kt—QB <sub>3</sub> . |
| 3. P—Q <sub>4</sub> .   | P×P.                 |
| 4. B—B <sub>4</sub> .   | Kt—B <sub>3</sub> .  |
| 5. O—O.                 | Kt×P.                |
| 6. R—K <sub>1</sub> .   | P—Q <sub>4</sub> .   |
| 7. B×P.                 | Q×B.                 |
| 8. Kt—B <sub>3</sub> .  |                      |

An effort of imagination was required on the part of the first player (reputedly Canal) who chose that particular way of achieving a rapid (though not decisive) attack. A player at the level of common-sense would not have seen the unusual reason why 5. O—O is a sound move.

This particular example illustrates an aspect of the thought process that takes place, or fails to take place, when a player studies his position. The mind follows logical (in Chess this means "familiar") lines (threat, defence, etc.) within its field of relevance. But the extent and depth of the field of relevance

depends upon the perspicacity of the player, and the perspicuity of the position from the standpoint of average ability.

Some positions, we shall see, are difficult and some are easy ; but the important variable is the subjective one (the perspicacity). At move 5, in the short variation just given, many players would never bring the move Kt—QB<sub>3</sub> into their field of awareness—into their conception of what was likely to happen ; it seems to be beyond common-sense. Yet to the player in whose field of vision this possibility is a feature, the play leading up to it is normal and common-sensical.


Briefly, the primary task of the Chess player is to apprehend adequately the whole matrix of relevant possibilities. The same mental act is required to reveal possibilities and to exclude impossibilities. It is selective from the beginning because it does not consider those moves which, if considered, would be evidently bad or pointless. It focuses what is of importance and reveals more or less clearly the consequences that are probable. And as the analysis proceeds, from move to move, the mind is always dismissing from, or excluding from, the field of attention all occurrences that are improbable, and, in the Chess sense, impossible. It is as if a light were thrown on the board illuminating everything significant and leaving in shadow everything unimportant. That light shines along vistas of consequences, always revealing what matters. As the light concentrates from moment to moment, some things become clearer, and some apparent certainties become disrupted. The field changes a little, because the mind is moving from the board at one moment, to the board at the next moment, and so forward ; but it is always the case that there is a concentration on the relevant and an exclusion of the irrelevant.

Concentration is the application of the mind, with the aid of will-power, to a datum. That concentration is at once the condition of revelation and the reason why different minds reveal variously more or less.

In Chess, at least as clearly as in any other mental activity, it is brought home to the psychologist that awareness is not a simple and isolable mental process. The end product is the open plain of the clearly seen. But the attainment of that grasp of the complete and continuous is as much the product of effort,

training, experience and the variables of natural equipment, as is the capacity of a man to recognise in the distance a hill or a river, or to discriminate these things in a crowded foreground.

In particular any departure from the normal configuration, any feature of the geometry of the piece-movements sufficiently individual to escape expectation, and therefore observation, is called an "idea". Ideas inhabit the Chessboard, to be seen or missed, as animals inhabit the forest. One fails to see them because one is looking at the trees, or because the play of light on other objects constitutes a camouflage. But once the hunter has seen his quarry, then, even if he turns away his eyes, he will not lose it ; and at his next glance the thing will be so obviously present that he will wonder how it ever escaped his awareness.



13.

White to Mate in Three Moves  
Key : Q—Q1.

Problem by T. and J. Warton.

The actual experience of hunting for ideas and finding them is familiar to all good players, and is to all of them in the nature of a recurring miracle. There is no reason why they should succeed in finding the idea except the unexplained capacity of the light waves of the mind to reveal significant relationships in any subject matter.

Typical is the solving of a problem in the diagram position (No. 13). White is called upon to mate in three moves. As he studies the position the reader will see that a rapid mating

process is made virtually impossible by the fact that the Knight's check takes place on a square that interferes with the protection of the Rook's Pawn. So the King escapes. And if the idea occurs to play  $R \times P$ , followed by  $B-Kt5$ , allowing  $Kt-B6$  mate, or, if  $P \times B$ ,  $R-R7$  mate, an extra effort of attention will reveal a reply to this ( $P-Q6$ ) after which White will not be able to proceed with  $B-Kt5$  because  $P \times Q$  will unpin the Knight and so prevent the mate by  $Kt-B6$ .

Again if the Queen attempts to arrive at  $K8$  in order to mate, the Knight at  $g4$  will be unpinned ; or if the Knight from  $e4$  attempts a process to  $g7$ , the Knight from  $h1$  is released and can interfere.

On the other hand, attention will reveal that Black also is lacking in moves if the position be left unaltered. Thus a Bishop move would allow  $Kt-B6$  followed by  $Q \times Kt$ .  $P \times RP$  would allow  $B-Kt5$ .  $Kt$  moves allow  $Kt-Kt3$  mate ; so that, of Black's pieces, only the centre Pawn can move.

Now if the attempting solver has the kind of mind that can find a new significant feature in this data, he will arrive at a solution. He will not do this deductively. The fact that the Queen seems to be the only piece that can safely be experimented with is insufficient to guide the mind to the following :

- |             |          |
|-------------|----------|
| 1. $Q-Q1$ . | $P-Q6$ . |
| 2. $Q-R4$ , |          |


threatening mate on  $K8$ , and now if 2. . . .  $Kt-B3$  to prevent this mate, the Queen (now that the Pawn has moved from  $d4$  and the Knight from  $g4$ ) will, if the White Knight moves, be guarding the Pawn at  $h4$  ; so that  $Kt \times Kt$  gives mate. And other lines of play by Black allow easier mates, as shown above.

The point of the illustration is the apprehension of an idea (involving the replacing of the Queen and the moving of three other pieces). Once the idea is seen, then it seems normal and logical, and easy to see again. Before it is seen, there is no available process of inference that can help the mind to it mechanically ; and there are very many players of some degree of skill and experience who would never succeed in solving such a problem.

This experience is typical of the game of Chess (as well as of

problem-solving) and is also familiar (in more limited scope) to the solvers of jigsaw puzzles, crossword puzzles, and the like. In each case the beam of the mind is extending or intensifying itself so as to bring some feature of the datum into a relevance which was not apparent before.

When the mind is not revealing as effectively as is required by the situation, then one is omitting to take into account appearances from a field of apparent irrelevancy. The unexpected emerges from the dark ; yet it was always there. A move excluded or dismissed (as bad or impossible) turns out to be good or possible. A process thought to be good turns out to be refuted, or a move occurs of which the ordinary person says " this could not have been expected ". Such a move may not lie very far ahead, because clarity and imagination are qualitative as well as quantitative. (There is a richness as well as distance in the Chess perspective.) But whatever it be that is omitted, the result will be the surprise move, or the surprise possibility becoming revealed or realised too late for its recognition to be useful.



14.

*An Idea that Assists  
Development*

13. KKt—K5. Kt×Kt.

14. Kt×Kt. Q—B2.

and Black appears to have  
forced 15. Q—B3.

Instead White plays :

15. Kt—B6.

There follows :

15. . . . B×P ch.

16. K×B. P×Kt.

White has a good attack.

An infinite number of examples of this could be extracted from Chess literature ; and many will be considered in the following pages. Suffice it for the moment to refer to some pieces of play




in which ideas have been essential for the proper interpretation and treatment of a position.

Diagram 14 shows how an idea made possible the playing of a strong developing move, against which there was apparently available a good line of play.

Also quite pointed is the play accompanying the next diagram (No. 15). Looking at it the reader may recognise that the move 21. . . . B—K7 available to Black is the kind of move of which the seeing determines play and the result of play. Had White seen it early enough he would not have played P—QKt4. It may be that after that he could not save the game ; but he could have made it last longer had he seen B—K7 even later. Then he would have interposed the Queen, not the Knight, and Black would have won the endgame, but only by very careful play.

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15.

*Play Involving an Idea*


- |             |          |
|-------------|----------|
| 14. . . .   | O—O—O.   |
| 15. P—QKt4. | B—Kt4.   |
| 16. KR—Q1.  | R×R.     |
| 17. R×R.    | R—Q1.    |
| 18. R×R ch. | Q×R.     |
| 19. Kt×P.   | Q—Q8 ch. |
| 20. Kt—K1.  | Kt×Kt.   |
| 21. P×Kt.   | B—K7.    |
| wins.       |          |

A companion example is taken from another game by the same player where an unexpected Bishop move quickly terminates the game (diagram 16).

In these examples the Bishop intrudes, as it were, from an irrelevant square to a square which suddenly springs into relevance. In other instances, other pieces—other ideas—intrude. Some examples will be seen in the paragraph on Error. Sometimes the intrusion takes the form of a demonstration on the side

of the board that is not being considered. Sometimes it takes the form of a disregard of the apparent values of particular

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(WHITE)

16.

*A Remarkable Finish*

White Wins

Black has just played R—K1.

There followed :

1. Q—B6 ch. K—Kt1.

2. R×R ch. R×R.

3. B—B8! wins.

If 1. . . . K—R3.

2. Kt—K7. Q—K6 (or B—B1).


3. R—K5 with the threat of

4. R—R5 ch.! forces a win.

pieces. A neat example of both features is the finish of a game by Tartakower against Wood at a Hastings Tournament (diagram 17).

WOOD

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TARTAKOWER

17.

*Unexpected Demonstration*

Black to Move

25. . . . B—Kt3.  
(exchanges would leave White with some control.)


26. B×KtP!. K×B.

27. Q—Kt5 ch. K—B1.

28. Q—B6! wins.

In these instances, be it observed, the player who fails to see the possibility in question is not failing to see an isolated move. There is hardly such a thing in Chess as an isolated move. He is failing to see a manoeuvre, a move with consequences, which manoeuvre may in turn be the consequence of something that has gone before and could only be avoided by a player of fine perception. Or it may be an immediate threat which can be avoided if the player who has to meet it is possessed of an element of imagination. In all these cases there are, of course, degrees of difficulty to be distinguished, and it is not possible to say that the difficulty is a function of distance. Distance certainly lends difficulty. But always the primary function of difficulty is the unpreparedness of the mind for the unexpected. Difficulty is enhanced when the previous play has been based on logical expectations, and when there are possibilities in the position for attack on fairly logical lines. Then a slight deviation is particularly unexpected. The following position is as good an example as any (diagram 18).

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18.

*Short and Difficult*

White to Play

- |               |          |
|---------------|----------|
| 1. P × P.     | Q × P.   |
| 2. Q—Kt8 ch.! | K—K2.    |
| (If:          |          |
| 2. . . .      | K × Q.   |
| 3. Kt—Kt6!.)  |          |
| 3. Q × P ch.  | K—Q1.    |
| 4. Kt—Kt6.    | Q × KtP. |
| 5. R—Q1 ch.   | B—Q2.    |
| 6. Q × R ch.  | resigns. |

Move 2 is one of very few moves known to the Author which merits an exclamation mark, although the main variation is only 2 moves deep.


Here the complex of Queen's sacrifice and unusual mating threat would not be anticipated by the vast majority of players because they would be concentrating on the dangers of the direct attack on points like KB7. The player who played Q × KP instead of

R×KP was quite satisfied that White could not win by direct attack on KB7 (e.g. with B×P or Kt—Kt6 ch.) and, having resolved that difficulty, adopted the logical move—made more plausible by the fact that it amounted to a trap, an invitation to unsound sacrifice. That it was not the logical move could only be realised by someone who apprehended White's clever idea.

Again, it must have seemed to the great master, Tartakower, that he was playing logically when, in the course of a Caro Kann, he permitted himself an excursion as far as the diagram position (No. 19), at which, to logical reasoning, it would appear that Black had equalised, the compromise on the King's file not being serious. What Tartakower had probably analysed was the play consequential on R—K1, P—KB4, P—KB3, whereby White regains the piece but leaves Black free. What he had not anticipated was a revolution which made the logic of the King's file irrelevant. Reti placed his Queen on Q8 and the game was over.

## TARTAKOWER

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(WHITE)

RETI


19.

*Unanticipated Aggression*

Black has just played Kt×Kt.  
 White replies Q—Q8 ch!  
 forcing mate (... K×Q;  
 B—Kt5, d. ch., etc.).

Only a very fine Chess apprehension (and it had to be fine indeed to exceed the fineness of Tartakower's vision) could enable a player to realise how inadequate was the apparent logic of the position.

These examples reveal the relative inutility of the term logical from the standpoint of the dynamics of the Chess mind. Logic without adequate intuition is the negation of perspicacity : and is very rarely useful. Logic of an elementary type, however, is present whenever a player does in two moves what another might do in three. Capablanca, at the 27th game against Alekhine (see Illustrative Games) played 32. R—Kt4, 33. R×KP, not R×KP, R—K4, R—Kt4. But in an endgame it may not be good to do in two what can be done in three, or in one what can be done in two. Here is a famous illustration of that point by Reti (diagram 20).



20.

*Endgame by Reti*

White Wins

Surprisingly, there is only one method (revealed on Move 2).

1. R—K2 (or 3). P—K5.
2. R—K1!. K—K4.
3. K—K7! and now Black must yield ingress to the White King.


The next diagram shows a purposive loss of move in the middle game (diagram 21).

As to the opening, there time is to be gained whenever possible. Nevertheless, it is not necessarily good to exchange in order to gain a move (e.g. using a piece that has moved once to capture one that has moved more than once) : nor is it wise to wait for such a move as B—Q3 if you wish to play P×BP, or to wait for P—KR3 if you wish to move your Bishop from Kt5 (diagram 22). In fine, an adequate logic follows vision, not precedes it. Any good move can be explained after the event in terms of “this could not be done, therefore” : “this was threatened, there-



## ALEXANDER


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GROB

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21.

*Purposive Loss of Move*

White plays :

10. Q—R4. B—Kt3.

11. Q—B2.

This is apparently the loss of a move. But White was anxious to limit Black's King's Bishop to one diagonal only, and achieved this by move 10.

22.

*Play Irrespective of Tempo*

Black does not wait for White's P—KR3, but plays :

12. . . . B—R4.

The game proceeded.

13. QR—Q1. QR—K1.

14. P—QR4. P×QP.

15. P×QP. B—Kt3.

16. B—B2. QKt—Kt5.

and White must lose at least a Pawn.


fore", etc., etc. But Chess players do not think this way, just as people do not argue in syllogisms. The idea, whether in Chess or outside, has to be apprehended (dimly or clearly) before it can be put into logical form. The logical form can at best be useful as a neat framework for the arrangements of thoughts that have already been appreciated. For the rest, elementary logic,

consisting of a few general principles (Steinitz and Lasker stated them as principles of cause and effect), is rather less useful in Chess than are the rules of rhetoric to an orator.

Before proceeding further, let it be said that, just as common-sense and elementary logic are inadequate to a game characterised by the intrusion of unpredictables, so a capacity for the apprehension of occasional cleverness is inadequate if the possessor of it allows himself to be obsessed by the cleverness to the exclusion of common-sense or general strategy. If he does that, then his victories can often be shown to be accidental, witty, debating successes rather than triumphs of mind.

The second main factor in the Chess task (and the reason why the mind should not aim at too much) consists in the objective obscurity of some positions. Some positions are, in their nature, translucent. The mind of the good player can exhaust the possibilities. The task may be very hard, but it can be done. There is also a kind of translucence where the task is easy—for example the counting of Pawn moves in endgame play. And there is a kind of translucence in which the mind is assisted by the projection of the future position which, without much analysis, can be seen as likely to take place. Thus the defender in the diagram position (No. 23) knows that he is safe because he knows that his opponent's best expectation is to be left with

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(WHITE)

23.

*Projection of Final Position*

- |            |           |
|------------|-----------|
| 1. . . .   | R × P.    |
| 2. R × P.  | R—R8 ch.  |
| 3. R—B1.   | R × R ch. |
| 4. K × R.  | K—Kt5.    |
| 5. K—Kt1.  | K—B5.     |
| 6. K—B1.   | P—R5.     |
| 7. K—Kt1.  | K—Q6.     |
| 8. K—B1.   | K—K7.     |
| 9. K—Kt1.  | K—Q8.     |
| 10. K—R1.  | P—R6.     |
| 11. K—Kt1! | draws.    |

King, Rook, Rook's Pawn and Knight's Pawn, against King, Rook and advanced Knight's Pawn. He knows that that end-game is drawn (though this is not obvious) and he therefore lets the game develop that way. In this example vision is being economised by the selection (with the aid of imagination) of a solution that renders irrelevant the remainder of the matrix of possibilities.


Other positions are opaque. Never completely opaque, because there is no position in which there are no possibilities. But there are positions in which either decisive prospects are remote, or in which there is such a glut of probabilities that the mind can hardly disentangle them. Most of the opaque positions of the former type are, paradoxically, very easy—certainly much easier than many translucent positions. At Move 1, for example, the mind is aware that it has no task that is worth undertaking ; and it frequently happens in games that situations develop in which there is nothing to be done but logical development. The difficult opaque position is the position that would be translucent if the mind were capable of the effort. Imagine a position in the early middle game when the four Queens' and Queens' Bishops' Pawns are crowded together, and guarded by Pawns and minor pieces, some of them also under attack. It may well be that any capture can be replied to in three or four different ways and each of these ways leads to sub-variations, all of importance. In the absence of a striking line that imagination can isolate, then to work out the consequences so as to be sure of a satisfactory position in all variations amounts to a formidable undertaking. Some players undertake the task. Others will content themselves with a developing move, or a safe-appearing move. Similar economy of thought is practical when a player declines a gambit or sacrifice, or when, for example, one retreats the Knight from Q4 to QKt3 in the Sicilian before the opponent's Kt—Kt5 is really threatened. Frequently it is tempting to make what seems a developing move, leaving it to the opponent to initiate the skirmish and the complications : and frequently the player who does this is wrong, because the opponent's attack, when it comes, is stronger than was anticipated.

Thus Bogoljubow, playing against Botwinnik, contented himself with P—QKt3 (see diagram 24) and Botwinnik's immediate

P—Q4 created such dangerous complications that the player of the white pieces felt compelled to develop his Bishop, not at QKt2 but at K3.

BOTWINNIK

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


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BOGOLJUBOW

BOTWINNIK

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BOGOLJUBOW

24.

*Forced Change of Plan*

White plays :

9. P—QKt3, having failed to work out the consequences of Black's reply :

9. . . . P—Q4, which threatens to win a Pawn.

If 10. Q—K2, Black's Kt—QB3 initiates an attack.

There followed :

10. B—K3. Kt—K5, with the initiative.

25.

*Miscalculation*

Having played, as Alekhine puts it, "with the resignation of a sheep under the butcher's knife", White now comes to life and plays 20. R—Q7. This is bad, however.

White had anticipated :

20. . . . B—Kt4.

21. R×B. B×R.

22. Kt—Q3.

but when Black plays :

20. . . . B—Kt4 he realises that after :

21. R×B. B×R.

22. Kt—Q3. Q—R8.

wins (if Q—K1, B—Kt7).

He must therefore play :

21. QR—Q1.

There follows :


21. . . . B—B3.

22. R×QRP QR—Q1.

and Black occupies the Q. file, winning quickly.

The above is an example of failure to tackle a complex line of thought early enough. From a later stage in the same game we see a similar failure (diagram 25). Again White did not see (or look) far enough. Probably what he missed was not the obvious, but the implications of a quite clever line of defence on which he had relied.

Here is another example of how easily a player can drift into a position where problems will soon present themselves that are well nigh insoluble. Up to the diagram position White's play has seemed logical. Yet see what a problem presents itself (diagram 26).



26.

### *Middle Game Problem*

Among other things, Black threatens (that means is able unless prevented) to free his game with B—Kt5, followed by B×Kt and P—K4.

If White attempts to prevent this with 1. P—KR3, Black can play P—QKt3.

If then :

- |           |       |
|-----------|-------|
| 2. O—O.   | P×P.  |
| 3. KtP×P. | Kt×P. |
| 4. P×Kt.  | P—Q5. |
- with freedom.


If 2. Q—B2, Black can play 2. . . . P—QR4, and in answer to P—QR3 exchanges RP for KtP, then Rooks, leaving himself with an open file.

This is a good example of the need in Chess to search the field of possibility with an eye capable of apprehending many groupings of the pieces. This search for consequences must be more than "consequential". Experience enables most players to see the "necessary" lines of play and the lines involving checks and captures. But Chess is not a series of checks or other warning flashes. Much Chess is "quiet". To anticipate the not apparently violent or the not apparently forced is an effort of application and imagination. Without these good Chess cannot be played. When a Chess player enters into a line of play in which the analysis includes "ideas" and the play is based on the availability, if necessary, of possibilities whose apprehension is in



SPIELMANN

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


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MARSHALL

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MARSHALL

27.

*Inadequacy of General Thinking*

Black, an experienced attacking player, decides to invite his dangerous opponent to launch, on the King's side, an attack which Black hopes to defeat, remaining thereafter with a Queen's side advantage.

- |               |           |
|---------------|-----------|
| 15. . . .     | B × Kt.   |
| 16. BP × B.   | B — Kt5.  |
| 17. R — B4.   | Q — Q2.   |
| 18. QR — KB1. | R — K2.   |
| 19. P — Kt4.  | B — K3.   |
| 20. KR — B2.  | B — Kt5.  |
| 21. R — B4.   | B — K3.   |
| 22. Q — B2.   | Kt — R2.  |
| 23. Q — B3.   | Kt — Kt4. |
| 24. Q — R5.   | P — QKt3. |
| 25. R — R4.   | Q — B1.   |
| 26. Kt — K2.  | P — R4.   |

And now White's attack proves surprisingly good (see next diagram).

28.

- |             |           |
|-------------|-----------|
| 27. R — B6! | Q — B1    |
|             | (forced). |

If now

- |                     |             |
|---------------------|-------------|
| 28. . . .           | P × R.      |
| 29. P × P.          | R — B2.     |
| (not                |             |
| 29. . . .           | R — K1.     |
| 30. Kt — Kt6).      |             |
| 30. Kt × B.         | P × Kt.     |
| (not                |             |
| 30. . . .           | Kt × Kt.    |
| 31. Q — B5.         | Kt — Kt4.   |
| 32. R — Kt4, etc.). |             |
| 31. Q — Kt6 ch.     | R — Kt2.    |
| 32. Q × RP.         | Kt — B6 ch. |
| 33. P × Kt.         | R × P ch.   |
| 34. K — B2.         | Q × Q.      |
| 35. R × Q.          | R — Kt4.    |
| 36. P — B4.         | R — B4      |
|                     | (best).     |


37. B × R. P × B.  
and White has a winning endgame.

And there are other variations. What Black played was: 28. . . . P × P.  
29. Kt — Kt6, P × Kt (best). 30. R × Q ch., and eventually won.

the nature of an idea, then he is said to be "combining" or playing combinatively. The mere perception of a conventional sacrifice like  $B \times RP$  ch. does not justify the use of the term combination. The essence of combination is an element of constructive originality. There are many examples in this book. Worthy of study as any are diagrams 27, 28 and 29. The first two are from a game between two Princes of Combinative Chess, Marshall and Spielmann. The third is a fine recent performance by Szabo against one of the strongest of the Russian Grandmasters. The essence of these examples is the mastery of the situation obtained by the player who grasps more clearly the ideas latent in the position (diagrams 27, 28, 29).

SZABO

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(WHITE)

RAGOZIN

29.

*Combinative Play*

White has played  $Kt-Kt3$ . Black now allows White to develop a formidable Q-side attack because he sees a possibility on the other wing while White is involved.

19. . . . .  $Q-Q4$ .
20.  $Kt-B5$ .  $R-B3$ .
21.  $P-QR4$ .  $QR-Q1$ .
22.  $Q-Kt5$ .  $Kt-K1$ .
23.  $P-R5$ .  $Kt-Q3$ .
24.  $Q-Kt4$ .  $Kt(Kt)-B5$ .
25.  $Kt \times KtP$ .  $R-Ktr$ .
26.  $P-R6$ .  $P-R4$ .
27.  $Q-R4$ .  $Kt-B4$ .
28.  $B-R3$ .  $Kt-R5$ .
29.  $B-Q6$ .  $R \times B$ .
30.  $Q \times Kt$ .  $Q-KKt4$ .
31.  $P-Kt3$ .  $Kt-B6$  ch.
32.  $K-Kt2$ .  $Kt-R5$  ch.
33.  $K-B1$ .  $R-B3$ .
34.  $P \times Kt$ .  $Q \times KP$ .

with an easy win.

# CHAPTER III

## IMAGINATION: ITS USE AND ABUSE

### INVENTION AND DISCOVERY


If imagination is the capacity of the mind for construction and clarity (einbildungskraft) then it is of the essence of Chess, is essential to vision or intuition. But the word is normally used by average persons and average players to describe a capacity for the apprehension of the not-obvious, of the particularly not-obvious, of the "clever".

Evidently this special cleverness is of the greatest importance in Chess, but it can also be dangerous to its possessor.

An idea may be interesting yet is not to be entertained as a possibility. It may occur in a context which is only one variation: and play allowing that variation may be bad, because the earlier moves may be exploited by the opponent in a different way.

ALEXANDER

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(WHITE)

GROB

30.

*Inadequacy of Wit in Chess*

If:

- 22. . . . P—B4.
- 23. B×P. Q—K4.
- (attacking two pieces)
- 24. B×QP! wins.

If:

- 23. . . . B×P ch.
- 24. K×B. Q—K4 ch.
- 25. Q—Kt3! wins.

Therefore:


- 22. . . . Q—K4.
- 23. P—KKt3. P—B4.
- 24. B—Kt6. B—K7!.
- 25. Q—Q2., and Black has still got a bad game.

Moreover, if a player has allowed his position to deteriorate in the pursuit of unsound attack, then he will usually find that the "cleverness" that is available in his favour can be refuted by a counter—cleverness, just as a witticism in the course of an unsound argument can usually be refuted by a more effective *jeu d'esprit* (diagram 30).

As an example of unsound, clever Chess, here is an excursion by Yates against Thomas, an uncontrolled effort of fancy, which led to nothing (diagram 31).

THOMAS

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(WHITE)

YATES

31.

*Fancy, not Imagination*


24. Kt—B3. R×Kt.  
 25. R×KtP. P×R.  
 26. Q—K4. Q—Q4.  
 27. Q×KtP. B—Kt2.  
 (If 27. . . . Kt—Kt2.  
 28. P—R5!).  
 28. B—Q4. Q—KB4.  
 29. B×B ch. K—Kt1.  
 And now 30. Q—R6 is unplayable because :  
 30. . . . Q—B5 ch.  
 31. Q×Q. R×Q.  
 32. B—R6 ch. and the Rook is defended.  
 There follows :  
 30. Q—Kt2. Kt—B5.  
 31. Q—B1. Q—Q6.  
 resigns.

That the perpetrator of this was capable of the highest imaginative flights is shown by his game against Takacs in the illustrative games, by his play against Reti from the diagram position on p. 14, and by many achievements from among which diagrams 32 and 33 are chosen haphazard. Better (albeit unsound) efforts than diagram 31 reveals are sometimes called "brilliant"; and the word "brilliant" is used, perhaps wrongly, by Chess players as an adjective which does not necessarily connote soundness or fulness of analytic substance.

On page 52 are two positions from a game between Reti and Lasker—in which the former (by no means an unimaginative

YATES

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


(WHITE)

MENCHIK

MICHELL

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(WHITE)

YATES

32.

*Imagination*

21. . . . P—Kt4!.

22. P×P. Q—Kt3!.

23. P—B4.

(If 23. P×R, Black plays :

23. . . . R—KKt1.

24. K—B1. Kt×P ch.

25. K—K1. Kt×B

mate.)

23. . . . P×P e.p.

with an excellent attack.

33.

*Imagination*

25. P—B4! allowing

25. . . . Kt×P.

There followed :

26. Kt—R5 ch!.

K—R2.

(26. . . . P×Kt

would be followed by an  
overwhelming attack com-  
mencing with Q—Kt3 ch.)

27. B×Kt. R×B.

28. R×B. Q×R.

29. Kt—B6 ch. K—Kt2.

30. Kt×R. Q—Q2.

31. Q×QP ch.,  
winning easily.


player) showed lack of imagination and the latter (the advocate of logic) showed excess of imagination or insufficient control of it—brilliance without soundness.



In the first diagram (No. 34) Reti is faced with some very difficult problems (see notes to the game in the Illustrative Games) but has available a Pawn sacrifice in order to save himself, yet fails to apprehend the resource.

LASKER

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

RETI

34.

*Caution*

21. Kt—Q3 was played. But White can obtain more play with :

21. P—K4. Q—Kt2.  
and

22. Kt—K2 (not R—K1).

If 22. . . . Q×P.

23. Q×Q. Kt×Q.

24. Kt—Kt6.

If :

22. . . . Kt×P.

23. Kt—Kt3. P—B4.


24. Kt×Kt. with chances.

The second diagram (No. 35) (taken from a later stage of the same game) shows Lasker in a dominant position. The move he makes, P—K4, is desirable if it is possible (the danger is Q—B5), but the game can be won without it. Lasker played P—K4 because he had in mind an elegant combination to regain the Pawn in such a way as to facilitate the winning process considerably. He must have taken it for granted, while analysing, that when he checked at his K7 the White King would move to B1 (as it did). Had Reti, however, moved his King to R1 (which seems the wrong square) Lasker's combination would not have been playable, and his loss of tempo (constituted by P—K4 and the Knight moves) would have enabled his opponent to draw.

Diagram 36 shows the occasion on which Lasker missed a very rich combinative line of play—in his unhappy tenth game against Capablanca. The possibility constitutes one of the best of the unheard melodies of Chess.

LASKER

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


(WHITE)

RETI

CAPABLANCA

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

LASKER

35.

*Cleverness*

27. . . . P—K4!?.  
 28. Q—B5. Kt—K7 ch.  
 29. K—B1. Kt—Q5.  
 30. Q×KP. Kt×P.  
 31. Kt—Kt6. Kt—Q7 ch.  
 32. K—Kt1. Kt—B5.  
 with winning advantage.  
 But, had White played :  
 29. K—R1, the combination  
 would have been ineffective.

36.

*Unheard Melody*

Lasker played 17. B×Kt(Q5)  
 and was left with slight in-  
 feriority. Had he played  
 B×Kt(B6) he would have  
 gained superiority. Thus :  
 17. B×Kt(B6). B×Kt.

(If :

17. . . . Kt×Kt.  
 18. Kt—Kt6!, etc.).  
 18. B×Kt(Q5).

- P×B.  
 19. Kt—Kt4. B—Kt4.  
 20. P—B4. B×P.  
 21. Q—B5.

with an attack (see notes to  
 the game, p. 247).

The line of play suggested we owe to the genius of a great  
 imaginative player, Breyer, one of whose best performances  
 will be found among the illustrative games. Bogoljubow sub-


sequently showed that the resultant position is not so bad for the second player as Breyer thought. Nevertheless, White holds the advantage. Had Lasker seen this line the course of Chess history might have been altered.

Of the champions who have succeeded Lasker, two at least have been of the greatest imaginative capacity as well as clear and profound in their perceptions.

The difference between their imaginative efforts is, however, striking. Capablanca's imagination usually manifested itself in the surprising culmination of a straight-forward, sound, line of play. In point are his game against Spielman (Illustrative Games) and the following diagram in which we see the end of a well-fought game defended by that excellent master Bernstein (diagram 37).

CAPABLANCA

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

BERNSTEIN

37.

*A Remarkable Endgame*

- |             |         |
|-------------|---------|
| 26. Kt—Q4.  | R—B2.   |
| 27. Kt—Kt5. | R—B4.   |
| 28. Kt×P.   | Kt×Kt.  |
| 29. R×Kt.   | R×R.    |
| 30. R×R.    | Q—Kt7!. |
- wins.

Capablanca has allowed the endgame battle to centre round his passed Pawn. The many possible Rook and Knight manoeuvres require exact analysis, but the remarkable feature of the position is the extraordinary reason why the pawn cannot eventually be captured. Particularly important in this position is the feature that the defender has adequate defence to other

invasions of the back rank. Having seen that, no master can be blamed for resting content. To have seen the concealed surprise in time was genius.


Interesting in contrast are the combinative efforts of Alekhine. That remarkable player crowded the board with ideas of a forcing, dynamic kind, well illustrated in the games that he played against such great masters as Rubinstein (see Illustrative Games) and the remarkable attack against Grunfeld, referred to later.

These, however, are examples from a very high level of Chess, and in these examples the vision is complete. At a lower level, as we have seen, imagination is apt to reveal the need for mental discipline. Above all, the player must avoid the cleverness that tempts him because it is clever, and, even more, the cleverness that tempts him because he thinks his opponent will overlook it.

As to the cleverness played "*ad hominem*" let it be said at once that there are no valid traps in Chess ; in Chess one plays the board, not the man. The move that cannot be made by the opponent is one move in a series of variations. If the line of play has no other merit, then the opportunity of error offered to the opponent does not justify the method adopted unless the position

ENGERT

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(WHITE)

GILG

38.

• A Trap

Black plays :

27. . . . R—K3!?

If now :

28. P—R4. Kt—K5.

If then :

29. Q×Q. Kt—K7 ch.

30. K—R1. R—R3  
mate in 2.

White, however, played :


KR—Ktr.

Black might have played :

27. . . . Q—R5  
with some slight defensive  
chances.

be desperate, In the latter event only is play *ad hominem* justified (diagrams 38, 39, 40). The only respectable use of the

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

39.

*A Trap*

White, who has incurred an attack through winning Q-side Pawns now plays resourcefully.

1. Q×KtP. R—K6.
2. R—Q1!. R—Kt6 ch.
3. P×R. P×P.
4. R—B5. R×R.
5. Q—Kt8 ch. R—B1.
6. Q×P. B—K4.
7. R—Q2!. Q—K8.
8. R—Q1 Draw.

This is a trap because White tempts Black into the plausible R—Kt6 ch. (instead of R—B6!).

It is a legitimate trap because White has no good move.

If, e.g.:

1. R—B5. Q×BP

(*inter alia*) yields Black a winning endgame, e.g.:

2. R×R ch., B×R. 3. P—KR4, P×P is good enough. If, again, 1. Q×P, R—K6. 2. Q—Kt7, R(B1)—K1, 3. R—B8, P—B6 ch., forcing mate. (3. K—Kt3, B—K4 ch., etc. or 3. K—Kt1, Q×R ch., etc.).

40.

*Psychological Chess*

1. . . . P—R6.

2. P—Kt4.

(If this is not the best, it is a trap: viz.:

2. . . . B×P.
3. Q×B. R—Kt3.
4. Kt—Kt5. P—B3.
5. P—B5.)

Interpreting the opponent's mood, and *ad hominem*:

2. . . . B—R3.,

expecting

3. P—B4!?

3. . . . B×P!.

4. P—Kt3. B—Q7.

5. B—Kt2 (as ordered!).

5. . . . R×P!.

6. Resigns!


Because if:

6. B—Q5. R×Kt.

7. B×Q ch. K—Kt2.

and White is lost.

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
(WHITE)



word trap (and that unnecessary) is when the player who is said "to have fallen into a trap" has succumbed to a "resource" that is available to his opponent. This trap he has created for himself by not seeing a danger.

Of cleverness that entices with its own blandishments, typical is the following line of play following a stone-wall defence (diagram 41). Here the win of the Pawn is clever, but the

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
41.

*A Pawn Gain*

9. . . . Kt—Kt5.  
 10. P—B4. P×P.  
 11. B×P. Q—R5.  
 12. P—KR3. Kt×P(e5).  
 13. B—Kt3 or B—K2 and  
 Black suffers in development.  
 The line is playable if one wants  
 a difficult game for a Pawn.

resultant position is difficult. Nevertheless, it is much better for a player to see this idea and be tempted by it than not to see it at all. The next diagram shows a move having been made with no other merit than one clever point. The move was therefore a bad one (diagram 42).

As has already been observed, without an awareness of ideas, without a readiness to appreciate the unexpected intrusion across elementary common-sense and logic, the Chess player will not achieve any mastery or, indeed, manifest any real ability. Admittedly, common-sense and logic (or familiar manoeuvring), and that conceptual thinking which we shall see is strategy, account for a great number of moves in most games of Chess that are played. Yet if a player contents himself habitually with the superficially correct, the safe appearing move, he will



42.

*Inadequacy of Cleverness*

In playing Q—Q3 White has relied on a good answer to Black's B—B4 : i.e. P—K4. But Black plays first Q—B4 (better than P—QKt4) and White is embarrassed. He has probably nothing better than Kt—Q4. This enables Black to solve the problem of his isolated Pawn.

certainly lose more games by reason of his obtuseness than he will ever win through his opponent's over-acuteness.


Further, the reader must bear in mind that Chess—though a science—is not an exact science. In Chess, we shall see, good play may involve the taking of chances. Often a good combinative player finds himself playing an attack that he cannot exhaustively analyse, but which he judges to be adequate. The very great masters reduce chance to a minimum, but there are considerable imaginative players, whose efforts are among the great brilliancies, and who have played unsound combinative attacks in situations where it was extremely hard to see the flaw. The diagram (43) position from a game between Bogoljubow and Spielman is a striking example of this.

In justification of "risk" in Chess, it must be pointed out that Chess is not only a science, but a dynamic science actualised in struggle. The element of struggle can determine a fine player in his endeavour to win in complexities beyond his depth. He relies, then, not only on his prior vision of the whole complex, but on his resource ; that is to say the resources that his inventive power can extract from the board and on his superiority in that respect to his opponent.

To state, in another way, the function of imagination (in the

## BOGOLJUBOW

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(WHITE)

• SPIELMANN

43.

*Speculation*

After enticing away White's Queen, Black has just played

19. . . . R × P.

Spielmann replies :

20. Kt × P. P × Kt.

21. R × BP. B—B4.

22. R × B. Kt × R.

23. Q × R. Kt—R5.

24. Q—Kt3ch. K—R1.

25. R—Kt5 and after many vicissitudes White lost.

But at Move 20 White can play

20. K × R. Q—R5 ch.

21. K × P. B—R6 ch.

and then, not

22. K—Kt1. Q—Kt4.

23. K—R1. R—R1, etc.

but 22. K—R1! and after all the discovered checks, alternatively after

22. . . . R—R1.

23. Q × P ch. K—B1.

24. R × P, it appears that Black has no winning attack.

In the text line, Black missed a clever win.


After 20. Kt × P, P × Kt. 21. R × P, B—B4. 22. R × B, best is R—R8 ch.!. 23. K × P, Kt × R (not Q—Kt3 ch. which only draws). 24. R × R, Kt—K6 ch. 25. K—Kt3, R—KKt1. 26. Q × P (best), Q × Q. 27. B × Q, K × B ch. 28. K—B4, Kt—B5 with a winning advantage.

narrow sense) in Chess, it may be said that what matters in Chess is discovery rather than invention.

In a limited sense, every Chess move, like every adaptation of conduct or words to a situation, is inventive : but the inventions that matter are the novel ideas, and the novel ideas that matter are those that flow from discoveries—as the steam engine followed from the discovery of a truth about gases, or as Toricelli's barometer followed the realisation of a truth about the atmosphere. Other inventions are either lucky accidents (like blotting-paper) or the results of concentration on a very narrow purpose. Invention is essentially discovery subordinated to purpose. But in Chess, as in physical science, the purposes are very rarely so narrow as to occasion a special inventive movement which is not a straining after clever effects.

Special invention takes place in Chess on the rare occasions when the problem is isolated and specific—as when clever re-

sources are needed. The Chess problem par excellence calls for invention on the part of the solver, who must endeavour, for example, to mate in three moves in circumstances where stalemate seems inevitable (diagram 44). Similarly, when




44.

*Indian Theme*

White Mates in Three

1. B—Kt8. P—B7.
2. R—B7, etc.

he is required, as in a famous Sam Lloyd problem (diagram 45), to focus the White Queen so as to be able to create a double



45.

*Focal Play**Mate in Three*


1. Q—KB1.

This is the only square from which White, on the 2nd move, can threaten mate and attack the Bishop simultaneously, thereby preventing the Defence P—Kt3.



threat on every possible second move : or when he is required to see why an apparently easy method of play is not available (diagram 46).

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(WHITE)

46.

*Point of a Problem*

Problem by Warton Brothers.

White to Mate in Three

The essence of a good problem is that the defence shall also be clever.

White here has to see why any Rook move is not adequate.

The key is R—R6.

If 1. R—B6 instead,


1. . . . B—R2.

2. R×B. R—Q1!.

postpones the mate.

In the practical game the player who needs an idea in order to establish a variation usually finds that the idea flows into his mind as he works through the possible sequence. But on a

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

47.


*Problem-Endgame**White to Win*

An endgame which is only soluble as a 2-move problem. Evidently there is no win by Kt—Kt1 ch., K—B5 (White is left with two Knights). But B—Kt6! brings about mate in two.



relatively empty board the search is narrower and the purpose more emphatic. The diagram (47) shows an inventive situation. This is a two-move problem by Barry, which is incidentally a practical endgame, the mate in two being the only way for White to win. In practical Chess a player with a conception of an endgame method projects his idea and plays up to it. A simple example to illustrate this has already been seen (diagram 23 on p. 43). Given originality or difficulty, such a projection is an act of invention.

A brilliant composition by an English player (diagram 48) shows a position that might easily occur in practical Chess, and in which the play is noticeably inventive. Here White's obvious move  $P=Q$  is met by  $P=Q$ , because 2.  $Q \times Q$  gives stalemate. Queen moves along the eighth rank are met by corresponding Queen moves along the first file. However, if White plays  $Q-K8$  there is a remarkable possibility. In answer to Black's  $Q-R5$  White can play  $Q-K5$  ch., and after  $K-R1$ ,  $Q-R8$ , and now the Black Queen cannot oppose the White Queen again because



48.

*An Inventive Situation*

Ending by Joseph

White to Move and Win


- |                  |          |
|------------------|----------|
| 1. $P=Q$ .       | $P=Q$ .  |
| 2. $Q-Kt8$ .     | $Q-R7$ . |
| 3. $Q-K8$ .      | $Q-R5$ . |
| 4. $Q-K5$ ch.    | $K-R1$ . |
| 5. $Q-R8!$ wins. |          |

the capture will involve check.

However, Black has a possible defence. If White plays 1.  $Q-K8$ , Black replies  $Q-Kt2$ , which is a defence to all threats. This is illustrative of the inventive aspect of defence. The

defender is usually the player who is called upon to find solutions to problems presented, while the attacker is making inclusive discoveries. However, here in turn the attacker is required to invent ; and he has the following device. On the first move he plays Q—Kt8 (not Q—B8 because that is met by Q—R6 with the threat of check at d6 to follow). In reply Black must play Q—R7. Then White plays 2. Q—K8, and the defence of Q—Kt2 is no longer available.

Here again is an endgame which is evidently at best a drawn one unless White discovers an idea (diagram 49).



49.  
*Endgame with Idea*

White Wins

1. R—Q2 ch. K—Kt8.  
(not 1. . . . K—R8.
2. K—Kt3).
2. K—B3. P—Kt7.
3. R—Q1 ch. K—R2.
4. R—KKt1! wins.

Similarly if :

2. . . . P—R7.
3. R—Q1 ch. K—R2.
4. R—KR1! wins.

Therefore :

2. . . . K—B8 must  
be played.
3. R—QR2. K—Q8.  
(If K—Kt8 ; 4. R—K2  
creates Zugzwang).
4. K—Q3. K—B8.
- (4. . . . K—K8.
5. K—K3!).

5. K—K3, P—R7. 6. R—R1 ch., K—Kt7. 7. R—KR1!, K—B6. 8. KB3  
wins.

All the above play depends on the perception of the interesting R—KR1 or R—KKt1, capturing both Pawns !

That this type of play is not a composer's monopoly is shown in the following clever draw from actual play (diagram 49A).


Of that mode of mind which is subtlety (exactitude and fineness of apprehension) rather than the discovery of surprises, the ending on the next page by Grigorieff is an excellent example (diagram 50).

This is typical endgame play, although it is not correct to suggest that the endgame is lacking in scope for combinative ideas. The examples so far given seem to establish the contrary.

The truth is that endgame thinking must rely less on combinative ideas than on exactitude.\* Where, however, the idea is present in the midst of exact lines of analysis then we have Chess of as high an order as the middle game has to offer. For the

## ELISKASES


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KERES

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49(a).

*Subtlety and Ideas in the Endgame*

A position that has (in essentials) occurred more than once in master-chess.

- |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| 1. . . .  | R—Kt3 ch. |
| 2. K—B1.  | R—KR3.    |
| 3. K—Q1.  | K—Q6.     |
| 4. K—K1.  | K—K6.     |
| 5. K—B1.  | K—B6.     |
| 6. K—Kt1. | R—Kt3 ch  |
| 7. K—R2.  | R—R3 ch.  |
| 8. K—Kt1. | R—Kt3 ch. |
| 9. K—B1   | R—KR3.,   |
- etc., etc.

50.

*Ending by Grigorieff*

White to Play and Win.

- |               |       |
|---------------|-------|
| 1. K—Kt3!.    |       |
| 1. . . .      | K—K6. |
| 2. P—R4.      | K—K5. |
| 3. K—Kt4.     | K—K4. |
| 4. K—Kt5.     | K—K5. |
| 5. P—R5.      | K—B6. |
| 6. K—B5 wins. |       |

If :

- |          |        |
|----------|--------|
| 1. . . . | K—B8.  |
| 2. P—R4. | P—Kt3. |
| 3. K—B4. | K—Kt7. |
| 4. P—R5. | P×P.   |
| 5. P—R4. |        |


If :

- |               |        |
|---------------|--------|
| 1. . . .      | K—B8.  |
| 2. P—R4.      | K—Kt8. |
| 3. P—R5.      | K R8.  |
| 4. P—R4.      | K—Kt8. |
| 5. P—R6.      | P×P.   |
| 6. P—R5 wins. |        |

\* The distinction is illustrated in a study by Weenink : 16, P7, 4k3, 7B, 8, 1K6, 6r1. White wins. 1. P—R7 R—Kr8 ch. 2. B—K1 (Idea), R×B ch. 3. K—Kr2 (Exactitude).

## PRINS

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


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BERNSTEIN

## MAROCZY

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GRAU

51.

*Subtlety and Imagination*

Black has played R×KtP and White wins!

1. R—Kt6 ch. K—R4.
2. R—Kt1. R—R5.
3. P—K5. P—B4.
4. P—K6. R—R1.
- (If:
4. . . . R—R3.
5. K—B4!)
5. K—B4. P—B5.
6. P—K7. P—B6.
7. K—B5. K—R5.
8. R—QB1. P—Kt5.
9. R—QKt1. R—B1.
10. R×P ch. K—Kt6.
11. R—Kt3. K—B7.
12. R×P. R×R.
13. P=Q resigns.

Note how White exploits first a possible mate in order to defend his advancing Pawn, then the Pawn to tie Black's Rook.

52.

*Vision in the Endgame*

1. K—B2. B×P!
2. K—Kt3. K×P!
- (and not the "logical" B×P, because the White Bishop penetrates quickly to KB8).
3. K×B. K—B6.
4. K—Kt3. K—Kt6.
5. K—B3. K×P.
6. K—Q4. K×P.
7. K—K3. P—B4.
8. B—K1. P—KKt3.
9. B—B2. P—QKt3!
10. B—K1 (K—K2 is not better because White has insufficient tempo for the capture of the Pawn).
10. . . . K—R6.
11. K—B3. P—Kt5 ch.
12. K—B4. K—Kt7.
13. B—R4. P—Kt6!
14. resigns.

For if:

14. B×P. P—Kt4 ch.


15. K×KtP, K×B. 16. K×P, K—B6 and Black wins because of the Pawn QKt3!



fusion in endgame play of originality and subtlety the two masterpieces of actual play by Bernstein and Maroczy respectively, on page 65, would be hard to excel (diagrams 51 and 52).

The next are more typical of the events of actual play. Here one has to be aware of a possibility in order to avoid it (diagrams 53 and 54).

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(WHITE)

53.

*Perception of Unusual Possibility*  
*White Wins*

In order to win, White must see a possible defence by Black.

If :


1. P—Kt4 (or K—B6),  
1. . . . . K—Kt2.  
followed by :
2. . . . . K—R3.
3. . . . . K—R4.
4. . . . . P—R3.

Stalemate.

Therefore :

1. K—K4!  
preventing the above process.
1. . . . . K—K1.
2. K—B3. P—R4.
3. K—K4, etc.

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54.

*Perception of Unusual Possibility*  
*White Wins*


Not P=Q, R—Kt1! (and if Q×R stalemate), but Kt—Kt2.

1. . . . . R—B8 ch.
2. K—K7. R—K8 ch.
3. K—Q6. R—K7.
4. Kt—B4. R—K8.
5. Kt—Kt6! wins.



Here is the converse, the invention of a drawing device where apparently White should lose (diagrams 55 and 56).

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
55.

*Invention*

White Draws

- |             |          |
|-------------|----------|
| 1. Kt—Kt3.  | B×Kt.    |
| 2. P—K7.    | B—Q3 ch. |
| 3. K—R4.    | B×P.     |
| 4. B—B4.    | P=Q.     |
| 5. B—Q5 ch. | Q×B.     |
- stalemate.

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(WHITE)

56.


*White "invents" a Draw*

- |             |       |
|-------------|-------|
| 1. B—R7.    | K×P.  |
| 2. B—B5.    | P—R7. |
| 3. B—B8.    | K—B3. |
| 4. B—Kt4.   | P=Q.  |
| 5. B—B3 ch. | Q×B.  |
- stalemate.

And the next diagram shows analogous ideas beautifully treated by a master of endgame composition (No. 57).

The following position (No. 58) is very highly valued not only because of its difficulty and simplicity but for its technical importance.

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(WHITE)

57.

*Imagination and Subtlety in the Endgame**White Draws*

(Study by Selesnieff)

1. P—Kt6. B—Q5.
2. P—B5. P×P.
3. B—B6. B—B4.  
(if 3. . . . B×B, stalemate).
4. B×P. B×P.  
(not
4. . . . K×P.
5. B—Kt2 ch.).
5. K—Kt5. B—B4.
6. K×P. K—Kt6.
7. K—K6. K—B7.
8. K—B7. B—K6.
9. B—B6. B—R3.
10. B—Kt7. B—K6.
11. B—B6, etc.

Observe the fine points; that while the White Bishop is on

Kt7, the Black King cannot move to a Black Square.


A subtle point is that if 2. . . . P—K4, then not 3. P—B6, P—K5, but 3. B—B6!

Note also that the first two moves by White cannot be reversed.

Thus 1. P—B5, P×P. 2. P—Kt6, P—B5!, etc.

If 1. . . . B—B4. 2. B—B6 (not P—B5, P×P. 3. B—B6, B—B1). 2. . . . B—B1. 3. P—B5, P×P (now best). 4. B—K7—A subtlety of composition.

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(WHITE)

58.

*An Original Endgame Theme**White Draws*


1. K—Kt6. P—B4.
  2. K×KtP!. P—B5.
  3. K—B6.
- If:
3. . . . P—B6.
  4. K—K6. P—B7.
  5. P—B7 draws.
- If:
3. . . . K—Kt3.
  4. K—K5. P—B6.
  5. K—Q6 draws.

This is due to the genius of Richard Reti. The idea of it, original to Reti, has been much copied by endgame composers

(including Reti : see diagram 58A) who work it into problems with other features (the King, e.g. creates a mating threat), and has also become part of the technique of all players who have been shown the position.

Originality, incidentally, is a subjective merit only. The good player should be original. If he is not original he will not reach the highest rank. But originality by itself is not objectively sufficient. The ideas of Chess, however attractive and important in themselves, are much less important as mental events than

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

58(a).

*Endgame by Reti*

1. K—K7. P—Kt4.
2. K—Q6. P—Kt5.
3. P—K7. B—Kt4.
4. K—B5. B—K1.
5. K—Q4, and overtakes the Pawn.

This (together with diagram 58) is an adaptation of Reti's original idea :


7K : 8 : k1P5 : 7p : 32 :  
White draws.\*

- (1. K—Kt7. P—R5.
2. K—B6. K—Kt3.
3. K—Q5, etc.).

for their place in the games, i.e. less important than the need for their apprehension when they are relevant, and the need for their discovery in play far enough ahead to enable the player to control the possibilities of the board. If they are features in a vista of analysis then they are proofs of greater imagination than when found in isolation as winning or drawing resources.

By now the reader will have accepted the proposition that in Chess the imagination must be always active and always controlled. As a player gains experience he will learn when to concentrate along the analytic lines in a quest for ideas, and when to content himself with an easier task. But on the whole he will find himself demanding greater effort, not less, and at more

\* This identical position was reached in a game (not by Reti) in Berlin in 1921. White resigned !




59.

*Imagination as Economy**White Wins*

The game can be finished quickly by B—Kt5!.

stages, not fewer. He may find that owing to the configuration of his mind some ideas will come more easily than others. That will determine his style of play. Some players find themselves best at the clear analysis of relatively straight-forward lines of play to a long distance. Others develop a taste and an aptitude for the clevernesses of the board. But for all of them cleverness is a necessary ingredient in the game not only as an essential of victory but as a labour-saver, as when the projection of an end-



60.

*Quick Solution with Aid of Idea*


1. R—K7!.

1. . . . Q×R.

2. Kt×B wins.

game saves the exact working out of sequences involved in a pawn-race (see e.g. diagrams on pp. 43 and 108), or as in the position in diagram 59, from the middle game, where the perception of an idea would have saved the player of the white pieces a great deal of subsequent labour and anxiety (see also Nos. 60 and 61). Indeed there is rarely an advantageous situation in Chess in which a good player will not find some possibilities that will make the task easier than laborious and logical exploitation.

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(WHITE)

61.

*Attacking Resource*

White Wins

1. R—Q3 ch.

If:

1. . . . P×R.

2. R—K6 ch. B×R.


3. Q—Kt3 ch., forcing mate.

Lasker has put forward the suggestion that some of the great combinations of Chess were unnecessary, because the positions in which they took place were already overwhelmingly in favour of the attacker. If Lasker ever seriously suggested (and not the Lasker-ites who correspond to Lasker as Darwin-ites to Darwin) that combination is an accidental of Chess, then he was doing scant justice to his own performances. There are positions that can be won combinatively, which can also be won by steady pressure. But it is in the combative nature of Chess that battles are decided precisely by the apprehension on the part of the winner of a combinative possibility, and/or by the failure of the loser to see it in time.

The difference is shown in the next two diagrams (62 and 63) between the combination that finishes a game from a highly advantageous position and the combination that is necessary



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62.


*Combination in very Advantageous Position*

1. R—QB3. P×P.
2. B—R6. B×B.
3. Q—R4. K—Kt2.
4. Q×B ch. K×Q.
5. R—R3 ch. K—Kt4.
6. R×P and mate next move.

for victory. The latter is of the essence of Chess : but the former is also important play, not only because, however good the position, it is wise to finish the game quickly and decisively, but because the Chess player has to see combinations that are not essential if he is to play successful combination at all.

Let it not be supposed that combination is all violence and sacrifice. Lasker's play against Salwe from the position in

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
(WHITE)

63.

*Combination Necessary to Ensure Victory*

1. P—R5. P—Kt4.
2. B×P. P×B.
3. P—R6. B×P.
4. R×B. K—Kt2.
- (with the threat of R—R1!).
5. P—KB4!. K×R.
6. P×P ch. K×P.
- (If :
6. . . . K—Kt2.
7. P×Kt ch. K×P.
8. Q—B3 ch. K—K3.
9. Q—B5 ch., etc.).
7. Q—B3. K—R3.
8. Q—B4 ch. K—Kt2.
9. Q—Kt5 ch. K—R1.
10. O—O—O. resigns.


SALWE  
(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
LASKER

diagram 64 shows the essence of combination without spectacle—namely the organisation of the forces in the most convincing way. All that sacrifice signifies is that the player sees through the superficial values of the pieces to their functions.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

64.

### *A Difficult Win*

R—Kt<sub>4</sub> is met by Kt—R<sub>3</sub>, and other direct attacks fail. Therefore Lasker attacks in two places.

1. Q—B<sub>2</sub>!. R—B<sub>1</sub>.  
(To make Kt—R<sub>3</sub> possible without allowing Kt×BP).
2. Q—Q<sub>2</sub>. Q—Kt<sub>1</sub>.
3. K—R<sub>1</sub>. R(B)—K<sub>1</sub>.
4. R—Kt<sub>4</sub>. R—Kt<sub>1</sub>.
5. R—Q<sub>1</sub>. Q—Kt<sub>5</sub>.  
(There is nothing constructive to do.)
6. Q—KB<sub>2</sub>. Q—B<sub>6</sub>.
7. Q—R<sub>4</sub>. Kt—R<sub>3</sub>.
8. R—B<sub>4</sub>. Kt—B<sub>2</sub>.
9. K—R<sub>2</sub>. R(Kt)—K<sub>1</sub>.
10. Q—Kt<sub>3</sub>. R—KKt<sub>1</sub>.
11. R—R<sub>4</sub>.

and now Black is virtually forced to play P—Kt<sub>4</sub> with a broken position.

65.

### *Need for Combination*

Unless White can effect a quick attack, Black will complete his mobilization.


Therefore :

1. Kt—Kt<sub>5</sub>.
1. . . . P—KB<sub>4</sub>.
2. B×P. B×Kt
3. B×B. Q×B.
4. P×B. P—Kt<sub>3</sub>.
5. R×QBP. QR—B<sub>1</sub>.
6. P—Q<sub>5</sub>.  
(the move upon which the whole combination depends).
6. . . . Q×P.  
(wrong ; but Black is lost now, whatever he does).
7. Q—B<sub>3</sub> ch. K—Kt<sub>1</sub>.
8. R×KKtP ch.  
forcing mate in four moves.

But these functions must be exactly and precisely followed. The player who bombards and tears his opponent's position open, regardless of the cannon-fodder expended, is playing an inexact type of positional Chess, and not really combining. On the other hand failure to combine when necessary is one instance of failure to analyse clearly.


The positions in diagrams 65 and 66 could only be won combinatively. Otherwise the games drift into indeterminacy.

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(WHITE)

66.

*Combinative Exploitation*

(From a blindfold game : 1924)

White has played the *Giuoco Piano* aimlessly.

There now follows :

- |                                   |           |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|
| 1. . . .                          | P—B4.     |
| 2. P×P.                           | R×P.      |
| 3. KKt—Q2 (with a view to P—KB3). |           |
| 3. . . .                          | Kt—Q5!.   |
| 4. P×Kt.                          | KP×P.     |
| 5. Q—K1.                          | Kt—K7 ch. |
| 6. K—R1.                          | Q×P ch.   |
- forcing mate.

67.

*An Idea that may not be Abandoned*

White can play :

1. Kt×B ch. Q×Kt.

2. B—R6,


but the attack is not conclusive if Black defends with

2. . . . Q—K2.

Nevertheless White is well advised to play this line. Otherwise Black extricates himself with K—B1!.

## LASKER

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
## SCHLECHTER

Diagrams 67 and 68 illustrate the distinction between ideas that should be seen and abandoned and those that should be seen and adopted as the motif of play.

The following diagram shows the kind of difficulty into which a player drifts who does not think clearly through sequences.

## MUHRING

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(WHITE)

## ROSSOLIMO

68.

*An Idea that may be  
Abandoned*

Here White played :

11. O—O.

He can, however, play :

11. KB—R6.

If then :

11. . . . B×B.

12. Kt×Kt. Q—B2.

13. Kt×B ch. Q×Kt.

14. Kt×P. Q—K5.

15. B×Kt with great advantage.

But Black can play :

11. . . . Q—B1,

and White emerges from the exchanges with no advantage.

69.

*Critical Position*

Black plays :

12. . . . P—QKt4.

(better was P—QB4) failing to analyse clearly the consequences of

13. P×P.

13. . . . P×Kt.

14. P×Kt. Q×P.

15. B×P. Q×P.

16. B—R3. R—K1.

17. P—K5. Kt—Kt2,

leaves Black under attack.

Black is unable to satisfy himself as to the consequences and is, therefore, compelled to reply :

13. . . . P×P.


after which White, with :

14. B—R3, obtains a good attack.




Combination and ideas are not to be found at all stages of every game and cannot be pursued for their own sakes. They arise as possibilities in a matrix of possibilities, and usually they make an essential difference to the assessment of the values of the game. In the next diagrams combinations are shown without which vigorous developing play would have been impossible.

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(WHITE)

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

70.

*Combinative Idea to Justify  
Queen's Side Development*

Black has played :

- |            |         |
|------------|---------|
| 8. . . . . | P—R4.   |
| 9. P—QR3.  | P—R5.   |
| 10. Kt×P.  | P×P.    |
| 11. B×P.   | B×B ch. |
| 12. Kt×B.  | Kt—QR4. |
| 13. Q—B2.  | Kt×B.   |
| 14. Q×B.   | P—QKt4. |
| 15. Q×P.   | B—Q2.   |
- with advantage.

71.

*Combination to Justify a Bid for  
the Initiative*

- |            |          |
|------------|----------|
| 1. . . . . | P—K4.    |
| 2. P×QP.   | P×P.     |
| 3. P×P.    | R—K1 ch. |
| 4. K—B1.   | Q×Kt.    |
| 5. P×Q.    | B—R6 ch. |
| 6. K—Kt1.  | Kt×P.    |
| 7. Q—Q1.   | R—K8 ch. |
| 8. Q×R.    | Kt×P     |
- mate.


If, at Move 4, White plays :  
B—K2, R×B ch., followed  
by Q×Kt ch. wins.

The next shows Lasker demonstratively (and in the only convincing way) the inferiority of his opponent's position.



BAUER

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
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LASKER

And here again is Lasker finishing one of his greatest games by a neat mating effect when it seemed that his attack had worked itself out.

LASKER

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

PILLSBURY

72.

*Combination to Demonstrate and Exploit Weakness*

1. Kt—R5. Kt×Kt.
2. B×P ch. K×B.
3. Q×Kt ch. K—Kt1.
4. B×P. K×B.?
5. Q—Kt4 ch. K—R2.
6. R—B3. P—K4.
7. R—R3 ch. Q—R3.
8. R×Q ch. K×R.
9. Q—Q7 and wins easily.

73.

*Combination to Finish a Game*

A clever mating net.


Black plays :

1. . . . R×P.
  2. Q—K6 ch. K—R2.
  3. K×R. Q—B6 ch.
  4. K—R4. P—Kt4 ch.
  5. K×P. Q—B5 ch.
  6. K—R5. B—Q1.,
- with mate next move.


Combinations of this type reveal the reality of the game as a

struggle in which it is essential to gain the maximum advantage by manoeuvring for it subtly, and by liquidating it into material superiority before it is dissipated by the normal development of the opponent's resources.

Combination is, of course, available in defence as well as in attack as the next diagram illustrates.



### NIMZOVITCH



### CAPABLANCA

74.

#### *Pressure which Fails to Kill*

After an eccentric King's Gambit, Black appears to stand well, but White has latent potential resources which pressure actualizes.

14. P—KR3. Q—B4.  
(threatening Kt—QKt5, etc.)

15. P×B!. Kt×KtP.

16. Q—R4 ch. B—K2.

17. Q×Kt. Q×Q.

18. Kt—K5. Q×P.

19. B—B3. Q—KB7.

and now the danger of excessive attack applies to White.

20. R—K2 secures a draw by repetition of moves.

75.

#### *Insight by Defender*

Black played B×Kt.

Why not K—R1 (with a view to R—Kt1)?

If:

1. . . . K—R1.

2. Kt—K4. B—K2  
(forced).

3. KKt—Kt5. P×Kt  
(forced).


4. Kt—B6. B×Kt  
(forced).

5. B—K4 forces mate.

It is important for the defender to think combinatively as well as the attacker, as Nimzovitch did in the adjoining position. It so happens that in that instance Nimzovitch, while seeing the mating possibility in time to avoid it, did not see it early enough in order to alter his whole line of play.

This illustrates the combative nature of Chess—the clash of mind against mind.\* The creativity of the mind, actualized in the Chess struggle, is the factor ignored by those who are tempted to think that there is an objective strategy that enables players to avoid combinative disaster. Strategy, we shall see, exists, and is important, but the hard core of the game is tactical threat. Moreover, good Chess has to be played even in good positions (see next diagram).

TARTAKOWER  
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(WHITE)  
SPIELMANN

It follows that good Chess has to be played in level, or bad, positions, and ideas have saved many a good player in many an awkward situation. The position in the next diagram, whatever its strategic features, was determined, as to the result, by the quality of the player's analysis. Spielmann came near to saving a bad game.

\* Mutuality of vision is well illustrated in the following (Alexander—Gligoric, 1951): r1b2rk1, 1p2bppp, 2ktppkt2, p5B1, Pq2P3, 1KtKt1QP2, 1PP3PP, 2KR1B1R. 1. . . . P—R3. If White tries to win the Queen with B—Kt5, then 2. . . . Kt—Kt5!

76.

*Tactical Idea*

White must attack quickly in order to prevent Black's recovery.

1. Q—Q2. Q—B6.


The move on which Black has relied. Since the Queen is pinned against the Rook the exchange of Queens seems forced. But White played 2. Q—R6, and after:

2. . . . Q×R ch.

Black cannot prevent mate.

## NIMZOVITCH

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

SPIELMANN

77.

*Middle Game Position*

White's QBP is in danger.

Black will play QR—B1, then P—KB3, then Q—B5, and then double Rooks.

If P—B4 (ever) the Bishop attacks from R3.

There is little chance in the K-wing.

Spielmann played a tactical line of some ingenuity but mishandled it.

1. P—QB4. B—R3.

2. QR—QB1. QR—B1.

3. Q—Kt3!. P—B3.

Now 4 P—B5! is good. Spielmann played :


4. Q—R4. P×Kt.

5. P×P. B—R6! and wins.

The next diagrams illustrate ideas (analogous ones) operating in one case to win a won game ; in the other to win a lost one (diagrams 78 and 79).

Equally obviously, failure of ideas, or wrong ideas, can lose a won game (diagram 80).

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78.

*Idea in Good Position*


Black, in difficulties, sees R—Q6 as a threat and plays ;

1. . . . Q—K3.

overlooking 2. R—Q7! which wins at least a piece.



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
(WHITE)

79.

*An Idea in a Bad Position*

1. . . . O—O—O.
2. P—QR4. K—Kt2.
3. P×P. P×P.
4. R×P ch. K—B3.
- (if K×R; 5. Q—B7 ch., etc.)
5. Q—B7 ch. K—Q4.
6. Q—B5 mate.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

80.

*Losing a Won Game*

Black, in a good position, can go wrong.

1. . . . R—Kt7.
2. Kt—Kt5 (with threat of P—K6).
3. Kt×P. P—R3.
4. B×RP. K×Kt.
5. R×B. P×B.
6. Q×RP with an attack. P×R.
1. . . . P—KR3 is playable.


Chess, it must be remembered, is combat. When the position appears static and solid, ideas, being appreciated, may reveal a breach.

When the battle is at its height, cleverness rather than logic is essential to avoid dangers as well as to exploit weaknesses.

And when the battle appears to be won, then mental effort is as necessary as ever. That the winning of won games can be harder



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
81.

*A Penetrating Idea*

Breaking up an apparently well-defended position.

1. . . . R—R3.  
2. P—R4. P—KKt4  
wins.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

82.

*Concealed Points*

In this position White has to see that he cannot win a Pawn easily.

1. B—R6. R—B3.  
2. P—Kt5. R—B7.  
3. Q×P. Q×BP.  
4. P—Kt6. P×P.

and if:

5. R—B1. Q×R wins

and if, instead,

5. Q—R8 ch. K—B2.  
6. B—K3. R—B6.

and beyond this the game is hard to analyse.

However,

5. B—K3. R—B1.  
6. B—Kt1 seems to leave White with sufficient material and pressure to win with. Yet care is needed.

6. . . . B—B3. 7. Kt—K3, Q—Kt6. 8. R—B1, P—K4!?. 9. Q×QP, Q×Q.  
10. Kt×Q, R×B. 11. R×R (not 11. Kt—Kt6 ch., K—Q1. 12. R×R, P—K6 ch. winning). 11. . . . P—K6 (not 11. . . . B×Kt. 12. R—Q1, B—B3. 13. R×B, P—K6 ch. 14. R×B ch., etc.). 12. R—QB1, P—K7. 13. B—B2, K—Q2. 14. R×B, K×R. 15. Kt—B3 and eventually wins.

This incidentally is a typical combative transition to an Ending, which is not easy to win.

- White must retain a Q-side Pawn. 15. . . . B—Kt5. 16. K—Kt2, B×P.  
17. B—K1 (the only way to keep the King out, e.g.: 17. . . . K—B4. 18. Kt—K4ch, K—Kt4. 19. Kt—K6 ch., K—B3 (forced). 20. B×B, etc.).

than the gaining of the winning position is a truth only too well known to the majority of good players. A game between Bogoljubow and Tarrasch (see Illustrative Games) illustrates this forcibly. It shows *inter alia* that the Chess player can never relax, that his vision is always being invoked, and he must always be applying it to the task : that, in other words, his vision must be the servant of his will-power, *nil actum reputans si quid superest agendum*.

To sum up and to revert to instances, in the practical game vision (including imagination) must be active most of the time.

First, imagination is always required for the recognition of the situation where imagination is likely to be required. One must apprehend quickly and early the possibility of manoeuvres that create complexity, and that recognition is already imaginative intuition.\*

One must also see clearly the future situations to which the logical moves are leading, and, more important, one must see when oneself or one's opponent, by departing in any degree from the normal and expected, can accelerate development or can prevent the other player's development, can attack, can create tactical or strategic advantage, can commence a skirmish.

In the faster openings, the many well-known King's Pawn aggressive openings in particular, the player must be constantly analytically vigilant. But the formal aspect of an opening is no criterion. Thus in the Queen's Gambit one plays :—

- |            |                     |
|------------|---------------------|
| 1. P—Q4.   | P—Q4.               |
| 2. P—QB4.  | P—K3.               |
| 3. Kt—KB3. | Kt—KB3.             |
| 4. B—Kt5.  | and Black replies : |
| 4. . . .   | K—KR3.              |

\* Intuition is a useful, and a dangerous, word to apply to the mental act in Chess. In a sophisticated sense of the word, the mature vision of the Chess player is intuitive—is INSIGHT. Sometimes, however, we find players whose glance at the board reveals possibilities, but not full or exact sequences. In another sense of the word intuition, they are playing intuitively. This flair for "good-looking" moves is a type of judgment to be found among imaginative players ; but it is no substitute for active imagination, just as judgment in general is no substitute for analysis. It has happened to many a master that he has encountered, on the part of weaker opponents, effective moves that were the lucky guesses of intuition or judgment rather than the product of clear analysis.

Logically, 5. B—R4 seems reasonable and harmless—and the danger of 5. . . . P×P is offset by the evident control of the centre that the first player can quickly acquire. But what of 5. . . . P—KKt4.

There follows :—

- |           |         |
|-----------|---------|
| 6. B—Kt3. | Kt—K5!. |
| 7 P—K3.   | P—KR4.  |
| 8. P—KR3. | Kt×B.   |
| 9. BP×B.  | B—Q3.   |

10. K—B2 and Black has the advantage. Already, then, on the fourth move we are involved in the analytic, if not the speculative, and indeed on move 3 the first player has to consider that if he plays KtKB3 instead of KtQB3, then he will only be able to follow on with 4. B—Kt5, if he is prepared to play 5. B×Kt (quite a sound, but not very popular exchange) in answer to 4. . . . P—KR3.

So ideas intrude, and more than superficial vision is called for at an early stage.


And so, further, whenever the forces become in any degree closely integrated at any stage (after the earlier essential development), tactical lines of play require to be examined, and to be anticipated before they can be analysed.

Vision is necessary then, in order to make possible—or to prevent—the seizure of advantages. And vision is required—even more—for the exploitation of advantages, and in the defence against exploitation. In the course of any year's master Chess the number of advantages obtained is tremendously in excess of the number of victories gained by the holders of those advantages ; and more greatly in excess of victories gained by the inevitable exploitation of those advantages without the mediation of further error on the part of the loser.

Here, chosen haphazard, are some examples of play in advantageous situations requiring clear and full vision for their successful exploitation.

LASKER


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TARTAKOWER

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

83.

*Tactical Difficulty*

White cannot play 1. Q—QB6  
because of :

1. . . . Kt×B.  
21. KR×Kt. R—Q8 ch.  
22. R—B1. R×R ch.  
23. K×R. R—Q8 ch.  
followed by :  
24. . . . R—Q7 ch!  
wins.

White actually played :

1. Q—Kt3, after which  
P—KKt4! breaking up the  
defences (if P×P, Kt—K4,  
etc.).


84.

*Middle Game Possibilities*

White's best is P×P.

If, instead, P—KB3, Black has  
a good answer :


1. . . . P—K4,  
with emancipation.



If then :

2. . . . Q×P. 3. B×B, R×B. 4. R×P ch., K—Q1 (forced). 5. Q—R5 wins.

If, instead : 2. . . . B×B. 3. R×B, Q×P. 4. QR×P ch., R×R. 5. R×R ch., K—Q1. 6. Q—R5 wins.



85.

### *Middle-game Impossibilities*

#### *Black to Move*

Black cannot play :

1. . . . P—QB<sub>4</sub>,  
because
2. P×P ch. Kt×P.
3. R×Kt!. R×R.
4. R×R. K×R.
5. Q—Q5 ch. K—Q2.
6. Q—Kt7 ch., wins.

Therefore :

1. . . . Q—K<sub>4</sub>  
was played.
2. Q—B<sub>2</sub>. P—B<sub>4</sub>!.  
and Black has chances.

However, White should have won as follows :

Not :

2. Q—B<sub>2</sub>,  
but :
2. B—R<sub>7</sub>! threatening B×B.

86.

### *Accuracy of Choice*

#### *White to Play and Win*

White can play :

1. R×B. Q×R.
2. Q—Kt<sub>1</sub>. P—KKt<sub>3</sub>.
3. Q×QKtP.  
with apparent gain, but this  
is refuted by :


3. . . . Kt—Q<sub>2</sub>.
4. Q×R. Kt—Kt<sub>3</sub>.

White's actual play was :

1. Q—R<sub>5</sub>!. P—KR<sub>3</sub>.
2. Kt—K<sub>4</sub>. P—KB<sub>4</sub>.
3. B×P ch. K—R<sub>1</sub>.
4. Q—R<sub>4</sub>. P×Kt.
5. B×RP. B—B<sub>2</sub>.
6. B—B<sub>5</sub>. B—R<sub>4</sub>.
7. B×P ch., etc.



(BLACK)



(WHITE)

If then :

3. K—K1, Kt—B6 ch. 4. P×Kt, P×P. 5. R—Q2, R—Kt8 ch. 6. K—B2, QR—Kt7 ch. 7. Q×R, R×Q ch. 8. K×P, R×R. 9. B×R, Q—Q8 ch. wins easily.

87.

*Inadequacy of Logical Moves  
Black to Play and Win*

Logical seems :

1. . . . QR—KKt1.
2. R—R1. Q—R5.
3. B—Q2. Q—B7.
4. K—K2. Q×KtP.

But then comes :


5. R—R5! R—B2.
6. Q—R4!

This is quite easy to miss by an analyst who has seen that 6. Q—B4 is met by Kt—R6! and that after 6. Q—Kt3, Kt—B2! wins.

But 6. Q—R4 is very strong. Therefore on Move 1, Black must play Q—R5 immediately.

2. R—K2 (best). QR—Kt1.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

88.

*Bolt from the Blue  
White Wins*

Black playing :


1. . . . Q—Q4.
- seems justified in thinking that he has forced White to a draw by perpetual check.

Then follows :

2. Kt—R6 ch. K—R1.
3. Kt—B7 d. ch. K—Kt1.
4. Q×P ch.! K×Q.
5. R—R7 ch. K—Kt1.
6. Kt—R6 mate.

## TRIFUNOVITCH

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


(WHITE)

BOLES LAVSKY

## KOTOV

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

KASHDAN

89.

*Difficult Idea to Anticipate*

28. Q—B3. P—K5.

(At first sight a much better move than Queen exchanges which leave Black's Pawns attacked.)

29. P×P!. Q×Kt.

30. P×P! and Black has nothing better than R(1)—QB1.

Then :

31. Q—Kt3. Q—B2.

32. Q×B ch., regains the piece with advantage.

90.

*Significant Point of Order*

White has played 27. Kt—B6. Black replies Q—Kt2 in order to prevent B×Kt, followed by Q×B ch., followed by Kt—K7 ch.

White, however, plays :

28. Kt—K7 ch. immediately and wins ; for if :

28. . . . Q×Kt.


29. Q×B ch. Q—B1.

30. B—R7 ch., wins the Queen.

It may be appropriate, in this chapter, to refer to a striking piece of play between Rubinstein and Lasker, played at St. Petersburg in 1909. The diagram position is not quite so rich as

the position Rubinstein—Capablanca (p. 19), but it is remarkably similar in the striking possibility that is realised in the line of play that actually took place.

LASKER  
(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
RUBINSTEIN

91.

### Quiet Move!

Black has sacrificed a Pawn for rapid development.

Black now plays :

15. . . . KR—K<sub>1</sub>.

There follows :

16. R—B1!. R×Kt.

17.  $R \times B$  ch.  $P \times R$ .

18. Q—B1!, and Black has nothing better than :

18. . . .  $R \times QP$   
with an inferior game.

Here the game has been fought and won by efforts based on vision far beyond the obvious. Lasker's logical plan was a rapid development dependent upon the exact analysis of White's counter-play. When Lasker planned to Castle Queen's side he saw much that was not obvious, including the sacrifice of the exchange, but he did not see early enough Rubinstein's ultimate reply.


What Rubinstein actually saw cannot be dogmatically stated. Probably he saw the possibility early enough, because he could have avoided the complications had he wished. But it is evident that Lasker based his game on a view of the possibilities that did not include Rubinstein's resource. This is a very good example of that mental struggle to control the material, which is prior to the struggle for control of the board in the game itself. The two examples together are further interesting because they suggest the possibility that certain aspects of the geometry of

the board reveal themselves more easily to some minds than to others. Rubinstein seems to have had a flair for the subtle move of the type Q—B1 occurring fairly late in a combative line of play. That was typical of that particular master's imaginative insight.\*

Finally, here is Lasker coping brilliantly with a challenge offered by a brilliant opponent (diagram 91(a)). The result is a piece of Chess in which, once an unbalance is created, the quantity of material seems to remain irrelevant. Development is preferred to recapturing. After the battle, the counting of survivors !

NAPIER

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

LASKER

91(a).

12. . . . P—Q4 (a bold bid to solve a strategic problem).

13. KP×P. Kt—Q5.

14. Kt×Kt. Kt×P.

Black is only lending this piece but White makes good use of it

15. Kt—B5!. Kt×Kt.

16. Q×Q. R×Q.

17. Kt—K7 ch.

K—R1.

(17. . . . K—B1 seems at first sight more likely to equalise material, but is met by B—B5 with a winning attack).

18. P—R5!. R—K1.

19. B—B5. KtP×P.

20. B—B4. P×P.

21. B×BP. Kt—K5.

22. B×R. B×P.

23. R—QKt1. B—B6 ch.

24. K—B1, B—KKt5. White's material advantage seems doomed. 25. B×KRP, B×B. 26. R×B, Kt—Kt6 ch. 27. K—Kt2, Kt×R. 28. R×P, P—R4. Material again! 29. R—Kt3, B—Kt2. 30. R—KR3, Kt—Kt6. 31. K—B3, R—R3. 32. K×P, Kt—K7 ch. 33. K—B5, Kt—B6. 34. P—R3, Kt—R5. 35. B—K3. Resigns because P—Kt6 is inevitable.

\* The reader who is interested in that kind of speculation may be interested to consider the combinations by Yates against Takacs and Reti (both starting with the decoy of a piece to the Queen-side) : some of Alekhine's Knight manoeuvres in the centre of the board : Reti's style of endgame composition, etc., etc.

# CHAPTER IV

## GENERAL THINKING


### STRATEGY AND JUDGMENT

By now the reader has either decided that Chess is too great a strain on the eye of the normal mind, or has realised that there are features of the game, or mental aids to vision that make Chess playable even by those who are not affected with hypermetropia.

The latter proposition is the true one. Chess is not so difficult at all stages as the analysis of the great Chess efforts might lead one to suppose. Certainly there are hard moves to see, some quite easy to miss when they are imminent, as in many examples already given : *a fortiori* harder to see through the mediation of intervening moves and among alternatives. Yet, usually, when these hard moves are relevant and important, it will be found that there is something in the position that suggests to the player the possibility of novel development (diagram 92).

THOMAS

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WALLIS

92.

*Typical Position in which Startling  
Moves may be Expected*

1. Kt—Kt5.      Q—B4.
2. Kt×B.        KR—K1.
3. B—B4.       R×Kt.
4. Q—B1! with devastating effect.

There followed :

4. . . .        B×P.
5. R—Kt1.    Q—QB7.
6. R—K1.     B—B6.
7. B—R3.     resigns.



The lightnings of Chess very rarely, if ever, strike from a clear sky. Before the storm bursts there are clouds to be seen as big as a man's hand, tension to be felt in the atmosphere, a recognition by the player that his game, or his opponent's, is being strained beyond its tensile strength by the projected play.


To state the matter another way, there are no miracles in Chess. Even if there is little useful meaning to be derived from such a statement as that Chess is the operation of cause and effect, yet it is true that there are antecedents perceptible to the Chess mind (not, be it noted, to the logical mind as such) suggestive of the general field of consequences. Certainly, Steinitz, acting on a so far insufficiently stated theory of balance in Chess, was able to defeat the immensely endowed Chess mind of Zukertort, of whom Lasker has said (in effect) that he was always trying to force the game to accommodate his brilliant ideas. In other words there are general factors in the Chess matrix, which, being recognised, are guides to play and aids to vision. Besides difficult tactics, there is a relatively easy coefficient of strategy.

Now we know the meaning of strategy from the analogous science of war. Strategically it was possible to believe that the losing of control of the Continent of Europe was not equivalent to the losing of a world war. In Chess strategy is not so abstract. In Chess the battle is more integral to the War than it is in modern warfare. But the distinction is, nevertheless, useful. Strategy is a set of relationships appreciated in that kind of thinking which enables a player to choose or prepare his battle ground. When Nimzovitch elected to avoid Queen exchanges against Capablanca (see Illustrative Games) he was making a strategic decision : as it happens a bad one. When, in the play, prior to the diagram position (No. 93) Botwinnik decided that his Queen would be more useful on the Queen side, and that his opponent Denker had nothing to achieve on the King's side, that too was strategy. So, too, Botwinnik's decision, while playing against Szabo, to capture with what, at first sight, might seem to be the wrong Pawn (diagram 94). Similarly, when one decides that play which invites a skirmish is dangerous and avoids it, one may be acting on strategic rather than tactical lines. One may be thinking with some degree of generality.

In practice, as well as in theory, strategic thinking is impossible

## BOTWINNIK

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DENKER

to isolate from tactical analysis just as, outside Chess, logic is not isolable from the particular subject matter that is being logically treated. There is a coefficient of strategy in all Chess

93.

*A Strategic Decision*


In allowing the King's side position to crystallize and in playing :

12. . . . . Q—Kt3,

Botwinnik takes an essentially strategic decision.

## SZABO

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BOTWINNIK

94.

*Strategic Decision*


White elects for an imperfect Pawn position but some middle game freedom with KP×P.

thinking : there is no "pure" strategy. The thinking about the relatively permanent features of the game, or of the process that is in hand, is inseparable from tactical analysis, or from some perception of the tactical possibilities that make the shape of the position that is being considered either desirable or to be avoided.

Typical is the following position reached early in a game between Konig and Smyslov in a Radio-match (diagram 95). When Smyslov played Kt—Q2 he was retaining a number of strategic and tactical possibilities. The problem for his opponent was whether or not to play the vigorous-seeming P—Q4. That move is playable, but not if reliance is being placed on the possibility P—Q5. That creates a doubtful strategic shape. One reason at least for the demerit of the resultant position is the tactical availability to Black of such a move as P—QB3, followed by Q—B2, and the generation of great pressure against White's centre.

SMYSLOV

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KONIG

95.

*A Study in Strategy*

Black has played :

9. . . . Kt—Q2.

10. P—Q4. B—B3.

11. P—Q5. Kt—R4.

12. B—B2. Kt—Kt3.


13. QKt—Q2. P—B3.

and Black after P×P, Q—B2 has at least an equal development.

In contrast there are many positions where the move P—Q5 causes difficulty to Black rather than to White, by reason of the tactical opportunities that the move makes available in the space

behind the Pawns and the restriction of scope on the other side of the Pawn curtain (see Illustrative Games and diagrams 96 and 97).

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
96.

*Strategic Advantage*

A position in which there is greater scope for White's further development than for Black.

NOTE.—The Pawn is better placed on K<sub>3</sub> than K<sub>4</sub>.

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97.

*Logical Outcome of Previous Diagram*

White Wins

1. R—KR1. K—Kt1.
2. P—Kt6. P×P.
3. K—K6 or
3. R—KKt1 wins, but not
3. K×P.

The general truth is that, in the building-up of a game, experienced players think about the centre, the endgame shape and

other features of the position, differently from the way in which they put their minds to tactical problems, thinking in continuous series of moves.

In modern Chess, this general thinking is manifest in the plurality of methods that exist for achieving the control of the central squares. The modern masters realise that a formidable appearing centre can be hollow, or can be flanked : on the other hand, that control of the centre can be achieved with fianchettoed Bishops, and Knights approaching the centre in roundabout ways and with the expenditure of much tempo. But there are very few occasion on which the thinking in these general terms can be isolated from the analysis of variations.\* If tactical threats without strategic control amount to blind fighting, strategic thinking without tactical motive is vacant contemplation.

Therefore it is insufficient to say that tactics consist of doing what requires to be done, and strategy of knowing what to do when there is nothing to be done. But that distinction is useful to enable players to be conscious of the double process that should be operating in their minds.


One clear function of strategy is to have regard to the Pawn structure. This, by reason of the irreversibility of the Pawn's move, is a feature of the game that always requires attention. A specific Pawn move may be useful, in order to drive a dangerous piece from an important square, but the tactician, in whose lines of analysis such a move occurs, has to study carefully the tactical-strategic weakness of the backward Pawn that may be left when the skirmish has worked itself out to equilibrium.

To leave backward Pawns is a frequent instance of strategic error ; and it is one of the strategic errors that are sufficiently near to the tactical level to be a possible cause of loss. On the other hand, tactical process may be available to solve the problem of the backward Pawn. There may be an eventual King movement combined with reciprocal Pawn advance to restore the balance : there may be an excursion by Rooks on an open file while hostile Rooks are operating against the backward Pawn.

\* An excellent example is the game Reshevsky—Dake, in which the pressure is on a strategic weakness ; but all the operations are tactical, and include charges in the strategic weakness itself.



In point is the game Reshevsky—Botvinnik (see Illustrative Games) : and here, in a narrower compass, is a position illustrating one solution of such a problem (diagram 98). But the problem is normally recognisable in relative abstraction. The general truth is that thinking about the Pawn structure is a part of Chess which, while inseparable from tactical analysis, is nevertheless of relatively independent importance.



98.

*Tactical Escape.*

White plays P—Kt5 and Black solves the problem by :

1. . . . QR—K1.

If :

2. P×P. Q×P.

3. Q×Q. R×Q.


4. P—B7. R—B1

and R(K7)—K1, a drawn endgame.

Analogous, too, is the consideration of that other irreversible decision—whether to exchange a Bishop for a Knight. Usually this is decided tactically, and on a general assumption that there are compensating features in the function of the piece retained. Quite often the decision involves the strategic consideration that the Bishops are of “opposite colour”. There are, however, situations where clearly the endgame will be more favourable to the scope of a Knight than to that of a Bishop. Then one plays tactically in order to force the appropriate exchange. Here, again, the strategic thinking is usually inseparable from tactical analysis. Either it takes place at the beginning of a movement of which the endgame is a continuation ; or it takes place so early that the result cannot be said to depend upon it.

In point is a line of play from the Ruy Lopez (diagram 99). Here the White player can, by exchanging Bishop for Knight,

secure the endgame advantage of four Pawns against three on one side of the board. Yet this line of play is not popular because the game is too fluid for the endgame factors to be relevant. If, however, such a decision could be made leaving an empty board (Kings and Pawns only) then it would be a good decision : but at that stage it would be tactical. Also in slightly different positions, the exchange may represent an important gain of tempo for tactical purposes.



99.


*Strategic Valuation*

After the opening moves :

- |            |         |
|------------|---------|
| 1. P—K4.   | P—K4.   |
| 2. Kt—KB3. | Kt—QB3. |
| 3. B—Kt5.  | P—QR3.  |
| 4. B—R4.   | Kt—B3.  |
| 5. O—O.    | Kt×P.   |
| 6. R—K1.   | Kt—B4.  |
| 7. B×Kt.   | QP×B.   |
| 8. P—Q4.   | Kt—K3.  |
| 9. P×P.    |         |

Black has compensation for any strategic defect.

6. Q—K2 may bring about a slightly better form—but also not decisive.



100.

*Strategic Decision*

Here it is important for Black to exchange his Bishop for Knight. Otherwise the Knight has a future on QB6.

Diagram 100 shows a position where the loss of the so-called "minor exchange" is necessary in order to avoid disadvantage.

So far, the argument is that Strategy and Tactics are relatively independent, but inseparable variables: that the structure can never be thought about without reference to the functions of particular pieces. Yet the reader must not infer from the foregoing the unimportance of strategy. Strategy is very important in Chess: but practical strategy is too concrete, and too subtle, to be isolated into general rules. A vague strategy is only vaguely helpful.


Thus in Chess there are no mathematical formulae, and nothing that corresponds to the "rule of the move" in the cognate (and very difficult) game of draughts.

Practically every rule that can be stated in Chess, can be shown to have exceptions, if not to be ambivalent. To leave pieces on the back row was once thought to be bad. Now we recognise that a piece may be functionally well placed there. Again, on logical lines, it seems good to save tempo. Obviously, if I can "get in" a move while my opponent's position is unchanged I have gained something. But there are limits to this doctrine. It may be that I have nothing better to do than  $P \times BP$ , and I would be wrong to wait for my opponent to play  $B-Q3$ , so as to cause him to lose a move. Similarly, if there is a useful purpose to be served by  $P-KR3$  or  $P-QR3$ , they cannot be regarded as losses of tempo. Thus Botvinnik has popularised a reply to Nimzovitch Defence based on  $P-QR3$  which many masters regard as loss of tempo. Yet it commits Black. For the rest, moves like  $P-R3$  (defensively) are only "provincial", as the epithet has it, when they arise from an aimless timidity generated by metropolitan excitements.

What is constructive in strategy is too empirical to be stated in rules. It is always an empirical question whether loss of tempo matters or not: just as it is not necessarily good to win material. Similarly, the "shape" of the game is not a matter for dogmatic pronouncement. If a player recognises, without exact analysis, that his attack should be on the Queen's side, rather than on the King's side, then he is being strategic (diagrams 101 and 102). Equally, his strategy may be correct if he disregards the Queen's side and launches a mating threat: or, if, as Lasker against

Rubinstein, he Castles Queen-side in order to attack more rapidly on the King's wing. Here, however, the function of strategy is harder to separate from tactical analysis than in the previous case. That suggests a reason why some of the great players of the Nineteenth Century are insufficiently valued as strategians. Their devastating attacks are so convincing tac-

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101.

*Strategic Decisions*


Black has played :

5. . . . B—Kt5.  
 White achieves nothing with :  
 6. P—KR3. B—R4.  
 7. P—KKt4. B—KKt3.  
 8. P—Q4. B—Kt3.  
 9. B—Kt5. K—B1!  
 10. B×Kt. P×B.  
 11. P×P. B×KP.

Better is :

6. P—QKt4. B—Kt3.  
 7. P—QR4. P—QR3.  
 8. P—R5. B—R2.  
 9. P—Kt5 with the initiative.

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102.

*Bad Strategy*

Black's last move, O—O—O, was bad. But prior to that the manoeuvre B—Kt5 was not promising. That was the "strategic error" proper. The danger of O—O—O was perceptible on tactical lines.

9. P—Kt4. B—Kt3.  
 10. P—QR4. P—QR4.  
 11. B—Kt5 and Black has no good move. Both P—Q4 and Kt—B4 are threatened.

If :

11. . . . P×P.  
 12. P—R5 with P—R6 to follow.


tically that annotators are apt to disregard or miss any strategic decisions involved in the play.\*

What requires to be recognised about strategy in Chess, as distinct from strategy in warfare, is that any canon that can be stated is more likely to be negative than positive. The Chess player is usually strategian when he refrains from committing himself, when, e.g. he acts on such a principle as that P—KB4 is "always too early": or that in a close Queen's Pawn Game Q3 is a less satisfactory square for the Black King's Bishop than K2: or that against a fianchetto the centre files must not be neglected: or that, in general, an attack on the wings cannot prevail if the centre is weak. These are empirical half-truths, which are useful as a sort of discipline for thought, but only "negatively," helpful to the finding of the best move.

The strategian is more active when he recognises his opponent's positional weaknesses, and plays tactically to enhance them. So Lasker, from the diagram position, plays so as to draw Alekhine's Pawns forward. But, here, again, the movement is so integrated with the intuitable possibilities of the board that

LASKER

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ALEKHINE

103.

*Strategic Play*

Black plays :

18. . . . B—KR4.

19. P—Kt4. B—KB2.

and White's line from KR2  
—QKt8 is weakened.

(Contrast this type of play  
with Lasker's play from  
diagram 91 (a). The strategy  
there is impossible to isolate).

\* It must be recognised that the modern consciousness of strategy enables players to give themselves more breathing space. Nowadays, battle tends to be joined either after preparation, or under the necessity of escaping from restraint.



the tactical vision remains the most impressive feature of the play, and reduces the strategy to an instance of the art that is concealed in art.


Strategy, it may be said, is at its best when it is least perceptible. The kind of control that a great master retains over the game shows always that he has considered all the important permanent features, even when it is impossible to say that any specific move was strategically motivated. His centre proves to be decisively strong : or his wing attack proves to be conclusive, while his centre is falling. It may be said generally that the knowledge that a good player has of the adequacy of his position, both for short range and long range operations, is strategic, while every line of thought is tactical.

He has not lost tempo without achieving some compensating positional advantage—a well-placed piece—a good Pawn structure. He has continued his development without being disturbed by threats. To do this he has seen the tactical lines, and has valued the permanent features ; but always of the specific position. He has not played a Pawn to QR4 because that is, *in general*, a good place for a Pawn, or refrained from it because it is, *in general*, a bad place for a Pawn. The movement of the specific game warranted the move, any permanent disadvantage being compensated. If such a disadvantage is not compensated then the far-seeing player is usually far-seeing enough to prevent the compromise from becoming necessary.

If rules of strategy could be stated, one of them would stress the importance of the retention of the control of one's own forces. The way to lose that control is to lose tempo where tempo matters, or to lose the control of important squares. Thus to have too few pieces in play, relatively to one's opponent, allows the latter to seize advantages. Also to find an opponent's Knight (for example) unassailable on a square from which it radiates threats is to incur disadvantage. So, too, the loss of control of an important diagonal is bad strategy; but the importance of diagonals, be it remembered, is never self-evident.

The value of space in Chess is always a variable. Space in which to manoeuvre is a factor subordinate to control. If the occupation of forward squares can be maintained, and free development proceed behind the forward Pawns and pieces,

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104.

*Formal Contrasted with Functional Development*

Here White is in danger, not Black.

If :

1. . . . . Kt—QKt5  
is strongly threatened.

1. P—K5. KKt—Kt5.

If then :


2. P×Kt. B×P.

3. B—Q5. Kt—Kt5.  
gives Black an excellent game.

the game is good (see Illustrative Game between Keres and Eliskases). But ambitious structures can be disrupted. An apparently backward development becomes good when pieces begin to penetrate the empty spaces of the opponent's position and when exchanges of advanced Pawns open lines for pieces which were functionally rather than formally well placed.

Time, rather than space, is the more reliable factor in control. A development in which time has been saved is likely to be a better

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(WHITE)

105.

*Functional Development*

6. Q—K2!. Kt×Kt.

7. QP×Kt.

White seems to be creating strategic disadvantages, but he is working up an attack.

There follows :

7. . . . . Kt—B3.

8. Q—B2. Q—K2.


9. B—K3. Kt×P.

10. Kt×Kt. Q×Kt.

11. B—Kt5 ch. B—Q2.

12. B×B ch. K×B.

13. O—O—O.  
with a winning attack.



106.

*Functional Development*


Black's pieces are doing more than White's.

Black wins by Kt×QP.

If P×Kt (Kt×Kt is obviously impossible) there follows R×Kt, etc.

development than one in which more time than the minimum has been consumed. This, again, is not a rule that is stateable in universal terms. There are positions in which time is not of the essence. Then what matters is the process of integration or disruption by the proper direction of forces. Or time may be gained and wasted by attacks which, failing to achieve the decisive result, serve only to consolidate the opponent's position.

In the result, it follows that the interplay of the pieces is some-



107.

*Error of Strategy*

At this stage, Black, who stands very well, can retain pressure on the King side while eliminating a Queen side danger, viz., R—QKt1.

Instead :


1. . . . . B—Q1.
2. R—Kt2. Kt—R5.
3. B—B1. B—Kt5.
4. Kt—KKt1. Kt—B4.
5. QKt—K2. P—KR4.
6. Q—Kt4 and White has a counter (in the event of the Black attack not being conclusive). This counter-development was something to be avoided by Black.

thing that cannot be appreciated in abstract terms. The Chess player is always engaging the enemy, and always preparing other forces to bring to bear in the battle. The frame of the game is part of the picture. An appreciation of general factors gives confidence, gives a certain guidance to thoughts of attack and defence, but is never a substitute for the detailed treatment of the empirical problems of the actual game. Both tactics and strategy include and involve seeing through the formal values of the pieces to their functional values. The strategian is a little more interested than the tactician in the values that remain after any skirmish : but what he sees (when his strategy is good) is the outline and some features of the tactical possibilities that remain (see diagrams 104, 105, 106 and 107).

In well-fought games of Chess, what happens is that each player plays insistently to articulate his game, to bring as many pieces as possible into the optimum co-ordination. Effective co-ordination is really what Chess players mean by attack. The player developing his forces is, of course, not in full control. But he will only allow advantage in exchange for advantage. The exchange of material is only one instance of this. Therefore it comes about that master games often end with each player

## BOTWINNIK

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ALEKHINE

108.

*Peace after Storm*

- |            |           |
|------------|-----------|
| 10. . . .  | P—Q4.     |
| 11. P—B5.  | B—B1.     |
| 12. P×QP.  | QKt—Kt5.  |
| 13. P—Q6.  | Q×P.      |
| 14. B—B5.  | Q—B5!.    |
| 15. R—KB1. | Q×RP.     |
| 16. B×Kt.  | Kt×P!.    |
| 17. B×Kt.  | Q—Kt6 ch. |
| 18. R—B2.  | Q—Kt8 ch. |
| 19. R—B1.  |           |


Drawn by perpetual check.

in a position to exploit eventually some important possibility (a free Pawn, e.g.) which prevents the respective opponents from allowing a final simplification. Given, further, a margin of draw in the game, it follows that determined development by both players, however aggressively carried out, should result in a draw. Some of the apparently wildest attacks do in fact result in draws. A simple example is afforded by a piece of play (diagram 108) between Alekhine and Botvinnik, now become a standard variation with a host of sub-variations.

Very amusing is the following draw from the so-called romantic period of Chess (diagram 109).

MEITNER

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(WHITE)

HAMPPE

109.

### *A Remarkable Draw*

Black has sacrificed every available piece for the attack, but just fails to mate.

If now White plays 1. K×B, Black forces mate with :

1. . . . K—Q2.

2. Q—Kt4 ch. K—Q3.

White plays

1. K—Kt5. B—R3 ch.


2. K—B6 draw.

But the proposition of the probability of draw is true in less spectacular circumstances even where some concrete permanent advantage exists. (E.g. many endings with K and P against K).

Victory, rather than a draw, occurs either through the mediation of tactical error on the opponent's part, or through a defective preparation for conflict so bad as to amount to bad tactics. Defective preparation can, however, manifest itself cumulatively. In the modern game losses occur most frequently through the combination of a slightly inferior preparation, and slightly inferior tactical play ; allowing, not overwhelming cap-



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110.

*Margin of Draw*


White with a Pawn up will have to defend very carefully.

If Black prevents exchanges before he is ready for them, the result should be a draw. At some stage  $R \times Kt$ ,  $Kt-B_4$  are possibilities open to Black.

tures or mating attacks, but the seizure of strategic advantages that can be exploited (see the following diagrams).

## MILNER-BARRY

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EUWE

111.


*Strategically Bad Position*

This position is bad for Black strategically, because White's tactical play against the centre Pawn is not difficult. It seems that Black has rendered White several favours (exchanges on d4) for which there cannot have been a strict necessity. The position obviously derives from a Tarrasch defence with Black playing passively. However, the game is not lost yet.

Black cannot play  $B-B_4$  followed by  $P-Q_5$  (apart from White's technical advantage from  $B \times Kt$ ). But  $P-QR_3$  followed by  $P-QKt_4$  generates a Queen side counter which should eventually equalise. In this type of position, however, it is easy to go wrong. Black played :

1. . . .  $P-KR_3$ . 2.  $B-KR_4$ ,  $P-KKt_4$ . 3.  $B-Kt_3$ ,  $Kt-R_4$ . 4.  $B-K_5$ ,  $P-B_3$ . 5.  $B-B_7$ ,  $KR-QB_1$ . 6.  $B-K_2$ ,  $R \times B$ . 7.  $B \times Kt$ , and now it is virtually certain that the QP will fall ; if, indeed, White has nothing better than its capture.

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(WHITE)

112.


*Clever Tactical Strategic  
Exploitation*

This diagram is a position developing from the last. White has delayed the capture of the QP and is exploiting other weaknesses first.

Kt—Q4 has given Black the awkward necessity of deciding whether or not to abandon the white squares to a Bishop and Knight attack.

Black, with R—Q3 (R—K2 is not better) refused to do this, at the cost of the QKtP which falls after White's R—QKt3).

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113.

*Endgame resulting from  
Previous Position*


This, the actual, one of many possible results (all advantageous to White) is an easy win for White, who, however, shortens the game with a pretty endgame combination.

- |            |          |
|------------|----------|
| 1. R—R7.   | R—R5.    |
| 2. P—R3.   | K—K4.    |
| 3. P—B3.   | K—B5.    |
| 4. B—K4.   | K—Kt6.   |
| 5. K—Br.   | K—R7.    |
| 6. R—KKt7  | K—Kt6.   |
| 7. R—Kt6.  | K—B5.    |
| 8. P—R5!.  | B×P.     |
| 9. K—B2.   | K—K4.    |
| 10. P—Kt3. | R×P.     |
| 11. K—Kt2. | R—R4.    |
| 12. R—R6.  | B—Kt3.   |
| 13. B—Kt6. | resigns. |

As the game proceeds, and the forces become integrated, the strategic gains of terrain are at once important and more tactically evident. Their liquidation is always an affair of delicacy and subtlety. In simplification by exchanges, it often happens that an advantage diminishes. But to rely on this is unwise. Sim-

plification can favour the attacker as well (diagram 114). Once again, there is no safe formula. Wisdom must be aided by vision.

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114.

### *Simplification into Loss*

Black has developed White through pressure on the Queen's wing. Now after O—O, Black has problems of development.


- |                |              |
|----------------|--------------|
| 12. . . .      | P × P.       |
| 13. B × P.     | B × B.       |
| 14. Q × B.     | Kt—Q3.       |
| 15. B × Kt.    | B × B.       |
| 16. Kt—K4.     | B—B5.        |
| 17. Kt—K5.     | B × Kt.      |
| 18. Q × P ch., | forces mate. |

What, then, is the mental act that differentiates strategic Chess from tactical Chess? One characteristic act is the assessment of the relative mobility of one's own and the opponent's pieces. Is one justified in attacking? Another characteristic act is the perception, among tactical lines, of a state—as distinct from a line of play—which is recognised as desirable or undesirable without further analysis. Thus, in the early game, it may appear, as the end of a variation, that a piece becomes well established on a good square (diagram 115). So in a later middle game it may be seen that at the end of a variation an endgame situation results which can be taken as favourable without analysis. Negatively, a similar perception would prevent the adoption (on the part of the opponent) of a line of play which could lead to such an endgame situation, or, which could leave any weakness in the structure of the game.

### JUDGMENT

But strategy is very rarely so clear cut. Firstly, space and time and development in Chess are functional, not formal : i.e. what pieces can really do matters more than their apparent emancipation. Secondly, there is a law of compensation in Chess

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115.

*Bad End Position from an Opening Line*

- |            |           |
|------------|-----------|
| 1. P—Q4.   | P—Q4.     |
| 2. P—QB4.  | P—K3.     |
| 3. Kt—QB3. | P—QB3.    |
| 4. P—K4.   | P×P.      |
| 5. Kt×P.   | B—Kt5 ch. |
| 6. B—Q2.   | Q×P.      |
| 7. B×B.    | Q×Kt ch.  |
| 8. B—K2.   | Q×KtP.    |
| 9. B—B3.   | Q—Kt3.    |
| 10. Q—Q6.  |           |

Black confirms White in his birthright for less than a mess of pottage.

whereby the possession of a good square tends to be offset by the opponent's possession of a good square. Most endgames produce dangers to set off advantages. These require analysis. If analysis does not yield more than the presentation of possible positions which are still indeterminate, then the player relies on a less clear mental operation which is called judgment.

Judgment is a strategic guess, and, at the normal level of Chess, is one of the most frequent—albeit least satisfactory—mental acts. The player who feels satisfied with the line of play he is adopting, because there are factors suggestive—rather than clearly demonstrative—of success, is judging. He is applying a rough strategy, valuing, rather than working out, the functions of his pieces, their scope, the shape of the attack or defence that he is projecting, the shape of positions that result from specific variations.\*

It often happens that a line of play is too hard to analyse exhaustively within the time at the player's disposal. He sees a few variations that are definitely in his favour, sees the possibility of one or two clever moves in the distance, sees no immediate

\* There is also a tactical factor in judgment. Perception of a "point" gives a feeling of confidence. E.g. 1. P—K4, P—QB3. 2. P—Q4, P—Q3. 3. Kt—KB3, Kt—KB3. 4. B—Q3, P—K4, and this Pawn cannot be won because of the check at QR4. The perception of this (which is typical short-range Chess) makes Black feel that he is in control.


refutation, and therefore, adopts the promising line, judging that the continuations will all be satisfactory.

In practice, the judgment that "something favourable will turn up" is true with a frequency that is inversely proportional to the player's laziness. To the Micawbers of Chess there only happen bad results and occasional pieces of luck when an opponent plays particularly badly.

One capacity that good players develop is a flair for the difference between vigorous play and feeble play. The retention of initiative is always regarded as a desirable thing—even if it is not clear what is being initiated. Loss of initiative is always regarded as a bad thing—and always correctly so.

Particularly as the game integrates in the middle game, an unfavourable balance can be created by play in which the difference of incisiveness, on the part of the respective opponents, is less than would determine the outcome of a normal opening. The diagram shows a position at which the judgment of one player was inadequate to make him realise that there was no time for quiet play, or that there were bad consequences to be anticipated (diagram 116).

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116.

### *Degeneration of Position*

White's use of tempo has left his pieces better integrated than Black's.

10. P—K4. O—O.

11. B—R3. R—K1.

(11. . . . Q—R4 is worth considering ; but best is 11. . . . B—Kt5, exerting some counter-presures).

12. Kt—Kt5 (threatening Q—R5).

12. . . . P—KR3.

(Black decides to force the sacrifice, instead of accepting an inferior game with B—K3 or P—KKt3).

13. Kt×P. K×Kt.

14. P×P. QKt—Kt1.

15. P—Q6. KKt—B3.


16. B—Q5 ch., B—K3. 17. B×B ch., R×B. 18. P—Q5, R—B3. 19. P×Kt, Kt×P. 20. Q—Q5, resigns.



Given superior play, it often comes about that possibilities present themselves in favour of the more incisive player that could hardly be anticipated far ahead. In point are positions from a game between Capablanca and Marshall. These constitute,

MARSHALL

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


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CAPABLANCA

MARSHALL

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

CAPABLANCA

117.

*Slipshod Play in the Opening*

4. . . . P—QR3.

A weak move. As White has played 4. O—O, instead of P—Q4. Black can play B—Q2 with a comfortable game.

The text gives White the normal attack against the Steinitz Deferred with a move in hand. He can play B × Kt without having played B—R4.

118.

*Failure to Fight Effectively*

White has played :

14. Kt—Kt5, preventing immediate O—O (P—K5!).

Black replied :

14. . . . P—Q5.

(Better was :

14. . . . P—B5.

Then, if :

15. Q—Q4. P—B4.

Or if :

15. Q—K2. B—Kt5.

16. P—B3. Kt—R4).

The game continued :

15. Kt × B. P × Kt.


16. Kt—R4. Q—R4.

17. P—QKt3, and the Knight re-enters via Kt2 and B4.

Black was eventually forced to rely on a King's side counter, with his Queen not well placed.

MARSHALL

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CAPABLANCA

(threatening mate!). 30. Q—K8 ch., K—Kt2.

119.

*Resources of a Good Position*

In exchange for loss of material and for White's good development, Black has something of a King's side demonstration.

In reply to :

23. P—Kt4! B—R5.

24. P×Kt. B×P ch.

25. K—R1. Q—B6.

with a threat. But White plays 26. R—K3! and the game is over.

26. . . . Q×BP.

(If B×R, 26. P×P leads to a mating attack : viz.:

27. . . . P×P.

28. Q×P ch. K—B1.

29. Kt—Q6, etc.).

There followed :

27. KR—Q3. Q—K7.

28. Kt—Q6. R×Kt.

29. B×R. B—K8

31. P—R6 ch., resigns.

incidentally, a superb example of the steady deterioration of a game through defective strategy.


In general, the judgment of a good player will evidently be nearer to exactitude than the judgment of weaker players. The former will see more, and leave less to chance ; and will play more ambitiously. Providence, in Chess as in life helps these effort makers. When two great analysts meet, as when two very bad players meet, one sometimes receives the impression that the result is a matter of chance (diagram 120).

At a high level, reliance on judgment is a factor in style. Some players will play an open, aggressive, game, judging that the evolution of the position will give them scope for the type of attack at which they are proficient. The judgment of other players is more conservative, or determined by a taste for defence, and by the hope of victory after the opponent's attack has burned itself out.

At the very highest level, differences in style are more pronounced than differences of ability. Capablanca possessed a judgment calculated to prevent him from ever risking the loss of control. Alekhine and Lasker were, in different ways more

SPIELMANN

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RUBINSTEIN

*Vision and Judgment*

White's last move R(R1)—K1 was only good on the assumption that Black has no forcing line.

1. . . . P—QR4.
2. Q—B3. Q—QB4.
- (maintaining a stronghold).
3. P—QKt4. B×P.

(Spielmann says that this move was actuated by judgment.

The fact that the Queen cannot be taken is an unimportant point. But there were many lines to be analysed, including 4. R—KB3! which was met by Q—B3!)

4. R×B.

(If:

4. B×B. R—B8 ch.
5. R×R. R×R ch.
6. K—Kt2. R—Kt8 ch.
7. K—B3. Q—R4 ch.
8. K—K3. Q×RP,

with a good game).

4. . . . R—B8 ch. 5. B×R, R×B ch. 6. K—Kt2, Q—B7 ch. 7. K—R3, R—KR8. 8. R—B3. (The only move to stop mate). 8. . . . Q×RP ch.
9. K—Kt4, Q—R4 ch. 10. K—B4, Q—R3 ch. 11. K—Kt4, P—KKt4.
12. R×P (forced), Q×R ch. 13. R—B5 (best), P—R3 with eventual Zugzwang.

determined to force ideas into the game, were more capable of irregularities in the opening, and experimental play calculated to give scope to their remarkable powers.

No one can say which of these players was greater. It is noteworthy, however, that at the height of Alekhine's powers, he was defeasible by lesser, but hard-fighting, players, like Bogoljubow, who never succeeded in defeating Capablanca. That, when judgment clashed with judgment, the judgment of Capablanca was almost indefeasible is evidenced by the cold-blooded, and inevitable-seeming, successes of the great master against that considerable virtuoso of aggression, Marshall.

Judgment, it may be hazarded, is best, when the element of the fortuitous in it is at the minimum; that is to say, when the function of judgment takes the form of a decision that there is no latent danger in the position. In the practical game of Chess, where time and fatigue are factors, a good judgment is as valuable

as intelligent guessing in the medical diagnosis of a busy practitioner. No analyst, however, rests content with a judgment when there is a significant line of play to be followed to its conclusion.


To say then, that judgment is desirable in Chess would be an over-valuation of an imperfect vision. To say that judgment cannot be dispensed with is to admit that the mind is inadequate to apprehend intuitively at all times all that requires to be seen. If judgment were not adequate fewer players would play well than now do so. By the same reasoning, few scientists would be at work if they demanded from themselves the perfection of apprehension which is the Platonic ideal of cognition. Chess is numbered among the inexact sciences, sometimes erroneously called the arts. The reader has seen enough of the conduct of master games to realise that the Chess mind does not fully control the field of thought in which it works, and while aspiring to that control does not claim to achieve it.

The judgment is something in the nature of a plumb-line, or a probe, returning vague but useful information. The player who is judging is asking himself intelligent questions.

Such questions include: Have I enough tempo in hand?

RAGOZIN

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BOTWINNIK

121.

*The Problem Already Solved*

*Control of Space*

Here Black has allowed White to occupy forward squares and to develop very freely. Now 18. P—KKt4 commences a winning attack. Black is cramped, and the Queen compromised. The Pawn cannot be captured, and will advance. Space must be found for the Knights, and the Pawns will break open the defences.




Have I enough space—including real control of advance points ? or, given disadvantage in time and space, can I hold the extra material that I am acquiring at the cost of tempo and space-control ?

The answers to these questions are given either by clear analytic perceptions or by the intelligent guesses of the experienced.


The diagram on page 115 and following diagrams illustrate various aspects of Chess strategy.

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122.

*Strategic Decisions**Compromising Play*

Black has played :

6. . . . P—QKt3.

This is not good but does not lose, and White can go wrong if he presses the attack too hard, viz.:

7. P×P. P×P.

8. B—Kt5. B—Kt2.

9. B×KKt. B×B.

10. Q—R4. P—QR3.

and White retreats. Best is

8. B—Q3 followed by Q—B2

123.

*Assessment and Preparation*


Black cannot play P—K4 without preparation unless he wishes to answer White's P—K4 with P—Q5.

Desirable moves are K—R1 and P—KR3, but White has counter-play with P—R5.

This may amount to nothing, or it may constitute a threat. This is a typical middle game with favourable features for both players.



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124.

*Opening Difficulty*

Black has already played slowly. Now he has to deal with White's thrust in the centre. Bad strategy involves difficult tactics.

Necessary is :

8. . . . P—Q3

and if :

9. B—Kt5.

9. . . . B—Kt5

holds the game.

Instead, Black played :


8. . . . P—KR3.

9. P—K5. Kt—R2.

10. P—Q5. Kt—K2.

(Kt—R4 would compromise the Knight) and with careful play, White should win.

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125

*Danger of Opening Up a Position*

If :

1. . . . Kt—Q5.

2. B×Kt. P×B.

3. P—K5! and

3. . . . P—Q6 is not playable, because after :

4. B×P. Kt—B5.

5. B×P ch.

gives White the advantage.

Worth considering, however, is

1. . . . Kt—Q5.

2. B×Kt. Kt—B5.


3. Q—Q2. P×B.

4. P—K5. P—Q6.

or :

4. . . . P—Kt4.

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126.

*Unbalanced Game*


Black has played to win the QBP, risking the K-side attack. This is quite a normal decision, but bad in this instance.

There followed :

- |                  |        |
|------------------|--------|
| 13. . . .        | B×P.   |
| 14. Kt—K4.       | B×P.   |
| 15. QB—Kt5.      | Q—B2.  |
| 16. Kt—Q6 ch.    | K—B1.  |
| 17. P—QB4.       | B—Kt2. |
| 18. P—B4.        | P—B4.  |
| 19. Q—R5.        | P—Kt3. |
| 20. Q—R4.        | P—KR3. |
| 21. B—K7 ch.     | K—Kt2. |
| 22. B—B6 ch.     | K—R2.  |
| 23. Kt—B7.       | R—B1.  |
| 24. Kt—Kt5 mate. |        |

NIETO

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

GOMES

127.

*Good Strategic Situation Requiring Tactical Exploitation*

A bad position, which, nevertheless, requires good play to exploit.

Given time White may be able to free himself with Kt—Kt1, Kt—Q2, and Q—K1.


Black plays :

- |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| 14. . . . | R—KKt1!.  |
| 15. P—B3. | Kt—R5 ch. |
| 16. P×Kt. | P—Kt4,    |

winning easily.

## TCHIGORIN

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

STEINITZ

4. P—QKt3, B—Kt5. 5. B—Kt2, P—B5, and with 6. K—B1 can hold the game.

In fact, Steinitz played : 6. Q—B2, Q × P. 7. K—B1, and with 7. . . P—B6 Tchigorin launched a winning attack.

128.

*Difficulties of an Undeveloped Game*

Steinitz has cramped his game in order to retain an extra Pawn. (The opposite mistake is to obtain insufficient attack for a sacrificed Pawn.) Black plays B—Q2, and now White cannot play Kt—KB3 because of :

1. . . . P—K5.

2. Kt—Q4. P—B4.

3. P × P. P × Kt.

4. P × Kt. R—K1.

and White cannot castle because of B × Kt.

White, in order to free himself plays :

1. P—Q4. P—K5.

2. P—QB4. Kt—K2.

3. QKt—B3.


(3. P—QKt3 is possibly better.)

3. . . . B—K3.

with 6. K—B1 can hold the

## ALEKHINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

EUWE

129.

*Resources Available Against Attack on Well-Developed Position*

White, overvaluing his attacking chances, has allowed Black to win a Pawn, and now expects a skirmish, starting,

16. . . . B—R4.

17. Kt—B3

and White has some threats.

Black, however, plays :

16. . . . Q—Kt5

and in answer to 17. P—Kt4 does not defend the piece against the threat of P—KB5, but plays :

17. . . . QR—Q1.

emerging with three Pawns and a superior development for a piece.

## HOW BATTLES ARE WON AND LOST


THE logician who approaches Chess with a view to discovering its inner truths finds his task easy—so easy that he should be warned that probably he is not discovering anything of importance.

It is easy to select a position, such as the diagram position (obtained by Broadbent) and say : Black won this game because there was a describable weakness to be exploited. To say this is to say that the patient died because he stopped breathing ; that an explosion took place because the forces within could not be contained by the forces without. Such propositions, we know, are not helpful to the medical man who is fighting a disease, or to the engineer who is working with, or inventing, explosives. Similarly a wide Chess formula is not helpful to the practical Chess player while the game is in progress.

Objectively regarded, every winning position, and every losing position, is an unbalanced position ; a position in which

R. J. BROADBENT

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

STEAD

130.

*A Lost Position*

Black has played well and White badly around the squares e5 and e4. Now that the Black Rook is established, Black can force a win.

There follows :

- |              |          |
|--------------|----------|
| 19. P—Kt3.   | Q—Q3!    |
| (better than | Q—B2).   |
| 20. Q—B3.    | Kt—B2.   |
| 21. Q—Kt2.   | QR—K1.   |
| 22. Q—B2.    | Kt—Kt4.  |
| 23. K—Kt2.   | Q—K3.    |
| 24. R—R1.    | B—R3.    |
| 25. B—Q2.    | R×Kt.    |
| 26. P×R.     | Kt—K5.   |
| 27. Q—K2.    | Kt×B.    |
| 28. Q×Kt.    | Q—K5 ch. |

resigns.

a player has a great advantage in tempo, or in space, or in the capacity to bring great force to bear effectively on a given point. But these characteristics are not easy to assess while the game is in progress.

An undeveloped position should not yield a winning attack. Yet it often does. In point is any one of a thousand Muzio Gambits at odds.

In these violent openings it is always the case that White is undeveloped. So is Black. But the relative merits of what development there is can only be found by seeing all the more important lines of play. Chess opinion has convincingly condemned many extravagant unbalancing attacks, such as the once popular Jerome gambit (P—K4, P—K4, 2. B—B4, B—B4, 3. B×P ch.), which yield the unbalancer nothing but loss against good defence. But highly aggressive and quite expensive lines such as the Danish Gambit can give rise to hard well-fought games in which the result is never a foregone conclusion. Nor are these attacks peculiar to the King's Pawn Group. In point are the illustrative games between Alekhine and Euwe, where the game appears unbalanced, but there are variations available to the defending player which prevent the attacker from achieving complete control.

What the strategian and the theorist of Chess have achieved is to instil into players the (correct) belief that, given development, there are resources. Chess, however, consists in finding the resources ; and the essence of the game is the seeing of what can be done, and what cannot be done, along lines of play leading from whatever move, in whatever position, is being considered.

Subjectively, the winning of a game of Chess consists in the laborious obtaining of a favourable balance (or unbalance) through the better tactical use of one's pieces. Sometimes we find that one player plays badly so as to allow of exploitation.\* So Broadbent's opponent in the example cited had played for the establishment of a piece or Pawn on K5, not seeing that, with Kt—Kt5 and P—KB3, his opponent could break up the apparently strong formation, leaving White with an uncompensated

\* A compendious statement may be helpful. Loss may be incurred by starting what one cannot finish, or by allowing the opponent to start something that he can finish. But the majority of moves are manoeuvres between these poles.




weakness ; and he had been unable to think out a tactical line involving P—K4. In other words the loser had not seen clearly or fought well. The exploitation by the winner was independently excellent. In general, battles are won and lost by the seeing of tactical lines on the one hand, and the omission to see them on the other. The losing position may be strategically described ! but it is a rarity for this strategic formation to be something that was not directly discernible as tactically bad. Strategic decisions there are, especially in the early stages of a game which are not identical with the apprehensions of clear tactical lines. But it is rare for the “ pure strategic ” decision (at best this means “ relatively ” pure) to amount either to an immediate cause of victory or an immediate cause of defeat.

Strategy makes the game smoother or rougher, it is tactical play that wins and loses. Two diagrams illustrate this. The first position (diagram 131) is from a game between two Russian masters in which one allows the other a quick attacking development on the centre squares. This was bad strategy, but it was also bad tactics. One bad strategic decision is usually insufficient

ALATORZEFF

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

TOLUSH

131.

*Bad Strategy*

White Wins

Black has wasted a lot of time through keeping his Queen in the centre of the board (in danger of an eventual pin) and playing aimlessly with his QB, which has now been exchanged at e2. Now he is in danger.

11. . . . B—Q3  
(inferior to B—K2, but that also leaves him backward enough to lose).

12. P—Q5! Kt×P.  
(if B×B ch. he will not be able to castle).

13. Kt×Kt. P×Kt.

14. Q—KKt3 (clever gain of a tempo).

14. . . . B×B.  
15. Kt×B. Q—KR3.

16. KR—K1 ch.  
K—B1.


17. Q—R3 ch. resigns.

to lose. Two bad strategic decisions are virtually impossible without involving bad tactical play. To develop (as Alatorzeff did) a Bishop at KKt5 where it will have to be exchanged, with gain of tempo to White, is bad strategy ; so it is bad to make one's Queen into an early target ; but there is nothing there that cannot be analysed as a line of play.

The next example (diagram 132) is a neat performance by the German player Brinckmann. Strategically his opponent has allowed him plenty of space (exchanging Pawns too freely) and has given him the option of closing the centre so as to attack on the wing. This danger (as well as the earlier undesirability of allowing the advance of the centre Pawns) would have been obvious to any competent analyst of lines of play. A good strategic judgment would also have prevented the debacle.

BRINCKMANN

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

LUCKE

132.

*Strategic Unbalance*

Black Wins

Black has played P—KR4. There follows : 12. P—KR3 (feeble, but there is little better).

12. . . . P—R5.

13. P—KKt4. B×P (the position asks for this sacrifice).

14. Kt×B. Kt×Kt.

15. P×Kt. P—R6.

16. B—R1. (There is no time for B×P and K—Kt2 but Q—K1 is preferable).

16. . . . P—R7 ch.


17. K—Kt2. Q—R5.

18. P—K3. Kt—Kt5.  
Resigns.

So far, the examples are of loss and victory at early stages. But an immense number of games are of long struggles in which choice is free at many stages—not predetermined by the pressure of development. Winning and losing decisions are harder to isolate. Dangerous pressure fails to win, and the opponent is left with superiority. This is typical of Chess at all levels.

The next diagram (133) shows a risk-taking defender recovering

(BLACK)



(WHITE)


133.

*Loss after Failure to Win a Battle*

- |                |           |
|----------------|-----------|
| 1. . . .       | Kt—R2.    |
| 2. Q—R5.       | R—Kt1.    |
| 3. Q—R6.       | R×R.      |
| 4. R×R.        | Q—Q2.     |
| 5. R—Kt6.      | R—QB1.    |
| 6. Kt—Q2.      | R—B2.     |
| 7. B—Q2.       | Q—B1.     |
| 8. B—R5.       | Kt—Kt3.   |
| 9. P—Kt3.      | P×P.      |
| (threatening : |           |
| 10. . . .      | Q×Q.      |
| 11. . . .      | R—KKt2).  |
| 10. Q×Q.       | R×Q.      |
| 11. R—Kt3.     | R—KKt1.   |
| 12. K—B2.      | P×P ch.   |
| 13. R×P.       | Kt—Kt4.   |
| 14. K—K3.      | R—Kt1.    |
| 15. K—Q3.      | R—Kt6 ch. |
| 16. K—B3.      | R—Kt7.    |
| 17. R—Kt1.     | Kt—B5 ch. |
|                | wins.     |

from the pressure exerted by his opponent and finding winning chances. In this case the opponent had not seen through his attack to the conclusion—had not seen, *inter alia*, that R6 would not be a good square for the Rook. Had he seen this he would have retained a balanced game. Let it be added, if it is not already clear, that big strategic advantages cannot be left to take

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

134.

*Difficulty of Exploiting Advantage*

There followed from an eccentric opening) :

- |           |                      |
|-----------|----------------------|
| 1. . . .  | P—K5.                |
| 2. B×Kt.  | P×KKt.               |
| 3. B×B.   | Q×B.                 |
| 4. Kt—Q5. | Q—K4.                |
| 5. P—Kt5. | B—B4.                |
| 6. Q—Kt2. | P×KP.                |
| 7. Q×P.   | QR—K1.               |
| 8. Q×Q.   | Kt×Q.                |
| 9. K—Q2.  | Kt—Kt5.              |
| 10. B—Q3. | B×B.                 |
| 11. K×B.  | Kt×BP ch.            |
| 12. K×P.  | R—K5 ch.             |
| 13. K—B3. | Kt×KR.               |
| 14. R×Kt. | R—K7.                |
| 15. P—Kt3 | and White stands     |
|           | surprisingly well !. |

care of themselves. How difficult their exploitation may be is illustrated by diagram (134).

Of close combat, examples from a high level abound in previous pages ; but the reader is particularly recommended to the position in the game between Szabo and Ragozin (diagram on p. 48). Here we see two players with their forces struggling on the Queen's Wing for control ; and Black undertakes a manoeuvre of great subtlety and elegance which gains him victory. This, incidentally, is the best type of Chess victory—that in the attainment of which one player plays so well that the other cannot be said to have played badly.

This last is also a striking illustration of the proposition that in Chess good moves win rather than good positions. Good positions in the hands of good players are more promising matrices of good moves than are inferior positions. In point is the resource found by Capablanca against Marshall quoted in the last chapter.

Of positions which lose (or win) " themselves " it may be said that they supervene after the battle (or capitulation). If the margin for victory is slight, then (usually) the battle has been well fought. If the margin is large, the discrepancy in the merits of the play of the two opponents has (usually) been considerable.


The highest type of Chess is that in which the winner wins by exploiting the minimum of weakness ; and does so in the nearest possible approximation to a continuous movement. This can be a violent, continued skirmish such as Lasker *v.* Napier (see p. 90) with development taking place while the battle is on, or a steady acceleration of tempo as advantages are gained. In the latter class the following series of positions between Alekhine and Grünfeld are worth studying as an object lesson. In these the strategic defects are cumulative, albeit individually slight, and they coincide with a failure by the loser to analyse exactly some difficult lines of play. The exploitation had to be brilliant.

The opening moves were : 1. P—Q4, Kt—KB3, 2. P—QB4, P—K3, 3. Kt—KB3, P—Q4. (The Q.G.D. by transposition : Black gave himself the option of a Nimzovitch Defence against Kt—QB3.) 4. Kt—B3, B—K2, 5. B—Kt5, QKt—Q2, 6. P—K3, O—O, 7. R—B1, P—B3, 8. Q—B2, P—QR3, 9. P—QR3 (strategically well grounded, but slow), 9. . . . P—R3, 10. B—R4,



ALEKHINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

GRUNFELD

19. B×Kt, B×B. 20. Q—B2, P—Kt3. 21. Q—K2, Kt—B5 and now Black is attacking (*inter alia* the QRP.)

135.

### *Decline of a Game*

**First Stage—Loss of Initiative**  
White has played a slow but quite strong development, relying on the assumption that Black cannot here play B-Kt2, because of K-Kt×KtP followed by R×Kt.

Black, however, plays :

16. . . . B—Kt2

because in answer to K Kt×  
KtP he can play Q—B3!.

White, seeing this too late, can do nothing to restore control of the centre.

There followed :

17. O—O. R—QB1


and there is now an attack by Black (Kt—K5 or B—K5).

White played 18. Q—Q2  
(Q—K2 allows B×RP) and  
Black with

18. . . . Kt—K<sub>4</sub> is in command of the board.

## ALEKHINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

GRUNFELD

136.

### *Decline of a Game*

Second Stage—Skirmish  
White with 22. B—K<sub>4</sub> defends  
his QRP, viz., if :

22. . . .  $\mathbf{K}t \times \mathbf{R}P.$

23.  $Q-B_3$ .  $B \times B$ .

$$24. \quad K_t \times B, \quad B \times K_t.$$

25.  $P \times B$  with an attack.

Black, however, replies :

22. . . . B—Kt2!.

There followed :

23.  $B \times B$ ,  $O \times B$ .

24.  $R \rightarrow B_I$  (to defend the RP).

24. . . . P—K4.

25.  $K_t - K_{t3}$ .  $P - K_5$ .

26. Kt—Q4. KR—Q1.


27. KR—Q1, Kt—K4.

and the position is critical.  
(See next diagram.)



## ALEKHINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

GRUNFELD

137.

*Decline of a Game*

## A Critical Position

Black is threatening :

28. . . . Kt—Q6

with obvious effect. At this stage, White must fight, compromising himself if necessary.

Best is 28. P—KB3.

Grunfeld recoiled from the implications of :

28. . . . P×P.

29. P×P. Kt—B5.

But that position is tenable.

Instead he played 28. Kt—R2 which seems to reserve the option of P—B3, but does not do so because of Black's combinative possibilities.

28. . . . Kt—Q6.


29. R×R. Q×R!

30. P—B3.

(See next diagram.)

## ALEKHINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

GRUNFELD

138.

*Decline of a Game.*

## Final Combination

White plays 30. P—B3 (at this stage his position is very bad if this move cannot be made) and relies on a temporary counter sacrifice to save him.

30. . . . R×Kt!.

31. P×P.

(If :

31. P×R. B×P ch.

32. K—B1. Kt—B5.

with a quick win.)

31. . . . Kt—B5!

(in conjunction with the next move, one of Alekhine's masterpieces).

32. P×Kt (forced).

32. . . . Q—B5!

(an exceedingly difficult move to have foreseen. The game is now virtually over because Black wins at least a piece).

There followed : 33. Q×Q?, R×R ch. 34. Q—B1, B—Q5 ch. 35. Resigns.


R—K1 (in order to make a flight square for his King), 11. B—Q3, P×P, 12. B×P, P—QKt4, 13. B—R2, P—B4, 14. R—Q1, P×P, 15. Kt×QP, Q—Kt3, 16. B—Kt1 (see diagram 135).

At this stage the reader is advised to refer to the Illustrative Games in order to see the dynamic effects in play of adequate, and less adequate, vision. In the games between Rubinstein and Capablanca, Rubinstein and Lasker, and even more strikingly in the famous game between Capablanca and Spielmann, he will see excellent examples of win and loss without the mediation of gross oversight.

It is to be observed in those games that the players are not at all stages concentrating on one possibility—fighting for and against the seizure of one particular point. Each player is developing his forces, working within his own frame of reference, which rarely (and only in relatively simple positions) coincides with the total

CAPABLANCA

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

SPIELMANN

139.

*Development of a Critical Position*

In this position Black has not secured sufficient freedom. The KB and the Kts. are not well placed. White has played 11. P—QR3, a much better move than O—O, because it deprives Black of a possibly good square.

Black plays :

11. . . . B—Q2  
which is slow. (Better would be B—K3 or P—KKt4 followed by Kt—K3 (with or without exchanges).  
12. P—K4! (seen but underestimated by Black).  
12. . . . P—Kt4.  
13. B—Kt3. P×P.  
14. Kt×P. Kt×Kt.  
15. B×Kt. B×B.  
16. RP×B and now Black has great problems to solve.


Safest is, perhaps, Kt—K3 (this when P—B4!).

Black played : 16. . . . Q—Q3 (in order to make possible B—K3).  
17. O—O—O, B—K3. (If: 17. . . . O—O—O. 18. P—Q5.) 18. Kt—B3, Q—B2. (Beginning an ingenious but inadequate defence. R—B1 might have been better. B—Q4 is met by B×B and Kt—Kt5.) 19. Kt—K5, Q—Q2. 20. P—Q5!, P×Kt. 21. P×B, Q—B1!. 22. P×P ch., K×P. 22. R—Q6 and White wins with best play.

of the possibilities of the board. What the player can do, and what his opponent can do in defence, counter-attack or relatively independent development, are lines of play with variations that he analyses.\* The better the player the more adequately he analyses. As the forces integrate with attacks becoming dangerous, and free organisation of pieces necessary to meet all contingencies, then the player who has played less adequately than his opponent will find that he can do less. He will encounter tactical difficulties that he has not anticipated; find that an opponent's attack is too strong to be met by what he thought was a sufficient defence. Either he discovers this too late, as when

CORZO

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

CAPABLANCA

strained position is held by an important piece (see next diagram).

Spielmann (see pp. 226-7) discovered that his attack on Capablanca's Bishop gained him no tempo—because Capablanca was prepared to lose the Bishop—or he discovers it when there is still time to change the plan, usually with loss of ground or tempo.

If he sees all the dangers that his opponent can create, and so plays as to be able to retain control, then he is playing at least as well as his opponent, and should not lose.

\* More accurately, "synthesises". He must create the "whole" that he investigates.

E

140.

*Central Unbalance*

Black has allowed an unbalance pressure on his centre because he sees an apparently good line, but his opponent has seen further.

Now, in answer to 1. P-K6, Black plays B-Kt4.

There follows :

2. Q×B!.
3. P-Q5 ch. R-Kt2.
4. P×Kt with an overwhelming game.

If :


4. . . . R-KB1.
5. Kt-Q4. Q×QP.
6. R-K8. Q×BP.
7. R×R ch. Q×R.
8. Kt×BP wins.

This is typical of what are called decoy sacrifices, which normally take place when a

Diagram 139 shows Capablanca in one of the very rare positions when he had not developed well, and encounters tactical problems that he might have been expected to see ahead. But even Capablanca nodded.

Diagrams 140 and 141 are of particular interest, because they show the effect of a change of a style. In his early years Capablanca always endeavoured to keep his game uncompromised. His opponents' compromising moves he exploited brilliantly. Later in life he tried at times to "force the game" and lost, occasionally, in the disastrous manner shown in diagram 141.

CAPABLANCA  
(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
BOTWINNIK

141.

### Central Unbalance

Many years later than the foregoing, Capablanca, suffering from blood-pressure and lack of confidence, finds himself with a game that he has unbalanced adversely to himself by Pawn hunting. But it requires a very clever combination to exploit this weakness.

1. . . . . Q—K1.
2. Q—K5. Q—K2.
3. B—R3 (a "decoy"). Q×B.
4. Kt—R5 ch. (The point). P×Kt.
- (If K—R3 White plays Q×Kt or Kt×Kt and White is soon out of check).
5. Q—Kt5 ch. K—B1.
6. Q×Kt ch. K—Kt1.
7. P—K7.

It is evident that White has satisfied himself that there is no perpetual check. 7. . . . Q—B8 ch. 8. K—B2, Q—B7 ch. 9. K—Kt3, Q—Q6 ch. 10. K—R4, Q—K5 ch. 10. K×P, Q—K7 ch. 11. K—R4, Q—K5 ch. 12. P—Kt4, Q—K8 ch. 13. K—R5, resigns.

Incidentally a study in the extent of vision.

An important phase in any combination is the creation of an unbalance or a strain in the opponent's position (diagram 142). The desirable state in Chess is to be in such control as to have the option.


### VISION AND CONTROL

In games of the type that we have so far seen, it is always hard



MASON

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

BIRD

142.

*Development of a Combination*

Black is threatening to remobilise with R—KB1.

White plays :

29. P—R5. B × P.

30. R × B.

This would not be good if R—KB1 was effective to drive the Queen from its attack on K6.

If, e.g.:

30. . . . R—KB1.

31. Q—B2

(or after Q—Kt6, R—B3)

then :

31. . . . Q × R.

32. Kt × P. Q—B2, etc.

However, in answer to :

30. . . . R—KB1

White played

31. R—R6. R × Q.

32. P × R with an excellent attack.

to prove how early the winning player saw all that had to be seen, and how much he left to chance and judgment. (We have already seen an example of a good move made by a player who did not know how good it was (diagram on p. 32). But the repeated successes of the great masters, always producing the decisive refutation of the opponent's best endeavours, indicate that they not only see further into the possibilities than their opponents do, but that they see what is relevant sufficiently early to enable them to make that position completely adequate for defence, as well as integrated for attack and the seizure, by force, of advantages.


If it were possible to inspect minds it would usually be found that along one of his lines of analysis a convincing winner has seen something important that the opponent has not seen. When the play eventually makes the possibility in question obviously relevant, then the player who has missed it at an earlier stage usually finds himself at a disadvantage—which will immediately or eventually be exploited. Certainly it is established that the losers of the games so far considered did not see the eventual refutation of their plans, the eventual success of the opponent's plans. Had they done so they would have played differently.



Typical then of Chess victory and Chess defeat, are the adequacy and inadequacy of vision respectively. The "pure case" which is rarely actualised in play, occurs when, in a struggle for a given point, one player has clearly seen further along the same line. This is rarely actualised in play because usually there is a *locus poenitentiae* in which a player who sees the possibility too late can retreat at disadvantage. The next diagram position exceptionally, however, reveals the often concealed essence of Chess.

SCHENK

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

ELISKASES

143.

*A Study in Vision*

White can play Q—K2, but prefers 11. Kt—R3.

Black sees some part of White's defence and counter-attack but not enough.

There followed :

- |              |           |
|--------------|-----------|
| 11. . . .    | KKt × P.  |
| 12. Kt × Kt. | Kt × Kt.  |
| 13. Kt—Kt5.  | Q—Kt1.    |
| 14. B—KB4.   | B × P ch. |
| 15. K—R1.    | B × R.    |
| 16. Q—K2!    |           |

The point that Black has missed.

- |                    |         |
|--------------------|---------|
| 16. . . .          | Kt × B. |
| 17. B × Q.         | R × B.  |
| 18. Q × Kt.        | B—R5.   |
| 19. Q—Q4.          | B—B3.   |
| 20. Q—R7 and wins. |         |


Here the player Schenk did not see along the line of play from the capture of the Pawn as far as his opponent Eliskases saw. This is quite demonstrated, because had Schenk anticipated the consequences he would not have captured the Pawn (his position not being bad enough for desperation), and had Eliskases not seen the complete process he would, quite evidently, have protected the Pawn on the previous move (Q—K2).

Analysing the matter further, one realises that, if a player sees such a tactical difficulty—that he cannot free his position by capturing a Pawn early enough—he will build up his game

differently. He must see adequately while the game is relatively fluid. Failing this, then either he engages in skirmish and is defeated, or, in order to cope with a tactical thrust that he under-estimated or overlooked, incurs some disadvantage, some permanent weakening or temporary immobility (diagram 144).

## VON GURETZSKY-CORNITZ

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

NEUMANN

144.

*Deterioration of a Game*

Black has compromised himself and now must play boldly

7. . . . P—Q4.

Instead he plays B—K2.

There follows 8. P—Q5 and

Black now sees that he cannot play 8. . . . Kt—QR4,

because of 9. B—Q3 followed by P—QKt4.

He must, therefore, play

8. . . . Kt—Kt1.

There follows :

9. R—K1. Kt—Q3.

10. B—Kt3. O—O.

11. Kt—B3. Kt—K1

(necessary in order to free his Q-side pieces).

12. P—Q6 with an overwhelming attack.

After :

12. . . . P×P.


13. R×B, etc., wins quite quickly.

Then the vision of his opponent is called for to make possible the exploitation. Sometimes decisive exploitation is impossible because the Chess matrix includes a large margin of draw ; and sometimes exploitation, though possible, is not achieved because it was too difficult for the opponent's apprehension.

In point is a recent example from the vast experience of Botwinnik, the present World Champion. Here is a position (diagram 145) which he was defending against his greatest rival, Reshevsky, and in which Botwinnik, as Black, had to concern himself with the defence of his QP. The moves he made indicate that he set out with the intention of defending by means of combinative counter-attack on the King's file. That attack is,




(BLACK)



(WHITE)

FINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

RESHEVSKY

(Avro, 1938)

146.

*An Unheard Melody*

Black considers :

8. . . . Kt—QB3.  
 9. P×P. P×P.  
 10. Q×QP. Kt—Kt5.  
 11. Q—B4. P—QKt4.  
 12. Q×KtP. B—R3 wins,  
 but abandons it because White  
 can play 11. Q—K4 and if  
 11. . . . P—KB4.  
 12. B—B4 ch. K—R1.  
 13. Q—Kt1 and White has  
 gained a Pawn.

147.

*Unheard Melody*

14. P—QR4.

If now :


14. . . . P—Kt5.  
 15. Kt—Q5. P×Kt.  
 16. P—K6. Kt—K4.  
 17. P×P ch. K—B1.  
 18. Q×QP. B—B3.  
 19. KR—B1. B—Kt2.  
 (If :  
 19. . . . P—B5.  
 20. R×P!).  
 20. Q×P ch. Q×Q.  
 21. R×Q. B×B.  
 22. K×B. Kt—Q2.  
 23. B×R. Kt×R.  
 24. B—Q6 ch. B—K2.  
 25. B×K. B×B.  
 26. R—B1 wins.

The reason why 14. P—QR4  
 (and independently sound  
 move) is necessary first, is  
 that if 14. Kt—Q5, even-  
 tually KR—B1 can be an-  
 swered with P—B5.


In the actual game Fine replied :

14. . . . O—O, rendering the speculation academic.

FINE  
(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
RESHEVSKY  
(Nottingham, 1936)  
STEINITZ  
(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
PILLSBURY

148.

*Unheard Melody*

An Easier Example  
Here White played 15. Kt—K5  
and Black cannot play :  
15. . . . B—K5,  
because of :  
16. Kt×QBP. Q—Kt4.  
17. Kt—Q6 ch.!

149.

*Heard and Unheard*

24. Kt×Kt ch. RP×Kt.  
25. Kt—B6l. P×Kt.  
26. Q—R4 ch. K—Kt1.  
27. B×P. B—Kt2.  
28. B×R. P×P.  
29. R×P and wins.  
If :  
24. . . . BP×P,  
Pillsbury had intended :  
25. Kt—B4. P×P.  
26. R—QKt1.  
But this is refuted by :  
26. . . . P×P.  
27. B×P ch. B×B.  
28. R×Q. P×R.  
and the Pawn cannot be  
stopped without heavy loss.

To sum up this chapter. Not all the melodies of Chess are easy to appreciate. So many games are won by the convincing exploitation of advantage that the wresting of the advantage goes unnoticed. The final forcing process is triumphal. But some good melodies are drowned in the applause.



## VARIETIES OF ERROR

WE have it on the high authority of Alekhine that no player can win a game of Chess unless his opponent gives him an opportunity. This was said in a note to one of the most interesting, but least known, of the games from the great World Championship Match of 1927. That game (the 27th—see Illustrative Games) is worthy of study, because it shows the varieties of “error” in Chess, and it is also valuable “for the record”, because it is one of the two or three failures on the part of Capablanca to reap the reward of his play, when, towards the end of a long and strenuous match, he began to show himself still capable of outplaying his great opponent.


The gift, however, that Alekhine refers to is not “error” but opportunity. He is speaking of a type of bad move (his own Knight manoeuvre in the game in question) which cannot be condemned as implying oversight, but which implies either a bad strategic assessment of a future situation that cannot be exhaustively analysed in any reasonable time, or else a decision to risk the consequences and rely on the resources of subsequent combat.

To call this “error” is, in a platonic sense, correct. But, in practice, this type of bad move, or any bad decision that cannot be demonstrated to be a failure of vision, is not described by Chess players as error, but as “not the best”. The distinction is all the more useful, because it seems to be true that games of Chess are very rarely lost by bad decisions which are not also failures of vision in respect of specific variations. The very rare occurrences of exploitation, by the winner, of nothing more than a defect of pure strategy are, for that reason, remarkable phenomena in Chess. Capablanca’s effort against Alekhine in the game just referred to, is, perhaps, one such masterpiece. So, too, is the former’s great victory over Nimzovitch (see Illustrative Games) in the course of which Nimzovitch’s only bad decisions seem to have been the avoidance of Queen exchanges long before the

winner's Queen demonstrated its efficiency (see also Reshevsky—Dake).\*

But in general, games are lost through oversights, through failures to see some particular danger along some line of play ; i.e. through tactical errors. If the manoeuvre that requires to be anticipated in time is difficult to see, then the winner, who has directed his play in the light of the possibility, has approached more nearly to convincing control of the board than is the case when the opponent has failed to see something relatively easy.

Certainly the failure to see something, whether far ahead or near, can cause loss without implying the superiority of the opponent. Ambitious players can defeat themselves more easily than their opponents can defeat them, by endeavouring to do too much, as when, for example, Lasker might have missed victory in the play from the next position on p. 53, and the next diagram prettily shows vaulting ambition o'erleaping itself and falling on t'other. This must be distinguished from greedy play,



150.

*Over-Ambitious Play*

18. . . . P—Kt6.  
19. Q × P. Kt—Kt6 ch.  
20. P × Kt. R—B3.

Black appears to have achieved a combination. But :

21. Kt—Kt4! (a difficult move to see) wins for White.

If :


21. . . . P × Kt.  
22. B × P ch. wins the Queen.

\* To argue whether a game of Chess can be lost without the mediation of any error, or inferior choice, at all is academic and unprofitable, because so many positions are not exhaustively analysable. Therefore no proof is possible. But it is a working postulate of Chess that if a game is not drawn, one player (the loser) has played weaker moves than were available to him. It may be useful to observe that this does not imply failure to see what could be seen. Inferior moves may be risks consciously taken rather than errors in the usual sense.

which is the snatching of material without adequate thought. The next diagram shows Mises taking excellent advantage of greed.

MIESES

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

CRADDOCK

151.

*Penalty of Greed*

Black induces White to remove all his forces from the defence of an attack that can, in certain circumstances, be launched.

Black has played :

1. . . . R—QKt1!.
2. Kt—Q5. B—B4.
3. Kt×Kt ch. Q×Kt!.
4. B×Kt.

(Clear analysis would have shown White his danger here.)

4. . . . P×B.
5. Q×R ch. K—Q2.
6. Q×R. Q—B6.
7. K—Q1 (there is nothing else, not even O—O).
7. . . . Q×Kt ch.
8. K—B2. Q—B5 ch.
9. K—Kt1. Q—Q6 mate.

In the convincing tactical victories of Chess, we usually find that the victor plays as if he has seen what his opponent misses. Such a victory is that famous one of Lasker against Pillsbury (see Illustrative Games). Also typical (though at a very high level indeed) is the game between Alekhine and Grünfeld already discussed. That, as we have seen, starts with the failure by Grünfeld to see a slight tactical point. This causes loss of tempo. Then Alekhine prepares his attack along lines rich in combinative possibility. Grünfeld fails to see the combination that can develop when Alekhine's position has crystallised: consequently he fails to join issue when the skirmish would be unsatisfactory but not demonstrably fatal. How far ahead Alekhine saw his final combination cannot be dogmatically stated. Certainly no move made by him gave his opponent respite. Everything was at all material times controlled. Against such powerful play, errors, particularly failures to see the distant and complex, detract little from the merit of the victory. These are the pardonable errors. Here, again, there are players who would

not call relatively inferior play of this type error, but just weaker, or inadequate, play : another example of providing opportunity, rather than a gift, for the opponent.

Psychologically the most frequent failure to see the difficult, or—for that matter—to see the simple, is a failure of vision, rather than of will-power. The mind is not sufficiently open except in the rarest cases. In most Chess, including most master Chess, the errors that cause loss are relatively grosser than those of Grünfeld against Alekhine. This is the case because there are very few players indeed capable of taking advantage of slight inferiority.

Normally (in high-class Chess) a player loses because once or twice during the game (some would say at least twice) he misses a tactical point, and fails, therefore, to achieve the satisfactory integration of his position. The opponent, missing less, and consequently controlling his forces more capably, eventually is able to force a decisive process.

At this point let it be remembered that the Chess task varies with the position. Some positions are challenges to the mind, and the mind has to compass depths and distances, before arriving at a decision. Or there may be no depths and distances, only a shallow foreground. Given a coarse position, the tentacles that the mind must extend into the Chess ether do not require to be strong and subtle. But in a position of difficulty and refinement the mind must be so keen that its capacity for recognition can glean the remotest corners of a tremendous field of relevance.


Most Chess, however, is not so difficult. A great number of moves are developing moves which, even if some of them lack subtlety, are correctly and effortlessly made by most experienced players. A critical position may supervene early or late, but when it supervenes it is not usually a position in which an innocent-seeming move can be proved to be fatal. Admittedly many players miss chances of subtler play than they adopt in, so to speak, quiet positions. But these failures are very rarely immediate causes of loss. The critical position, wherein a failure to see everything will involve loss, is usually a position where the battle is already joined and the tactical lines immediately urgent, and analysable with more or less effort.

The better player is one who anticipates the critical position before it develops. The losing player is the one who, in an average critical position, fails to see the practical and proximate tactical points. Apart, then, from the inherent difficulties of the board in opaque positions, we find that the common psychological factors in error on the part of good players, are an occasional mental passivity, also lack of imagination : very rarely lack of clarity. In weaker players we see the same defects intensified, with lack of clarity more frequent, and often amounting to confusion.

Mental passivity accounts for the failure to anticipate a new departure in the opponent's scheme of things. The "voluntary" move, not forced, not apparently prepared for, not part of an attack already anticipated or in being, is at once easy to see and easy to miss. The player whose attention is acute does not miss it : but in general Chess experienced players are apt to relax from mental effort from time to time ; and often at the wrong time. Thus Tarrasch, playing against Yates on the occasion of that excellent player's first continental appearance, was probably not taking his youthful opponent seriously enough. Having opposed the entry of the young Yorkshireman to the

YATES

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

TARRASCH

152.

Safe is Kt—KB<sub>3</sub>.Tarrasch played 19. R—QB<sub>1</sub>  
to which Yates replied Kt ×  
KP.

If :

20. P × Kt.

20. . . .


wins easily.

Q—Kt<sub>4</sub>



Tournament, the old master was possibly not in any of the frames of mind conducive to good Chess. He therefore failed to anticipate Yates's not very difficult move in the diagram position (No. 152) and succumbed to an attack comparable to the blow of Nemesis.\*

Analogous is the following position in an irregular opening where Black must be on guard against his opponent's P—Q6 (diagram 153). In the game from which this position is taken, Black intentionally allowed the move to be played, and eventually secured a good game ; but the risk was a serious one.



153.

*A Tactical Point*

Here Black has to recognise that White's threat is not Kt—Kt5 but P—Q6.

If he sees this, he may decide to allow it by B—Kt2. P—Q6, Q—K4 with good chances, but White's attack is very dangerous.


In contrast to the Yates—Tarrasch position, we have the case of Te Kolste, playing diffidently against his opponent Reti, and failing to find, in his own frame of reference, a promising idea (diagram 118).

Overawed by his opponent he offered, with R—K3, the exchange of Rooks. His opponent accepted, and demonstrated that he could turn an endgame advantage into victory as effectively as he could use major pieces. Had Te Kolste played 1. P—QR3, P×P ; 2. P—QKt4 he would have drawn as the analysis shows.

\* Tarrasch, who was a medical man, coined a good phrase for the grosser errors :—*AMAUROSIS SCACCHISTICA*.

## RETI

(BLACK)




(WHITE)

TE KOLSTE

That passivity can lose a won game, the next diagram illustrates (diagram 155), and the following diagrams are illustrations of the difference that vigour makes to the balance of a position. Needless to say, it is not always safe.

Energetic play (forward development), tactically sound, normally gives equality in advantages.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

154.

1. R—K3 loses because Black's Pawns are better than White's (e.g. one of them controls two).

Quite good is :

1. P—QR3. P×P.
2. P—QKt4. P—Q4.
3. R×RP. P×P.
4. R—R6 ch.!. K—Kt2.
5. R—R3, after which White loses his QKtP for the QBP, and can draw, with careful play, as this is not a position in which K, R, and four Pawns, can win against K, R, and three Pawns.

155.

*Degeneration of Good Position*

*Error of Slackness*

White, with a piece to the good, is playing without constructive ideas.


1. . . . R—QKt1.
2. B—Kt3. R—Kt2.
3. R—K2. KR—Kt1.
4. B—B4. R×P.
5. R×R. R×R.
6. R×P. Q—Kt5!

and Black has a strong attack.

7. B—B1 (better was B—R2, but: 7. . . . Q—B6 maintains Black's attack).

7. . . . R—Kt8.
8. Q—K2. B—K3 and wins.


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(WHITE)

18. R—Kt3 ch. K—B2. 19. Kt—Kt5 ch. K—K2. 20. Kt×KP, K×Kt.  
 21. Kt×QP gives chances to White after: . . . Kt—Q6 ch. 22. B×Kt,  
 Q×Q ch. 23. Kt×Qch., K—K2. 17. R—K1, K—K1 (a mistake after  
 which 18. Kt×QP wins). 17. . . . P—B4 will hold the game.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

18. Q—K3. P—QB4. and Black's position is sound. 19. P—QKt3. P—QKt3.  
 20. P—KB4. R—Q5, etc.

156.

*Energy and Timidity in Chess*

13. . . . Q—Kt3.  
 Black's first error against  
 White's irregular opening  
 play.

(13. . . . Q—B2  
 is good.)

14. O—O—O. Q—B2.  
 (An admission of weakness.)

14. . . . B×P.  
 15. Kt—KKt5. Kt×P.  
 gives Black chances.)

15. P—R5 (White's position  
 is crystallising favourably).

15. . . . P—B3 (better than :  
 15. . . . P—R3.

16. Kt—R4!). 16. P—R6  
 (bold). 16. . . . P—Kt3  
 (timid, but perhaps best).

16. . . . Kt×P.

17. P×P ch. K×P.

157.

*Typical Equalising Play*

White has played 10. O—O  
 (10. R—Q1 was possibly  
 better) and Black is able to  
 play :

10. . . . P—K4  
 taking advantage of an ulti-  
 mate pin of White's Bishop,  
 and so solving the problem  
 (which is inveterate in the  
 QP) of Black's QB.

There followed :

11. Kt×Kt ch. (best).

11. . . . Q×Kt.

12. P×P. Kt×P.

13. Kt×Kt. Q×Kt.


14. KR—K1. Q—B3.

15. R—K3. P—KKt3.

16. QR—K1. B—K3.

17. R—K5. QR—Q1.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

158.

*Vigour and its Dangers*

After a Sicilian Defence in which Black stands well (through the early freeing manoeuvre P—QKt4) it is important to turn the advantage to account quickly before White's attack commences.

Best is :

1. . . . P—K3.

If P—KKt4,

2. . . . P×QP.

3. P×QP. B×Kt.

4. B×B P—B5!.

Inferior is :


1. . . . P—K4.

2. Kt—B2! and in order to retain initiative Black must sacrifice ; and the outcome is not clear.

The next position, in which Lasker overlooked a move by his opponent, Bogoljubow, that himself could have prevented by altering the order of his moves, is typical of the oversights that

## BOGOLJUBOW

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

LASKER

159.

*Automatism*

In answer to :

1. . . . R×R

White played Q×R which is met by B—Kt4, giving Black plenty of play.


2. P—B6 ch. would have prevented this.

The automatic recapture was probably due to fatigue.



## BOGOLJUBOW

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

LASKER

160.

*Margin of Draw*

Black played :

1. . . . R—KB1

and lost.

He can draw by :

1. . . . R—Q1.

One variation is :

2. Q—R7. R—Q2.

3. Q—B5. B—R5.

4. R—KB1. R—Q8!.

Simpler is :

2. . . . B × Kt ch.,


etc.

This is a good illustration of the margin of draw.

occur in good Chess. The move missed was not hard to see. The passivity here is physical, not volitional. Later, in the same game, we find Black committing a more important error—failing

LASKER

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

SCHLECHTER

161.

*Point of Analysis*

White has played 1. Q—B2.

Black attempts to win a piece by P—KKt4.

2. B—Kt3. P—B5.

There follows :

3. B × P ch. K—R1.

4. Q—Kt6 and

4. . . . Kt—B3

is forced.

Lasker's error consisted in his expectation of :

3. P × P. P × P.

before B × P ch.

In that event he would have had a good defence in B—B1 (after Q—Kt6).

This is the opposite of missing a Zwischenzug.




to see a drawing manoeuvre which it would have been meritorious to see. Bogoljubow's error is also physically accountable, because the idea was not beyond that master's mental range.

The converse of Lasker's error is seen in the diagram 161, where he misses his opponent's Zwischenzug. Apart from fatigue, the main cause of this type of error (on the part of players capable of seeing) is that obsession with one's own plans which thrusts some variations temporarily out of the field of consciousness.

The next diagram shows Lasker more recently benefiting from an opponent's failure to see a Zwischenzug (diagram 161A).

EUWE  
(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
LASKER

161(a).

*Missing a Zwischenzug*

In answer to 1. K—Q3, Black, instead of moving or defending the Knight, counter-attacked with B—R4, overlooking

2. P—QKt4 B×P.

3. Kt—B2 winning a piece.


In the next diagram position we find Alekhine against Steiner failing (through obsession with his own plans) to observe a fairly easy Queen capture available to his opponent.

Again, here is the same great player, relaxing too early in a game with Yates (diagram 163)—a player who achieved excellent results against Alekhine—and falling into difficulties.

And there is Yates (diagram 164), having outplayed Alekhine in a position quoted on p. 184, making, later in the game, an oversight that loses. This is evidence, if any is required, that

## ALEKHINE

(BLACK)




(WHITE)

A. STEINER

## YATES

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(WHITE)

ALEKHINE

162.

*Missing an Idea*

1. . . . Kt—Q2?  
with a view to redistribution.  
2. P—B5 (good but not the best.

Best is :

2. Q×B. P×Q.  
3. R×Kt, winning the Q).  
2. . . . B×P.  
3. Kt×BP, clever, but not good enough to win.  
3. . . . Kt—Kt3.  
4. QKt—Q6 (over complicating. Better is KKt—Q6).  
4. . . . B—Kt5!.  
5. R—Q2. R—K1.  
6. Kt×R. R×Kt.  
7. Kt—Kt5. P—R3.  
and a piece is lost.

163.

*Errors of Passivity*

Black stands well, but allows himself the luxury of a routine move (correct was Q×KP).

31. . . . B—Q4.  
32. Q—R7 ch. K—B1.  
33. R×B?

The error of "positional play."  
(33. B—Kt6 wins, viz.:  
33. . . . Q—K6 ch.

34. R—B2!).

The game continued :

33. . . . P×R.  
34. B—Kt6. K—K1!!.  
35. R×BP. R—B8 ch.  
and White has no wins even with his discovered check!

Alekhine now makes the mistake of trying to win a drawn game.

36. K—B2. Q—R5 ch.  
37. K—K3. Q—K8 ch.  
38. K—B3. R(B1)—B6 ch.!


(Exactly calculated).

39. P×R, R×P ch. 40. B—Q3, Q—B8 ch. 41. K—K3, R×B ch. 42. Q×R, Q×Q ch. 43. K×Q, K×R. 44. K—B3, K—K3. 45. K—Q4 with a won endgame.

physical factors cannot be separated from the Chess effort in the practical game. Good players can overlook easy things, and near things, even—or, should we say, especially?—in games where they are seeing over great distances and difficulties.

## ALEKHINE

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


(WHITE)

YATES

MARCO

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

VON POPIEL

164.

*Error*

Yates, having played hard and seen much, misses a short idea under fatigue.

37. P—R<sub>3</sub>?. R—KB<sub>5</sub>.38. K—Kt<sub>2</sub>. R×RP.39. Q—Q<sub>3</sub>. R—Q<sub>5</sub>

and Black is left with a winning endgame.

164(a).

*Premature Resignation!*


Black resigns but could win by

1. . . . B—Kt8!

Gross errors—leaving pieces *en prise*, etc.—are rare at the level of good Chess, but clever ideas can be quite easily missed by a player whose thoughts are elsewhere, even when the idea is very near in the series of moves. In point is diagram 165, in which Capablanca's strong opponent misses a very short variation—that B—Kt2 was playable. Also in point is the Tartakower—Reti position already quoted. Almost too well known is the error of Marco who resigned a won game, because he failed to see his own “next move”, which could both save the game and win the game (diagram 164A). Nearer to our own day, Flohr has been known to resign a game that was not lost, through failure, under fatigue or time-pressure, to see something immediate. The position is not significant enough for reproduction.\*

## CAPABLANCA

(Avro, 1930)  
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(WHITE)

FINE

165.

*Missing Imminent Idea*

1. P—KB4 (better was Q×Q followed by P—KB4, with big advantage.

1. . . . B—Kt2!.

with an attack. Then follows

2. R—B2. B—K5.

3. Q—Q2. K—B2.

4. R—K1 (to stop sacrifices at g2 followed by Q—K5 ch.).

4. . . . R—Kt5.

5. Kt—B5 (better was P×P).

5. . . . B×KtP.

6. R×B. QR—KKt1.

7. R—K2. P×P.

8. Kt—Kt7. Q—Q4.

9. R×R. R×R ch.

10. R—Kt2. R×R ch.

11. Q×R. P—B6.

12. Q—R3.

Thereafter winning is difficult for White and the game soon ended in a draw.


So we add to the factor of mental passivity, the lack of resilience that characterises minds fatigued and anxious.

It happens to the most imaginative players that they miss on occasion exactly the kind of move they might be expected to see. Thus (diagram 165A) we find Marshall ruining one of the few opportunities given to him by a youthful Capablanca.

\* For another premature resignation see p. 69.

## CAPABLANCA

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MARSHALL

165(a).

*Missing Imminent Idea*


White played Q—Kt5 and eventually lost. He can, however, win outright by

1. Q—K8 ch. K—Kt4.
2. P—B4 ch. If then
2. . . . K—B3.
3. Q—KR8 ch. wins the Queen. If
2. . . . K—Kt5.
3. Q—K2 mate.

From here the transition is easy to failure of imagination generally.

The line is hard to draw between moves that a player would see if his mind were fresh and his effort keen, and moves which are beyond his capacity. Even among relatively weak players, there are few who will attribute to lack of capacity failures that

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(WHITE)

166.

*Overlooking the Development of an Attack*

Black has played :

10. . . . B—K3  
with a view to weakening  
White's long diagonal.
11. KKt—Kt5. B×P?
12. B—K3. Q—Kt5.
13. P—QR3. Q—Kt6.
14. B—Q1 wins the Queen.




can be attributed, however unconvincingly, to lack of effort.

In practice, the really good player sees imaginative ideas far ahead and near. The less imaginative player, while still a good and clear analyst, can miss cleverness very near to actualisation. Usually, among good players, the decisive "next move" (and, of course, this means the series commencing with the next move) is missed by the player whose position has already deteriorated: though there are players who only see good moves when their positions are bad. More typical is the omission by one of Morphy's many unhappy opponents (diagram 167) to see a quite quick, and unusual mating attack: and the reader has already seen plenty of examples of good moves that can be overlooked by the player to whom they are immediately available, or against whom they are immediately threatened.

### MORPHY

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(WHITE)

167.

White, in a bad position, should play Q—R4: plays, however, Q—B2.

There follows:


- |          |            |
|----------|------------|
| 1. . . . | Kt(B3)—Q5. |
| 2. Q—K4? | Kt—Kt6.    |
| 3. Q×Q.  | Kt(Q5)—    |
|          | K7 mate.   |

The next diagram shows a position reached by a master of great ability and some imagination who, having won the exchange by vigorous play, yet failed to find an ingenious method of saving a piece. (Here the word "ingenious" is advisedly used as the adjective to describe resource rather than fine vision.)

This is a good example of failure to see possibilities available to oneself. Strictly speaking, the board is a unity, but psychologically one does not, in any complex position, project the

## MONTICELLI

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(WHITE)

HAVASI

168.

*Black to Play and Win*

White has played 1. B—K4.

1. . . . B—R3.

If 2. Q×B, P—QKt4 wins.

Instead Black played :

1. . . . Q—Q2.


and eventually lost.

opponent's matrix of possibilities as clearly or as fully as one projects one's own plans. Therefore it is easier to miss ideas that seem to lie in one's opponent's frame of reference. This can be difficult in complicated games, even over the shortest range (see diagram 168A). If the idea is far ahead and can be realised only after intermediate play which consists in one variation among many—and that conditioned by the opponent's decision—then to miss such an idea is hardly error. And it may be added that games are not often lost by failure to see clever ideas at a great distance : only when play is concentrating itself into long forced sequences, does the idea at the end of the sequence determine the result of the game. Most of the distant brilliant ideas are possibilities rather than necessities. Such was Rubinstein's Q—B1 against Lasker. The line of play that led to it need not have been played ; but Rubinstein's Q—B1 against Capablanca was relevant at the moment of the exchange of minor pieces. That is about as far ahead as a master is ever called upon to see in the middle game. Not to see such ideas is the upper limit of error, beyond which failures to see can hardly be called error at all.

More practically important is the failure to see the fine point

## BOLESLOVSKI

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168(a).

*"Hanging" Pieces*


Missing an intervening threat  
 1. R × P?. R—KKtr!.

that makes the difference between the effectiveness and the ineffectiveness of an opponent's attack.

Had Nimzovitch been defective in imagination he would not have anticipated the mating attack shown as possible in the diagram on p. 78. The Knight move to B6 is hard to see at any distance. Had Nimzovitch's imagination been even greater he might have avoided the position altogether. To have done so would have been superb play; and even to have missed the mating attack would have been to commit an error of which few masters would be justified in feeling ashamed. The really distant (and yet vital) dangers are, be it repeated, comparative rarities. Most of the omissions to see that matter take place in a narrower compass.

A player can think along a line of play, omitting what is called a *Zwischenzug*—an interpolated move that disturbs the logical process of the defence or attack (such as Euwe missed in the diagram position on p. 147). An extreme example (diagram 169) is the check by a Rook at R8 before the move Q—R5. The latter move threatens mate and, possibly, disrupts the position; but the absence of check may give an important tempo to the defence. The R—R ch. deprives the defence of tempo and forces mate.

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169.

*Point of Order*

1. Q—R5 is met by B × P.

But :

1. R—R8 ch. K × R.


2. Q—R5 ch. K—Kt1.

3. P—Kt6 forces mate.

In general, points of order are easy to miss. One of the simplest occurs, when, emerging into the end game, a player discovers that his opponent can make an important Pawn move, or an important check, before attending to what appeared to be a priority.

The next three diagrams show finesses easy to overlook.

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170.

*Surprise in Endgame*

1. . . . R—Q6 ch.

2. K—Kt4. R × RP.


3. P—R5 ch. K—Kt2.

4. R(K)—B2. R—K2.

5. P—K6! wins.

DAKE


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BERNSTEIN

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171.

*Finesse Overlooked*

The actual game continued :

- |          |         |
|----------|---------|
| 1. . . . | R×R ch. |
| 2. K×R.  | R×R.    |
| 3. P×R.  | K—B6.   |
| 4. P—B6. | K—B5.   |
| 5. K—K2. | K—B4.   |
| 6. K—K3. | K×P.    |
| 7. K—B4  | drawn.  |

Black can win however :

- |          |           |
|----------|-----------|
| 1. . . . | R—B8 ch!. |
| 2. R×R.  | R×R ch.   |
| 3. K×R.  | K×R.      |

and Black has the opposition and wins.

172.

*A Rare Finesse—Study by Joseph White to Win*

Clearly Black gains in an immediate Pawn push, because one of his moves will be check.

The winning method is as follows :

- |               |           |
|---------------|-----------|
| 1. K—B2.      | K—R7.     |
| 2. K—B3.      | K—R6.     |
| 3. K—B4!.     | K—R5.     |
| 4. P—B4.      | P—Kt4 ch. |
| 5. K—K3!.     | K—R6.     |
| 6. P—B5.      | P—Kt5.    |
| 7. P—B6.      | P—Kt6.    |
| 8. P—B7.      | P—Kt7.    |
| 9. P—B8=Q ch. | Wins.     |


5. . . . K—R6  
is necessary to prevent K—B2  
and K—Kt1.

As we approach the endgame we find more scope for the mental function which is clarity. In the middle game good players can usually keep track of the lines that are opened and closed by the movements and exchanges of pieces. Only weak



## NAJDORF

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


(WHITE)

FINE

FINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

RESHEVSKY

173.

This is drawable by :

64. Kt—B2. Kt—K6 ch.  
 65. K—Kt1. P—Kt4.  
 66. Kt—Q3. P—R4.  
 67. Kt—K5. P—Kt5.  
 68. P×P. P×P.  
 69. Kt—Q3, etc.

Instead White played :

64. P—R3? and there followed :

64. . . . Kt—K6 ch.  
 65. K—R2. Kt—B7.  
 66. K—Kt2. Kt—K8 ch.  
 67. K—B2. K×P  
 (the point).  
 68. K×Kt. K—Kt7.  
 69. K—K2. P—R4.  
 70. Kt—Kt5. P—R5.  
 71. Kt—K6. P—Kt4!.  
 72. resigns.

For if :

72. Kt×P. P×R6.  
 73. Kt×P. K×Kt.  
 74. K—Q3. K—Kt7.  
 75. K—K4. K—Kt6, etc.

174.

*Tactical Points*

Through loss of tempo, Black has allowed his opponent to play 24. P—QR3.

The best reply appears to be

24. . . . P×P,  
 followed by :

25. Q×Q. P×Q.  
 26. Kt×P. P—Kt5.  
 27. Kt—B4. Kt—Q4!.  
 and there is much to do.  
 Instead, Black, under time pressure, played :

24. . . . Kt—Q4.  
 25. P×P. Kt×Kt ch.  
 (Not Q×P because of 26. Kt×Kt! and not Kt×P because  
 26. R—Kt1. P—R4.  
 27. Kt×RP!.)


There followed :

26. Kt×Kt. B—Q3.  
 27. R—QKt1 (missing 27.  
 P—Q5!).  
 27. . . . R—Kt?  
 (missing B×P!).

28. Q—R2, P—QR4 (better was : 28. . . . B×P!). 29. Kt—B4! 29. . . .

B×QKtP. 30. Kt×P, Q—R3. 31. K—B1? (better was R—Kt2 defending Q as well as P). 31... R—Kt3. 32. R—R1!, B—B6. (Not B×Kt. 33. Q×B, R—Kt8 ch. 34. K—B2, R×R. 35. Q—Q8 mate). 33. R—B1!, B—Kt7. (Not B×P. 34. Kt—Kt3!). 34. R—B2 (not the best: R—B4 is better). 34... P—Kt3 (an error: the technician plays P—R3 automatically to avoid the check on K5). 35. R×B, R×R. 36. Q×R, Q×Kt. 37. Q—Kt8ch. (See next diagram).

FINE  
(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
RESHEVSKY

175.

*Wrong Appreciation of Endgame*

White played 38. K—B2 and after:

38. . . . Q—R8  
the game was eventually drawn.

But in the play preceding the diagram, White at least (and probably both players) failed to see that 38. Q—K5 ch. wins for White.

38. Q—K5 ch. Q×Q.

39. P×Q. K—B1.

40. P—R4. K—K2.

41. K—Kt2. K—Q2.

42. P—R5.

If:

42. . . . P×P.

43. K—R3. K—B3.

44. K—R4. K—Q4.

45. P—B4. K—K5.

46. K×P. K—K6.

47. K—R7. K—B7.

48. K×P. K×KtP.

49. P—K3, etc., wins.

Other variations are easier.


players "forget" (if that is the proper word) that a certain point will no longer be defended when a given manoeuvre has been made.

But in the endgame, paradoxically on the very open board, masters can find the paths of the pieces hard to follow clearly. In point is a recent endgame between two great players, Fine and Najdorf (diagram 173).

To follow all the Knight manoeuvres required a hard effort; and efforts in the endgame are the harder because of the additional factor of fatigue. Fatigue and time-pressure account for the kind of error that occurred in the game from which diagrams 174 and 175 are taken.

MICHELL

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
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WAHLTUCH

the KKtP, but cannot prevent the Black King from reaching KR1 and drawing.

JANOWSKI

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(WHITE)

MARSHALL

175(a).

*Type of Endgame Error*

1. P-B4. K-Q3?
2. K-K3. K-B4.
3. K×P. K×P.
4. P-KR4. P-QKt4.
5. K-K5. P-Kt5.
6. K-Q6!. K-Kt4.
7. K-Q5, after which both Q side Pawns fall and the White King captures the KKtP with enough tempo in hand.

*What could have Happened*

1. P-B4. K-K4!.
2. K-K3. P-KKt4.
3. P-KR3. K-B4.
4. P-QR4. K-K4.
5. P-B5. P×P.
6. P-R5. K-Q4.
7. P-R6. K-B3.
8. K×P. K-Kt3.
9. K-Q5. K×P.
10. K×P, and can capture

175(b).

*A Technical Error in Endgame*

1. . . . K-Kt8?
2. R-Kt4 ch. K-R7.
3. K-B2! and Black is paralysed.

Instead,

1. . . . K-Kt7.
2. K-K2 (best). R-R8.

draws.


“Simple” positions, like the above, are the hardest, because decisions can rarely be corrected.



ing the error. The very best players very rarely make any perceptible tactical error. They lose by choosing a bad strategic line and persisting in it. They lose, in effect, by trying to do too much (or too little). Their errors are better described as faults of volition rather than lapses of intellect.

## SOME DEGREES OF ERROR

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
177.

*The Almost Immediate*

White playing B—Kt5 sees that Kt×P attacks his Queen; but sees further that if Kt×P; B×Q, Kt×Q; P×Kt wins a piece: and may also see, further, that thereafter, Kt—B5 is met by B—B6, giving White time to defend the KKtP.

Black replying to B—Kt5 with Kt×P is guilty of missing the almost immediate.

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(WHITE)

178.

*Very Elementary Error*


White's last move was Kt—QB3, met by Kt×KtP.

From a knowledge of the moves it is evident that Black threatens mate, and that P×Kt allows mate.

This was visible with little mental effort; further back, when White played P—QB4, attacking a bishop (in answer to P—KR3, attacking a Knight), the present situation should have been anticipated.



(BLACK)



(WHITE)

179.

*Missing the Point of a Witticism in Chess*

White to Move

The elementary R—Kt2 threatens P=Q and is met by R—Kt1.

1. R—R2 and Black cannot save himself by R—Kt1 because of 2. R×P, followed by R—R8.

Also the Black King is too far away.


According to the ordinary idiom of chess, resigns seems to be the proper reply.

Instead Black plays :

1. . . . K—Kt1.
2. R×P. R—K8 ch.
3. K—R2 (or B2). R—KKt8.

4. R—R8 ch. K—R2.  
and the Pawn cannot be promoted without stalemate.

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180.

*Missing Concealed Danger*


If :

1. . . . R—B2.
2. Kt×P!.

But :

1. . . . R—K2  
has no such bad consequence, because
2. Kt×P. Q×Kt.
3. R—Kt3 is no longer possible.

(BLACK)



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
181.

*Missing an Idea*

Black captures a Pawn and White wins.

1. Q—Q5 ch. K—R2.
2. Q—B7. Q×R ch.
3. K—R2. Q×BP  
(the move on which Black relied).
4. R×RP ch. K×R.
5. Q—R5 mate.

(BLACK)




(WHITE)

182.

*Missing an Idea*

White plays 1. Q—Kt7, being aware that if :

1. . . . R—B8 ch.  
he must not take the Rook  
but not seeing that after :
1. . . . R—B8 ch.,  
2. K—R2. Q×Q  
wins a piece because the  
Rook is "pinned", un-  
usually, between Rook and  
Rook.




183.

*Idea Easy to Miss*  
*Protection of a Piece from Behind*  
*the Attacking Piece*

If Black plays :

1. . . . B × Kt.
2. B × R. B — Kt6.
3. Q — R5 defends the RP and wins.



184.

*A Point of Order*

Endgame Accuracy

If White makes the weak player's mistake (of exchanging) with :


1. Q — K2 ch. Q × Q.
  2. K × Q then
  2. . . . P — QKt4
- is essential and saves the game.

If :

2. . . . K — Q3.
3. P — QR4 wins.

## CAPABLANCA

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

## SULTAN KHAN

17. B × BP, R × B with advantage. If : 13. Q × P, P × Kt. 14. Q × B, QKt—B4.  
15. P × Kt, Kt × P. 16. Q—B6, Kt × B ch., etc.

185.

*Mutual Error—Failure to Analyse Completely*

Capablanca has played rather against his own style (as he often did in the 1930's); and when his opponent plays 12. Kt—QKt5 “parries” with :

12. . . . B—Q3, involving himself in a bad game.

But White's 12th was not the best.

As Duras has pointed out, Black can play :

12. . . . P—QR3.

If then :

13. B × P.

13. . . . Q—B1

wins a piece.

If :

13. Kt × P. R—B1.

14. Kt—K6. R × Q.

15. Kt × Q. R × KtP.

16. Kt × B. Kt × BP.

186.

*Degrees of Error*

White plays 1. R—K1. The apparent threat is R × P. Black is anxious not to play Kt—KB3, allowing Kt—K5. But if he plays :

1. . . . Q—B3

White can play 2. P—B5, and if B—B2, 3. R × P. Black would therefore have to play :

2. . . . P—K4,

“sacrificing” for freedom.

In this position the serious error has already been made in Black's last move (P—KR3, calculated to facilitate Q—B3).


There was no time for that. Necessary was P—K4. This

example illustrates at least four degrees of error.

(1) Gross error—the omission to see that the Q cannot take the R after R × P.

(2) The omission to see R × P after P—B5.

(BLACK)




(WHITE)

- (3) The omission to see  $R \times P$  as a consequence of  $R-K1$ .  
 (4) The omission to see the whole manoeuvre  $R-K1$ ,  $P-B5$ ,  $R \times P$ , at the stage immediately preceding the diagram.  
 To see it even earlier is beyond normal Chess practicality.

Finally, here is a beautiful example of missed opportunity (diagram 186A).

TCHIGORIN

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

SCHIFFERS

186(a).

*Missed Opportunity*

The great master who played Black made his King safe with  $P-Kt3$ , but missed the following :

- |                    |                 |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| 1. . . .           | $R-R8$ ch.      |
| 2. $Kt \times R$ . | $B-R7$ ch.      |
| 3. $K \times B$ .  | $R-R1$ ch.      |
| 4. $K-Kt3$ .       | $Kt-B4$ ch.     |
| 5. $K-B4$ .        | $R-R5$<br>mate. |



## CHAPTER VII

# EMPIRICAL CHESS

### CONTROL AND CHANCE


#### *A. Limits of Vision.*

THE reader will by now appreciate the impossibility of giving a satisfactory answer to the question (which is asked by non-Chess players rather than by Chess players) how far a good player can see. Since the number of moves ahead that a good player can analyse varies with the position, it is evident that the question (stated in unit moves) is as meaningless as the standard absurdity of asking the size of a lump of coal or the length of a piece of string. Secondly, the good Chess player does not know his limits, and does not acknowledge limits. He only refuses to attempt further seeing when he is satisfied with what he has seen, or when he is satisfied that so many possibilities are good possibilities that the choices are relatively unimportant. It may be added that it is in the nature of the Chessboard that many positions can be satisfactorily treated in quite different ways ; and it could not be demonstrated in a position of that type that any one move was the best. There might be many best ; the choice would depend upon style.

Nevertheless, Chess players are evidently limited because human capacity is limited. Nor is it easy to infer from games that have been played how much any given master (among the great masters) must have seen. Over relatively short distances some demonstration can be made. Thus in the game between Bird and Mason (diagram 187 and see Illustrative Games) we can be reasonably sure of what Bird must have seen when he played QKt—K5 in answer to the check. If he had not seen what followed he would undoubtedly have made one of many simpler, apparently safer, moves. So Lasker, playing against Pillsbury, would hardly have played B—K3 unless he had worked out the long combination involved (diagram 188). Again, in the game between Yates and Takacs, we know something of

MASON

(BLACK)




(WHITE)

BIRD

LASKER

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

PILLSBURY

187.

*Vision in Chess*

After a Queen sacrifice White plays :

35. Kt×P.      Q—B2 ch.

36. Kt(B6)—K5.    Q×P.

37. R—K3 and now Black cannot play Q×QP because of 38. Kt—B6!.

Therefore :

37. . . .      Q—Q7

and White has time for K—Kt2.

188.

Black plays :

15. . . .      B—K3

contemplating the following combination :

16. P—B4.      QR—B1.

17. P—B5.      R×Kt.

18. P×B.      R—QR6.

(For the play see Illustrative Games.)

the distance that Yates must have seen, because if he had not contemplated the combination that developed, his Pawn move on the Queen's side would have been pointless. Clear evidence

of what the player must have seen is surprisingly rare. In the game between Alekhine and Rubinstein (Illustrative Games) it is hard to say at what stage Alekhine must have seen the possibilities that emerged. Were they features in a quite early vision, or were they resources emerging from a complex which the judgment of the great master of combination would have apprehended to be rich in resource?

On the other hand it is easier to find examples of what good players must have failed to see. Capablanca must have failed to see the significance of Rubinstein's Q—B1. So must Lasker in that curiously similar game (see Illustrative Games). These two failures have a characteristic in common. There was a failure to apprehend a change of idea, the intrusion of a new thought, a new possibility; and that novelty, rather than any consideration of distance, constitutes the difficulty that sets limits to the Chess master's mind.


Vision, then, in Chess is not limited by the kind of myopia which is the inability to see distance. Some distances are easy to see.\* What is hard is the exactitude of discrimination in the heart of complexity. Admittedly the very near complexity should be less difficult to analyse than the complexity that lies a few moves ahead. But it must be remembered that in Chess there is hardly any move that can be described as immediate. Every move is part of a series leading forward; and we have observed that if the idea is novel enough, a move which is the next move, with a consequence on the immediately following move, can be hard to see.

To resume, then, difficulty in Chess is a function of the richness of the possibilities and of the distance at which they must be apprehended, the richness being more important than distance. What normally takes place is that a player works through a series of moves, following the lines of the strongest moves (eliminating sub-variations en route), and decides on what is the best process or group of processes to initiate, only to discover eventually that he has failed to apprehend the intrusion of an idea at some stage of his journey or at the end of it. The reason was that the intruding idea was not within his perspective at the important

\* For Projection see p. 43. An extreme example is the following: 8, kPp5, 2P3p1, p1P1p1P1, 2PpPp2, 3p1p2, 3P1P2, 5K2. Mate in 50! The series of King marches is easier to see than many short middle-game complications.

time—was not in the field of relevance. A good example is afforded by the position in the next diagram (189). To White his attack seems promising, and analysis reveals an eventual gain of material. But, unhappily for White, at the end of that process a new counter possibility emerges. A check by the Black Queen forces the White King on to a square where the Black Bishop can give check, allowing the Black Rook to win the White Queen. It is as if a piece of music were being played within a certain melodic pattern or theme, and a new theme surprisingly develops out of the closing notes.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

189.

*"The Move After"*  
*Limits of Vision*


1. P—K4. BP × P.
2. P × P. P × P.
3. P—Q5. P × P (best).
4. B—B4. Kt—B3 (best).
5. Kt × P. Kt × Kt  
and White must lose, because  
neither R—R5 nor R—Q1  
nor O—O—O are con-  
clusive, whereas the direct  
line (originally intended)  
fails as follows :
6. B × Kt ch. Q × B.
7. Q—B7 ch. K—B3,  
and if :
8. Q × R. Q—R4 ch.  
drives the White King onto  
a white square, where Bishop  
checks.

In practice a good judgment diminishes the chances of the player's finding that he is beyond his depth—beyond his capacity to retain equilibrium. Some players allow themselves a more limited scope than do others. They are content to look at the position in the flat, and in the present, and to assess changes in the position in terms of the positional improvement or deterioration from a technical or from a strategic standpoint, and to refrain from long undertakings along the time dimension. Other players think in long series of moves, and these tend to aim at changes of which the merits can only be assessed with the aid of long analysis. And since players tend to make moves that are promising in their lines of thought, the players whose thoughts are long thoughts tend to play more violently, more combatively ;

and they are called combinative players because it is in that type of Chess that are usually manifested the surprises that depend on the using together of pieces in vigorous combinations of threats. The players who concern themselves more with the preservation of values are called positional players. The distinction is not an exact one, but is useful. Both types of player use judgment and other mental processes as well as vision; but the genuinely combinative player (not the positional player who plunges into complexity because it looks promising) is one who uses the energy of his mind the more vigorously. The very great masters are great in their combinative capacity and in the care with which they conserve values. But even at this level one can apprehend a distinction of degree between the masters who crowd the board with ideas and are never content with passivity, and those masters, also of rich and rapid vision, who are always content to let the game remain within an easier control until subtle—rather than violent—treatment had created the opportunities for decisive action. At that level of Chess it is quite impossible to estimate whose vision is better or whose play is better. The illustrative games show how different are the appearances of the different styles and how much they have in common.

## ELISKASES

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

EUWE

190.

*Vision*

White does not realise his danger.

Best seems to be 1 K—B3 (if R—R5, 2. R—Q4). White played :

1. R—Kt7. P—Kt5.

2. R×P. P—R3!.

the point that White probably missed before the liquidation into this endgame position.


Black's resource wins, because 3. R—Kt7 is defeated by R—Kt4.



At the lower levels the more combinative player is likely to be the better player, because much of Chess is struggle. A good judgment will reduce the chance of a hopeless struggle ; but judgment cannot determine every move. Possibilities present themselves that are promising and the player must follow them to the limits of his vision and beyond. A good illustration for this contention is afforded by the last diagram position (190) from a game between Euwe and Eliskases. What Euwe missed was a new development in the game, the intrusion of a new idea. And earlier in this game (diagram 191), which is very rich tactically (see Illustrative Games), there are several examples of the emergence of new threats that neither of the players can have fully appreciated when they were still distant.

## ELISKASES

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

EUWE

191.

*Distance of Vision*


White plays 1. P—B4 and after the answer

- |          |                              |
|----------|------------------------------|
| 1. . . . | Kt—Q3,                       |
|          | realises that he cannot gain |
|          | from exchanges, viz :        |
| 2. B—Q3. | Kt—K5.                       |
| 3. Q—B2. | Q—B4.                        |
| 4. P—B3. | Kt—B7 ch.                    |
| 5. Q×Kt. | Q×B.                         |
| 6. P—K4. | P—B4!,                       |
|          | with a vigorous attack.      |

Apart from all questions of style and approach the nature of the game determines the task. Some games proceed in short stages from equilibrium to equilibrium. Other games resolve themselves into situations where the result depends on the seeing of the play through many stages.

The next diagram position (192) constitutes a case where an attack must be followed mentally through, at least, three logically

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

192.

*Distance of Vision*

34. . . . QR—KB1.

35. P×P. P×P.

36. B×P. R×Kt.

37. R×R. R×R.

38. R×R. Q—R5 ch.

39. K—Kt2.

(If:

39. Q—R2. Q—K8 ch.

40. K—Kt2. Q—K7 ch.

41. K—Kt3. Q×P ch.

42. K—Kt2. Q—K7 ch.

43. K—Kt3. B—B2 ch.,

etc.)

39. . . . Q×P ch.

40. R—Kt3. Kt—B5 ch.

41. Q×Kt. Q×Q.

42. B—B2 dis. ch.,

and Black must eventually give up the Queen.


different phases, and there are intrusions of other ideas on the way.

The next diagrams, showing shorter analyses, are useful in order to demonstrate the difference that can be made to a plan of campaign by the seeing of the relevance of some apparently irrelevant piece or square. Judgment without full vision cannot arrive at this kind of result, because the pieces, etc., exploited do not start by being evident targets (diagrams 193 and 194).

Most of the above positions are typical of the tactical middle game. Strategic decisions have been made, and the fight is on in order to further the strategic purpose or to exploit what advantage exists. Evidently he who can see further when the battle is joined will control the situation better. And the player who is combinative will tend to be richer in ideas, so that in complexity he will find resource. On the whole the best Chess is played at a pitch and a tempo calculated to strain the player's capacity. The best battles are won and lost by the embarking upon, or the permitting, of long enterprises at the end of which there emerges final advantage, equilibrium, or defeat.

Victories and defeats of this type constitute good Chess. Failures to see the demonstrable sequences are, as we have seen, distinguished (not with logical perfection) as errors. (The term includes errors of strategy like the one so well exploited by Capablanca against Nimzovitch.) But when (as rarely happens)

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(WHITE)

193.


*Essence of Combination*

1. . . . Kt—Kt5.
2. Kt×Kt. P×Kt.
3. Q×P. P—K4.
4. Q—R4. P—K5.
5. B—K2. Q—R4.

Without this last move, freeing the Rook without loss of tempo, the sacrifice was not playable.

The idea includes the Knight at White's Q2. Positionally that is *not* a piece so placed as to call for a combination.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

194.

*Essence of Combination*

1. R—Q6. B×R.
2. P×B. R—B3.
3. Q×P. R—QB1.
4. Q—Kt7.

This, with the next move, constitutes the "manoeuvre after", perception of which is the essence of combinative Chess.

4. . . . Q—B2.
5. B×KP and wins.


a game is won by the winner's perception or control of many possibilities, rather than the opponent's failure to apprehend any reasonably perceptible point of tactics or strategy, then the winner may be said to have outplayed his opponent. Very few games indeed achieve that standard. Those that come nearest to the highest standard of Chess will almost inevitably be drawn games.

That follows from the margin of draw that is inherent in the Chess-board. When we find games that are won by the exploitation of infinitesimal advantages, then we are witnessing a manifestation of genius.

### B. *The Empirical Element in Chess*

Much good Chess is played in bad positions (that is where it is really necessary) and much good Chess is interspersed with bad Chess, even on the part of the player who is playing well.

The next diagram (195) shows a position in which Black is at a disadvantage, having sacrificed Pawns, without full justification, but so as to free his game and to leave his opponent with some problems of defence to solve. The opponent failed to solve them.



195.

#### *Loss or Sacrifice ?*

White has won, or been allowed to win, Pawns and is "in angustus rebus".

The problem is soluble, but only with better play than White provided.

12. O—O. Q—B2.
13. R—K1. B×P ch.
14. K—B1 (of course, Kt×B, QR—K1).
14. . . . QR—K1.
15. Q—R3. R×R ch.
16. Kt×R. Kt—K5.
17. QKt—B3. Kt×QP!
18. P×Kt. Q—B5 ch.
19. Kt—Q3. Q×Kt ch.
20. K—K1. Kt—Kt6!

resigns.

Because if :

21. P×Kt. R—K1 ch.
22. Kt—K5. B×P ch.,  
etc.


What this illustrates is the proposition that Chess is a process of fighting as well as the pursuit of military exactitude.

So, too, the next diagram shows a British master endeavouring to win, and actually winning, by clever play. Yet the process was defeasible. The practical point of such a position is that Chess is a test of the relative merits of the play and the players. The absolute is not in question. Had Broadbent's opponent

seen all that was required to be seen he would have been acting well enough to win. In fact, he played with less perspicacity than he should have manifested—and lost.

## WINTER

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

## BROADBENT

13. . . . K—Kt4 and loses to P—Q7 etc.

Black could, however, have made a fight of it with : 13. . . . P—R5.

If: 14. P×P, P—K5. 15. P—Q7, P×P. 16. R×P, R—Q1. 17. R—K7, P—B5. 18. P—Kt7, P—B6 ch. 19. K—Kt1, K—Kt6. 20. R—K8 (not P—Kt8 =Q, R×Q, etc.). 20. . . . P—B7 ch. 21. K—B1, P—Q7 ch. 22. K×QP, K—Kt7! with drawing chances at least.

If, instead : 14. P—Q7, P—R6 ch. 15. K—Kt1, P—K5. 16. R×P, R—Q1. 17. R—K7, P×P, and Black wins.

196.

- |          |        |
|----------|--------|
| 1. P—R3. | P×P.   |
| 2. R—R1. | K—Q2.  |
| 3. R×P.  | R—QR1. |
| 4. R—R1. | K—B2.  |
| 5. R—R1. | K—Kt3. |
| 6. K—B3. | K—Kt4. |
| 7. K—K2. | K—Kt5. |
| 8. K—Q2. | R—QKt1 |

(he cannot safely take the Pawn because the White Rook penetrates the 7th).

- |            |        |
|------------|--------|
| 9. K—B2.   | R—QR1. |
| 10. K—Kt2. |        |

White has now created a danger for Black which the latter does not see.

- |           |         |
|-----------|---------|
| 10. . . . | R—K1.   |
| 11. R—R7. | R—KKt1. |
| 12. P—K5. | QP×P.   |

(If BP×P, 13. P—B6!, because of the mating net).

13. P—Q6, and now Black, conscious of error, parries with :

In empirical Chess many players lose through not seeing difficult possibilities. On the other hand, many win by manoeuvres, rich in ideas, which, however, are not perfectly sound. The struggle of abilities is an inevitable feature of practical Chess ; and this fact renders academic any approach to Chess from the standpoint of ideal exactitude or formal pattern.


Much of Chess is trial and error. Within the scope of the effort the player's liability to error is controlled, first by the clarity of his vision, which can exhaust some, at least, of the tactical lines : second, by the recognition of what lines of analysis are likely to be unprofitable. This is a mental economy which



is the true function of strategic thinking, and of the judgment, which is a tactical-strategic guess : thirdly, by technique which, where it is available, amounts to a further economy of vision.

Even with the aid of these ancillaries, the intuitive mind can only cope with, and completely control, the board in positions which are analysable along all important lines to definite results. Such positions are not the average of Chess.

FINE  
(BLACK)



(WHITE)  
RESHEVSKY

197.

*Vigorous Play Justified*

In this position Black plays P—B5, followed by P—Kt5 in the expectation that the threat will continue to yield advantage.

This is justified, and better than quiet development. There followed :


- |            |                         |
|------------|-------------------------|
| 10. . . .  | P—B5.                   |
| 11. Q—B2.  | P—Kt5.                  |
| 12. Kt—Q1. | R—B1.                   |
| 13. B—Kt5. | Q—R4.                   |
| 14. B×Kt.  | Kt×B.                   |
| 15. Kt—K3. | P—B6 with<br>advantage. |

In the practical game, the opponent's position if well handled will always be rich in possibilities. The player who joins battle or prepares for a particular battle is, at the stages of the game that matter, initiating processes the results of which cannot be stated in advance, at least without the mediation of extraordinary mental process. Therefore the good player, whenever he sets out to determine the game, does so against a background of chance. What he sees clearly and exhaustively amounts to certainty. But he cannot, in the time available to him, exhaust all possibilities. Some lines of play he assumes will work out in his favour ; and along the lines that he analyses he may stop at a stage which he projects as one satisfactory for his purposes. In both these ways he can be wrong.

Some players, being highly conscious of fallibility, refrain from all excursions of which they cannot anticipate the complete course. These players will lose for other reasons. The good player (who realises that opportunities should not be missed) will not refrain from proceeding beyond his depth, if he feels that in the depths he may find victory, or better chances than he can find in the shallows. One throws the Pawns forward with gain of tempo and drive, believing rather than seeing that the initiative is valuable and that there will be compensations for strategic weakness (diagram 197). It is at this level of Chess that factors other than the pure mental become relevant. Players of very great will-power work hard to see further than the distance that would satisfy them if they were less determined. Other players exercise a greater control over their desire to win at all costs; a desire which so often causes players to join battle of uncertain outcome.

ALEKHINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

ZNOSKO-BOROWSKI

198.

*Will-Power in Chess*

The fact that White has no disadvantage does not prevent Black from trying to create one. Also it lulls White into aimless play with a draw in view.

1. B—R6. (Aimless. Much better is R—Q3, threatening R check in conjunction with B—R6 (or Kt5).)

1. . . . KR—Q1.

2. K—B1. (Again slow. P—KB4 was promising—if P—K5, P—B5!—so was P—KKt4.)

2. . . . P—KB4.

3. R×R ch. (Again aimless, unless "marking time" be a purpose.)

3. . . . R×R.

4. P—KKt3. (To prevent the cutting off of the Bishop.)

4. . . . K—B2.


5. B—K3. P—KR4.

(And now Black has targets to attack). 6. K—K2, K—K3. 7. R—Q1, R—KKt1. 8. P—KB3. (An attempt to solve a developing problem: better, albeit risky, was P—KB4). 8. . . . P—R5. 9. B—B2, P×P. 10. P×P, R—KR1. 11. B—Kt1, B—Q3. 12. K—B1, R—KKt1 and Black has a superior position (see next diagram).

Will-power is a factor in Chess that accounts for great successes ; and for failures on the part of greatly talented players to achieve the results that could be expected from their mental abilities. Even between two players of great capacity, a difference can be made by the existence in one of a more pronounced will to win.

ALEKHINE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

ZNOSKO-BOROWSKI

198 (a).

*Effect of Superior Effort*

Black Wins

Black has an inroad into the game. White is targetless.

1. B—B2. P—QKt4.  
2. P—QKt3.

(If :

2. P—QB4. P×P.  
3. R—B1. R—Kt1.  
4. R×P. R×P.  
5. R—R4. P—B4.  
6. R×RP. P—B5!  
wins.

2. P—QR3 also fails.)  
2. . . . P—QR4.  
3. K—Kt2. P—R5.  
4. R—Q2. (P—QKt4 gives better defensive chances.)  
4. . . . P×P.  
5. P×P. R—QR1.  
6. P—QB4. R—R6.  
7. P—B5. (Bad but best.)  
7. . . . B—K2.  
8. R—Kt2. P—Kt5.


Note that White seems not to have time to stop this.)

9. P—Kt4, P—B5. A very good instance of strong "hanging" Pawns : White's, are weak, since White has no break-through). 10. K—B1, R—R8 ch. (P—K5 is also good). 11. K—K2, R—QB3. 12. R—R2. (Playing more promisingly now!) 12. . . . R—B6. 13. R—R7, K—Q2. 14. R—Kt7, R×KtP. 15. R—Kt8, R—Kt7 ch. 16. K—B1. P—Kt6 and wins without difficulty.

The next position is also a study in will-power, but it is additionally interesting as an illustration of the fact that great masters revolutionise formal technique (or strategy) in their play. Thus Rubinstein defending a Lopez allows himself a backward Pawn on d6, because he realises that when all the blockading pieces have been exchanged on d5, the resulting Rook ending is in Black's favour because of his ingress via e5. The vast majority of players (including so strong a player as Mattison) would have assumed that a backward Pawn is a fatal weakness.

## RUBINSTEIN

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

MATTISON

199.

*Inequality of Effort*

White plays the lazy move  
1. KR—Q1 (better is R×R  
which should result in a  
draw).

There followed :

- |              |   |
|--------------|---|
| 1. . . .     | R×R.  |
| 2. R×R.      | K—Q2.   |
| 3. P—QB4.    | P—KKt3.   |
| 4. K—B2.     | K—K3.   |
| 5. K—B3.     | P—B4.   |
| 6. P×P ch.   | (Inferior to P—K5 which gives White, but White thinks he is safe. |
| 6. . . .     | P×P.  |
| 7. R—Q2.     | (Also slow :  |
| P—QKt4       | was in order, projecting a minority attack).                      |
| 7. . . .     | P—QKt4.   |
| 8. P—QKt3.   | P—KR4.  |
| 9. P—KKt3.   | P—KB5.  |
| 10. R—K2 ch. | K—B4.   |
| 11. R—K4.    | P×KtP.  |
| 12. RP×P.    | R—KKt1.   |
| 13. R—B4 ch. | (The last   |

chance was P×QKtP followed by P—Kt4 ch. with prospects on the Q side.  
13. . . . K—K3 and Black has a winning advantage. 14. R—K4 ch., K—Q2.  
15. P—Kt4, R—B1. (Note that he does not commit himself to P—Kt5.)  
12. R—K3, P—R5. 17. P—R4, P×P. 18. P×P, R—K8. 19. K—Q2, R×R.  
20. K×R, P—Q4. 21. Resigns. (If : 21. P×P, P—R6, not P—B5, met by P—Kt5).

At the average level of master Chess, the combination of will-power and mental ability (the type of vision that the player finds easiest) manifests itself in style.

Some players endeavour to put more into a game than others. They adopt openings that are apparently compromising—modes of development that yield advantages to their opponents as well as to themselves ; attack earlier than would others, or on more speculative lines. Yet when the problems of the position are apprehensible style becomes unimportant.


If there is a clearly “ best ” move, all good players (whatever their styles) will make it. For the rest, since all good players aim, in the first instance, at winning, it happens to most of them that in some games they play attacks, or invite attacks of which they do not completely anticipate the results.

They take it for granted that the end position of their analysis contains no dangers that they do not see ; or they adopt the view that that position will not be inferior to the position from which they are analysing.

Thus when Sacconi commenced his attack against Honlinger in the diagram position (No. 200) neither he, nor his opponent,

SACCONI

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

HONLINGER

200.

Chance

White has played 1. Kt—B4 (manifesting good judgment).

1. . . . Kt—Kt5.
2. P—R3. B—R7 ch.
3. K—R1. B—Kt8.
4. P—K4! (only).
4. . . . Kt×P ch.
5. R×Kt. B×R.
6. P—K5. B×P.
- (Not O—O because of B×RP ch., etc.)
7. Kt×B. P×Kt.
8. Kt—Q6 ch. K—B1.
- (If K—K2, 9. B—Q2.)
9. Q—R5. Kt—B4.
10. B—R6! wins.


anticipated that an apparently successful attack would involve difficulties amounting to a bad game. Yet after driving White on to the defensive, Black finds his position extremely hard to defend.\* The next diagram (201) shows a situation where it is hard for White to retain the advantage except by vigorous and clever attack, but the line of play is not conclusive. Yet he must embark on it because there is nothing better.

It may be observed *en passant* that it is often a mistake for a defender to suppose that a vigorous attack is abated, or an advantage minimised, by the exchanging of material. A relatively empty board can be rich in resource. The position Bernstein *v.* Capablanca illustrates the truth of this (see p. 54).

\* Compare the following misadventure: r4k2r: p1qb1p2: 4p1p1: 1p1ktPktPp: 2pPQ3: 5Kt2: PPBKt1PP1: R4K1R. With QKt—K6ch. Black obtains his opponent's Queen, and a most difficult game.



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201.


*Chance*

14. P—B5 seems good enough.  
 14. . . . Kt—R5  
 losing a piece, but best!  
 15. P—B6. P×P.  
 16. Kt×Kt. P×P.  
 17. Kt—Kt2 and Black has  
 a game with life in it.

So, too, the diagram on p. 109. The player who reduces forces in order to save himself is taking a risk, sometimes as great as the risk of complication.

The element of chance, however, must not be over-estimated. Vision, combined with the self-consciousness which is strategy, should be sufficient to protect the player whatever his opening

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

202.

*Inadequacy of Technique Against  
 Forcing Process*

8. . . . P—K4.  
 9. P×P. Kt—Kt5.  
 10. Kt—Q4. B—Kt3.  
 11. P—KR3. KKt×KP.  
 12. P—KB4. Kt—B5.  
 13. P—Kt3. Kt—R4.  
 14. P—QKt4. Kt—B5.  
 15. P—B5. B—R2.  
 16. P—K4. P×P.  
 17. Kt×P. B—K2.  
 18. Kt—K6. P×Kt.  
 19. Q—R5 ch. P—KKt3.  
 20. P×KtP. Kt—B3.  
 21. P—Kt7 ch. and White  
 wins.

(unless it is bad to the point of absurdity) from any convincing exploitation, until he comes within mental eye-range of definite lines of play to adopt or to avoid.

Games are usually lost, not through the taking of chances but through the failure to apprehend certainties. Thus the player who played P—K4 in the diagram position (202) was not taking a reasonable chance. While aiming at White's possible weakness, he was failing to see the destructive effect of his opponent's forcing process.

Chance is the unknown factor which makes the outcome of good play uncertain—where, for example, the winning of material appears to be the best available process of play, yet does not yield victory.

This is different from luck, which is what occurs when bad play is met by worse play, or when a haphazard move turns out to be a good one.


That there is an element of luck in good Chess is only true if one takes the unit of Chess not as the game but as the competitive event (whether game or tournament). Then it may be lucky against given opponents to be White or Black as the case may be : to meet them early in a tournament or late.

But so far as the game itself is concerned, the element of the uncertain is insufficient to put the control of the game beyond the players. Consequently the game is not a "game of chance" (the phrase means "game of luck"), but entirely one of skill. Of those rare cases when it seems possible to say of a player, "He was unlucky", here is an example from a game between Yates and Alekhine (diagram 203). In this game Yates attacked well, so well that he won his opponent's Queen for less material. Yet he was unable to force a win. The reality in that situation is the resource of the Chessboard. When the opponent's play is vigorous, then an attack may be successful short of victory, because there is an insufficient preponderance of force to the putative winner. That he holds the preponderance usually implies that he has played well. That the preponderance is insufficient to win may, or may not, imply that he has chosen a wrong plan. What it can signify (and signifies in this instance) is that he did not sufficiently overplay his opponent, for the good reason that it was impossible for him to extract more chances

from the position than he actually found. This is, at a middle game level, one instance of the margin of draw available on the Chessboard. The element of chance here is that in battle one must often take what one can get and be satisfied. If the enemy is resourceful he, too, will make some gains. It cannot fairly be said, after every indecisive battle, that to have joined issue was wrong.

## ALEKHINE

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(WHITE)

YATES

203.

*Chance in Chess*

23. . . . P—K4.

24. Kt—R6!

A move that Black seems to have overlooked but could hardly prevent in the most recent moves.

However, it does not win !

24. . . . Q—B1.

25. R—Q8 ch. Q×R.

26. R×Q ch. R×R.

27. Kt×R. K×Kt.

28. B—B4 ch. B—Q4.

29. Q—Kt4. B×B.

30. Q×B ch. K—K2.

31. Q—KKt4. K—B1.

32. K—R2. P—KR3.

and White cannot win.

## C. Resource


When a player attacks and undertakes operations leading beyond the variations that he has seen—or when he finds himself defending an attack that he has not anticipated, and, in either case, finds clever moves, then he is being resourceful.

A resourceful player is a good player, because he finds the best methods of play in time, though he has not seen them early enough to be able to feel that he has controlled the game. Indeed, the resource may occur in a position into which he has been forced willy nilly by his opponent.

From a game played by a strong English amateur against Alekhine, the diagram (204) shows the opportunity for a good resource—so good that Alekhine himself had to discover a later resource in order to win.

SPENCER

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(WHITE)

ALEKHINE

11. R×R ch., R×R. 12. R×P, B×R. 13. Q×B, and now White has the attack again.

204.

*Resource*


Black has defended well along the lines of a system, however, which leaves White with greater control. He now plays resourcefully :

1. . . . Q—Kt2.
  2. Kt—K6. B×Kt.
  3. P×B. KR—K1.
  4. P—Kt5. Kt—Kt5!
- (the point : if 5. Q×Kt, B—B6. Thus the compromising move 4. . . . Kt—B4 is not forced).
5. R—B1. P—B4.
  6. P×P e.p. Kt×P.
  7. P—K7 ch. K—R1.
  8. Q×P. Kt×P.
  9. R—Kt1. KR—QB1.
  10. Q—Q7. KR—QKt1.

In the last few moves Black has failed to appreciate a resource available to White).

The next diagram (205) shows Black plunging into an attack that had to be played, though it culminates, not in a quick win, but in an advantageous endgame that still required great

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(WHITE)


205.

*Chance and Resource*

1. . . . P—QKt4.
2. Q—B5. Q×Q.
3. P×Q. P—Kt5.
4. QR—Q1. B—R3.
5. R×R ch. R×R.
6. R—Q1, and Black wins a Pawn by :
6. . . . R—Q6
7. R×R. Kt×R.
8. Kt—K4. Kt×KtP.
9. P—B3. Kt—B6, etc.

delicacy of treatment. In this play, White, turned defender, found available resources that he had not contemplated ; but he found them when they were needed. In this instance they were not adequate to the saving of the game.

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206.

*Chance and Resource*


- |            |       |
|------------|-------|
| 1. . . .   | P—R5. |
| 2. R—KKt3. | P—R6. |
| 3. R×KtP.  | Q×R.  |
| 6. Q×Q.    | P×B.  |

wins !

The Queen cannot reach any focal point for the defence of White's QKt1.

EUWE

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

KERES

207.

*Winning Idea*

- |           |         |
|-----------|---------|
| 20. . . . | P—Kt5!. |
| 21. Kt×P. | B—B6!.  |
- Now, if :
- |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|
| 22. P×B.  | Q×RP.     |
| 23. P—B4. | B×Kt.     |
| 24. Q×B.  | Q—Kt5 ch. |

wins.


Black's 20th move is intrinsically good, because both P—QR<sub>4</sub> and P—Kt6 (*inter alia*) are threatened.

A constructive idea rather than a resource.



KERES

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

EUWE

208.

*Resource*

Black to Move


White has played the apparently sound P—KR<sub>4</sub>, and Black extricates himself neatly from difficulties.

- |                        |                    |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| 35. . . .              | P—B <sub>5</sub> ! |
| 36. KP×P.              | P—K <sub>6</sub> ! |
| 37. B×Kt.              | P—K <sub>7</sub> ! |
| 38. R—K <sub>1</sub> . | Q×B.               |
| 39. Q×Q.               | R×Q.               |
| 40. P—B <sub>3</sub> . | R—Q <sub>8</sub> . |
| 41. K—B <sub>2</sub> . |                    |
- Drawn.

Resource, it must be remembered, is a very important factor in Chess, because it is one instance (and a frequently recurring instance) of short-range vision, and apprehension of relatively

WANKIN

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

GRÜNTALL

209.


*Resource in Endgame*

1. Kt—Kt<sub>3</sub> ch. draws.  
 If 1. . . . P×Kt, the White King can never be driven from the squares e1, f1.

There followed

- |                          |                    |
|--------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. . . .                 | P—R <sub>6</sub> . |
| 2. P×P.                  | P×P.               |
| 3. Kt—R <sub>1</sub> .   | K—K <sub>5</sub> . |
| 4. Kt—B <sub>2</sub> ch. | draw.              |

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(WHITE)

210.

*Endgame Resource*


- |            |           |
|------------|-----------|
| 1. R × P.  | K—K4.     |
| 2. R—R4.   | R—B2 ch.  |
| 3. K—Kt5.  | P—B3.     |
| 4. P—B5.   | R × P ch. |
| stalemate. |           |

isolated ideas. These, we have seen are very important constituents in the make-up of any player.

The difference between an idea that may be said to be part of a plan, and a resourceful idea, is well illustrated from the games of two leading masters of the 1930's, Keres and Euwe (diagrams 207 and 208).

FRANCEZON

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

N.N.

211.

*Defeat into Victory*


White has advanced too rapidly.  
There followed :

- |                     |        |
|---------------------|--------|
| 1. . . .            | Q—KB1. |
| 2. K—R7.            | K—Kt4. |
| 3. P—R6.            | K—R4.  |
| and mate next move. |        |

The endgame is a rich field for resource, notwithstanding the diminution of forces. Here advantages often have shorter lives than in the middle game. Diagrams 209, 210 and 211 show neat achievements by the apparently losing side.

The final diagram of this chapter (diagram 212) shows that there is sufficient in Chess to make a sharp distinction necessary between bad position and lost game. The art of not losing bad games is an important part of Chess. As we have seen, good play is possible in any position ; in bad positions good play is essential.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

212.

*Margin of Draw*

- |             |          |
|-------------|----------|
| 1. . . .    | B—R5.    |
| 2. R—Q5.    | R—QB2.   |
| 3. R×P.     | B—Kt6.   |
| 4. B—B1.    | K—Kt2.   |
| 5. R—K6.    | K—B2.    |
| 6. R—Kt6    | B—B7.    |
| 7. P—K5.    | R—K2.    |
| 8. R—B6 ch. | K—Kt2.   |
| 9. R—B2.    | B—Q8.    |
| 10. R—Q2.   | B—B6.    |
| 11. K—B2.   | B—K5.    |
| 12. K—K3.   | B—R8!    |
| 13. B—Kt2.  | B×B.     |
| 14. R×B.    | R×P ch.  |
| 15. K—B4.   | K—B3.    |
| 16. P—R4.   | R—B4 ch. |
- and Black has achieved a draw.

## CHAPTER VIII

### MEMORY;

### EXPERIENCE AND TECHNIQUE


THE Author has so far maintained that intuition is the essence and the moving edge of the Chess mind. But the contention has often been raised that masters owe their judgment in some measure to experience; further, that since the openings determine something of the shape of the game, and since opening learning can cover many moves, much of Chess can be learned by the mnemonic mastery of countless master-games. This the Author believes to be a fallacy.\*

In the first place, it is hardly possible for a good Chess player to be reliant upon memory in more than the slightest degree. If his only ideas are those that he remembers, he will not be capable of apprehending the thousand and one fresh points that can occur in any game. If, for example, his equipment is dominated by the conventional sacrifice of the Bishop on KR7 or KB7, his conception of how to use a Bishop will be limited. If he is obsessed by the sacrifice which is called Philidor's Legacy he will not be assisted to the recognition of other smothered mates such as the one that is latent in the diagram position after a few moves of a Blumenfeld Counter Gambit (diagram 213).

On the other hand, to say that memory is useless in Chess would be wrong. Obviously, when a player is working out a number of lines of play, he is assisted if he has a clear memory of what he has already analysed. Indeed, as in any mental activity, some kind of memory is implicit in the process of working out consequences and implications, so in Chess a long variation, in the course of which many pieces change their places or are removed from the board, can only be worked out mentally if the analyst is holding in his mind a clear conception of every

\* The great master, Rubinstein, is supposed, in an early period of his career, to have memorised the scores of all available master games. Yet Rubinstein never played "by rote". Indeed, his Chess was always characterised by a subtle originality, much admired by Capablanca who emulated his freshness.

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
213.

*Unusual Setting*

6. QKt—Q2 (best is Q—B2),  
 6. . . . Kt—B4.  
 7. P—QKt3. Q—K2.  
 8. B—Kt2. P—Q3!  
 9. P×P2. Kt—Q6  
 mate.  
 (9. P—QKt4 is speculative  
 and offers chances to White.)

situation in which he mentally makes a move. Thus, to take a relatively simple example, if one is embarking on a long series of exchanges on some centre square, culminating in a capture with a Rook or Queen from the back rank, one must bear in mind, throughout, the possibility that the final situation gives the opponent a mating possibility. The vision that apprehends

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(WHITE)

ALEKHINE

214.

*Memory in Chess*

Illustrating the memory involved in analysis.

(see p. 192).



that is in part constituted by the memory of what will have happened, i.e. what has already happened as a mental event.

Here (diagram 214) is a combination by Alekhine to illustrate the point : Black plays 16. . . . R—QB1, giving White a tempo (best was Q—Kt3). There follows :—

- |             |        |
|-------------|--------|
| 17. P—KKt4. | P×P.   |
| 18. P×P.    | Q—Kt3. |

and Alekhine embarks on a combination

- |            |         |
|------------|---------|
| 19. P—Kt5. | Kt—Kt5. |
| 20. R×RP.  | Kt×Kt.  |
| 21. Q×P.   | Kt—B4.  |

At Move 19 at the latest, Alekhine had to see that a line was being cleared (against his QKt2) by removal of pieces ; had to "remember" the clearing of this line.

The combination is not good unless 22. R×B ch. is good. It is, however, very good.

There followed :—

- |                                   |              |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
|                                   | Kt×R.        |
| 23. B—K4.                         | R—K1.        |
| 24. Q—R7 ch.                      | K—B1.        |
| 25. B—Kt6.                        | Q—B4 (best). |
| 26. B×Kt.                         | K×B.         |
| 27. P—Kt6 ch.—and a quick finish. |              |

It may be said that Alekhine also had to have a clear idea of the new position of pieces in the event of :—

- |                                   |      |
|-----------------------------------|------|
| 20. . . .                         | K×R. |
| 21. Q×P ch.                       | K×Q. |
| 22. B—K4 ch., with mate in three. |      |


Diagram 215 shows another instance of the need for this kind of memory retention.

In point also is the combination seen in diagram 216, produced by a player renowned for his combinative capacity. The line clearances, here, completely change the original picture, and must be borne in mind by the analyst who is thinking through the whole movement.

Again, from the opening after the moves :—1. P—K4, P—K4. 2. Kt—KB3, Kt—QB3. 3. B—B4, P—Q3. 4. P—B3, B—Kt5. 5. Q—Kt3, Q—Q2 White must analyse a long variation, holding in his mind the open lines that develop as exchanges are made.

FINE

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


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CAPABLANCA

A. SCHWALB

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VICTOR TIETZ

215.

"Memory"

1. P—QKt4. Q—KR4.

2. B×Kt. P×B.

3. R—Q7. QR—B1.

4. Q—Kt2.

(not :

R×B

Kt×KtP.

5. Q—Kt3. Kt—B7 ch.

6. K—K2. Kt—R8.

7. Q—Kt1. R—B7 ch.

8. K—K1. Q—R4 ch.

The analyst has to "remember" that the Pawn has gone.)

4. . . . KR—Q1!

5. R×B?

(Better was P—KKt4.)

5. . . . Kt—K4.

6. B—K2. Kt×Kt ch.

7. B×Kt. Q—K4!

(The move that White had missed.)

8. Q×Q. R—B8 ch.

and forces a quick draw.

216.

A Famous Combination

1. Kt—Kt6 ch. P×Kt.

2. P×P dis. ch.

K—Kt1.

3. R—QB8!

In conjunction with the next moves, a brilliant conception.

The direct attack R—KB7 (met by R×B) fails to force mate.

3. . . . R×R.

4. R×Kt!

(clearing the KB file for the Q without loss of tempo.)

4. . . . R—B1 (the offer must be refused).

5. R—B8! Q—K2.

6. Q—B4 ch. (note that

6. B—Q6 is refuted by R—R8!.)

6. . . . K—R1.

7. Q—KR4! R—R8 ch.

8. B×R, Q—K6 ch. 9. K—R1. (White in initiating his combination had to have clearly in mind that Black now has no checks.) 9. . . . R×R. 10 Q×P ch., forces mate in 5 (Q—R7 ch. : Q×P ch. : Q—B7 ch. : B—B6 ch., etc.).

Thus if White tries to win material by :—6. B×P ch., Q×B. 7. Q×P, K—Q2. 8. Q×R, there follows 8. . . ., B×Kt. 9. P×B, Q×P. 10. R—B1 or Kt1, Q×KP ch. 11. K—Q1, Q—B6 ch., and the King cannot escape to B2 because, now that the diagonal is clear, 12. K—B2 is met by Kt—Kt5 ch., opening a battery against the Queen.

The memory that is involved in these examples is rather difficult to describe. Most Chess masters would agree that in so analysing they are not visualising changing images ; nor are they holding things in their minds in the way that one holds something that has been learnt by heart. Certainly they are doing something very different from the work of the Bridge player who recollects play and bases arithmetical calculations on it. The Chess player's grasp is not so mnemonic ; yet is such that if called upon to make the effort he can project an image or repeat a series of moves ; but while thinking he does not do so. A similar mystery surrounds blindfold Chess (which is only different in degree from the analysis that a player does who has a board in front of him). The blindfold player grasps a situation in detail without requiring to conjure an image, or to repeat a series of moves, and he thinks forward from a position that he does not see physically, and does not require to visualise mentally. If he is remembering, then his memory is that grasp of the immediately previous which is part of a full apprehension. In reality this memory may be nothing other than the fullness of a vision, a grasp which is not limited to an immediately present moment of time. The grasp of the mind both forwards and backwards in time is indeed an essential constituent in all significant apprehension. This grasp is essential, for example, in all argument, in all oratory, in all continuous and spontaneous thinking. It is the unity of apprehension which constitutes the difference between reflex action (parrot-like repetition) and real awareness.

The student should appreciate here that there is ambiguity in the word memory. The word is used to cover that full awareness of the present and immediate past which is essential to any complete vision. "Memory" is also used to describe the recollection of the more distant past, after the mind has invoked its machinery of forgetting and recalling.

And there is a third meaning—very difficult to state exactly

at the present stage of our knowledge of the physical constitution of the mind. That is the memory which is our knowledge of the meaning of words—the Chess player's knowledge of the moves of the pieces and of methods of play. These are remembered in the sense that they become habits of the mind. This, however, is not the notion of memory that people usually entertain when they speak of memory and Chess. The difference is made clear when one distinguishes between having in mind the meaning of the words one uses, and remembering from the past the points from somebody else's argument for one's own purposes.\*

As to the first notion of memory (memory as awareness of the period that surrounds and is involved continuously with the present) we have seen that this is essential to the Chess player ; and his concentration, his attention, must be so inclusive as to make his awareness rather more than instantaneous or momentary.

As to the second kind of memory, this is usually strong in good Chess players. The clear grasp of any set of details, the holding of any totality in the mind, implies a mental capacity of which clear recollection is a consequence.† Usually that power accompanies the first type of memory ; because it flows from a capacity for attention by the mind to any set of things or events that are of interest and the retention of that interest.

That capacity is advantageous in Chess, as in other departments of thought, because the enrichment of the mind, by memory, up to a point makes it more facile in apprehension, readier in the recognition of possibilities, abler in diagnosis.

Very long retentiveness is, however, different again from this, and is often a concomitant of minds lacking in originality.

In general it must be remembered that the mind is not a simple apparatus. It is a fact of psychology that great mental ability is not necessarily accompanied by retentiveness, certainly not by long retentiveness of detail. The two can go together, but not necessarily. There have been very good Chess players with very

\* The psychological difference is clear in the case of the victim of amnesia, who forgets his identity (i.e. history), but not his language.

† That is why good Chess players, combining clear memory with imagination, have been known to excel at Bridge. But Chess players can also be good while lacking retentiveness. Nevertheless, the Author believes that Stefan Zweig's Chessmaster moron, who was lacking in memory, is a false construction.

poor capacity for retention ; and that defect has not hampered them. On the other hand, it can be the case that a greatly retentive memory can impede the mind in its constructive work. This does frequently happen ; again, not of necessity. But what is clear beyond the need of demonstration is that the mind which is apprehending, or in some way constructing, is not attempting at that moment to remember (in the accepted sense) from further back than the specious present.

Given, then, that the Chess player in action is doing something which is different from remembering (recollecting the past), it is also true to say that a Chess player can be greatly assisted by memory so long as he does not allow memory to usurp the intuitive functions of his mind. The practising Chess player has played and observed a great many games ; and normally he remembers a great many opening variations, whether established as orthodox or attempted as experimental ; and he knows, when he plays a given opening, that he is making moves that have been tried before and found good. Even in a middle game he may undertake a general plan similar to a plan many times adopted ; and in the endgame this adoption of familiar methods is even more frequent. But in these later instances it is not always true to say that the player is relying on memory. If he is, then it is in the third and difficult sense of the word memory. His mind is being influenced by experience—has, possibly, been moulded, below the level of consciousness, by experience. The dynamic of his mind, the moving edge of the mental instrument, continues to be “grasp” or vision.

In this connection it is interesting to observe that many of the fine combinative movements of master Chess have been echoed, or reflected, or even completely reproduced in other games.

The reader need hardly be reminded of the relatively elementary Philidor's Legacy or “Greek gift” sacrifice. But the harder sacrifice (that may be termed the “double Greek gift”) played by Lasker against Bauer (diagram on p. 77) has been played by other masters—including Alekhine—in comparable (though not identical) positions.

Sacrifices against KB7 are familiar enough, but in a recent British Championship a new form of the conventional sacrifice was played.



VEITCH.

1. P—Q4.
2. P—QB4.
3. Kt—KB3.
4. P—KKt3.
5. QKt—Q2.
6. P×P?
7. B—Kt2.
8. K×B.
9. K—K1.


J. PENROSE.

- Kt—KB3.
- P—K3.
- P—Q4.
- P×P.
- P—B4.
- B×P.
- B×P ch.
- Kt—~~K~~t5 ch.
- Kt—K6.

wins the Queen even after Q—R4 ch., B—QR2.

Again the striking sacrifice by Reti against Tartakower (diagram on p. 40) has occurred in other games, earlier and later.

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MACZUSKI

217.

*Echo of an Idea*


1. P—KB4.      Q×BP ch.
2. B—Q2.      Q—B4.
3. Q—Q8 ch., etc.

And examples abound, including at least one amusing example of a neat idea seen by one master, and missed by another half a century later (diagram 218).

It cannot be denied that past awareness of possibilities of the board such as these, through the witnessing of their demonstration in the games of others, equips the mind to recognise these and analogous possibilities when they recur. But it cannot be said that Reti or Alekhine was remembering a combination

RUBINSTEIN

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TCHIGORIN

218.

*Recurrent Idea*

White Wins

1. R—KB7 resigns.


This was played in 1906. In an exactly similar position (save for the colours) at Groningen 40 years later, Smyslov (against Lundin) could only find Kt—B7 and a perpetual ch.

when they combined. The unlikelihood of this is proved by the capacity those players possessed for the revelation of entirely new (and more difficult) ideas.

So far as recollection is concerned, certainly it helps the Chess player. But the player who, out of laziness, or by reason of mediocrity, relies on memory, and not on his ability in apprehension, is destined to reach a point where a divergence will leave him on his own resources, which will either be atrophied or otherwise inadequate. Even if he is possessed of the most phenomenal of memories, his memory will not be adequate to all conceivable variations. By contrast, the energetic and able player will, even while remembering, not be relying on memory. Every move that he makes he will be rendering his own by seeing, in the specific game, what follows from it. One should not state it as a dilemma that, if a player is good, he does not need memory and that if he is bad it will not be very useful to him, because, whether reversible or not, that dilemma will over-simplify the issue. There are pieces of advice that can be given to Chess players and are useful: e.g. that in the QP openings Black's Bishop is usually better situated at K2 than at Q3 or QKt5: that against a King's fianchetto the Rooks are better placed at

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VIDMAR

219.

*A Well-known Position  
(in the "Slow" Form  
of the Q.G.D.)*

White has played 8. P-K4.

Best is 8. . . . P×KP.

Dangerous is :

8. . . . P-K4

(as played here).

9. BP×P! BP×P.

10. KP×P. P×P.

(best).

(If :

10. . . . Kt×P.

11. P×P. Kt×P.

12. Kt×Kt. B×Kt.

13. B×P ch., winning a Pawn  
(not necessarily the game).

11. Kt-K4. Q-Kt3.

12. Kt×B. Q×Kt.

13. Kt×P. Kt×P.

14. Kt-B5. Q-KB3.


15. Q-R5

(threatening Kt-K7 ch.,  
etc.).

QB1 and Q1 than at Q1 and K1. These may be useful to remember. Also there are some pitfalls which, while not beyond vision, are worth knowing (see for example diagram 219). Again,

MARCO

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TARRASCH

220.

Black Castles and loses (see  
next page).


there are pieces of Chess which are so hard that it is as well to remember them. There are very few Chess players who can work out unaided over the Chessboard such a piece of play as the so-called Tarrasch trap. This is the line of play that arises from the position in the diagram 220, where the plausible move of O—O is not available for Black for the following reason :—

- |                         |                      |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. B × Kt.              | O—O.                 |
| 2. P × P.               | B × B.               |
| 3. Q × Q.               | P × P.               |
| 4. Kt × P.              | QR × Q.              |
| 5. Kt × B.              | B × P.               |
| 6. Kt—Q <sub>3</sub> .  | Kt × Kt.             |
| 7. P—KB <sub>3</sub> .  | P—KB <sub>4</sub> .  |
| 8. Kt × B.              | B—B <sub>4</sub> ch. |
| 9. B—Kt <sub>5</sub> .  | Kt × Kt.             |
| 10. P—QB <sub>4</sub> . | R—Q <sub>4</sub> .   |
| 11. B—K <sub>7</sub>    | R—Q <sub>2</sub> .   |

wins the exchange.

If at move 3, . . . KR × Q, then at Move 9, K—B<sub>1</sub> wins material. Not quite so hard is Rabinovitch's counter attack in the Lopez (see diagram 221).

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221.

*Rabinovitch's Counter-Attack*


If 7. Kt—Kt<sub>5</sub>, Black has very good counter play with

7. . . . P—Q<sub>4</sub>.  
8. P × P. Kt—Q<sub>5</sub>.

There are combinative threats involving QB—Kt<sub>5</sub> and KB—B<sub>4</sub>, and the game is difficult for White. It is interesting to observe that a typical Giuoco Piano attack fails in the Lopez.

Other long and difficult variations arise from the Vienna, the

Max Lange, the Moller, and many other openings ; and they are worth knowing. Recently Smyslov's experiment in the Ruy Lopez has been proved important enough to remember (diagram 222)\*



222.

*A new Development in the Lopez*

The move 9. Q—K2, played by Smyslov caused unjustified consternation in the recent World Championship Tournament.


The threat is 10. R—Q1, followed by 11. P—QB4, which is very strong indeed, and can even be the basis of a sacrificial attack.

9. . . . Kt—B4,  
in conjunction with :

10. . . . P—Kt5  
has been suggested (Reshevsky). But simplest and best is :

9. . . . B—K2.  
10 R—Q1. Kt—R4.  
11. Kt—Q4. O—O.

Memory might also have proved useful to the player of the



222(a).

*A Variation*

9. B×Kt is playable :

9. . . . B×Kt ch.

10. P×B and now

10. . . . Q×P ch.

would be inferior to P×B,  
viz.:

10. . . . Q×P ch.

11. K—B1. Q×B ch.

12. K—Kt1 with an attack!,  
because Black cannot now  
take the Bishop on f6, and if  
he castles, does so into  
danger.

\* This variation was very important in the 1948 World Championship. Other opening experiments have influenced the results of other tournaments.



Black pieces who played up to the diagram (222a) position only to discover that he could not capture the undefended piece. The Capablanca and Alekhine would not, however, have required the prior expenditure of midnight oil to prevent themselves from arriving at that particular position.

There are many other long variations in every opening. None of them are beyond the capacity of the fine player. And there are players who will work through these lines, so as to keep their mind active from the beginning of the game, and be keyed up to any task of concentration and clear apprehension that presents itself. But it is a sound economy to know these things. In match Chess time requires to be saved, and effort requires to be saved; memory is used for those reasons. But, in general, the effort to learn much by heart is wasted. Normally, what can be seen by one player can be seen by another player. Therefore X is not required to remember what Y did, or Y what Z did; X and Y and Z are equally capable of making their own discoveries when required to do so. In practice one can recognise the mnemonic player by his flashes of stupidity and his incapacity for original thought at critical moments. In the same way a person using a language at a literary level may have a rich knowledge of other writings, but his own writing will be indifferent if the effect that is given to the reader is one of quotation, creating the impression that the author is not the master of his own words and that he has not made the material his own.\*


\* It follows from this and from the spontaneous nature of mental activity in Chess, that good Chess players do not rely on the pronouncements of authority—though these are rarely dogmatic in Chess. Those who follow the examples of the great know the reasoning. When they follow blindly they are behaving wrongly and deserve to come to grief. Such was the amusing fate of the late A. Steiner at the hands of Capablanca. It happened that Alekhine, who occasionally wrote a book (as he played) *sans voir* and post-prandially, had said in one of the notes in the New York Tournament Book that after the moves 1. P—K4, P—K4. 2. Kt—KB3, Kt—QB3. 3. B—Kt5, P—QR3. 4. B—R4, P—Q3. 5. P—Q4, the Pawn could be taken, because after 5. . . . Q×P, P—B4 (the closing of the Noah's Ark Trap): Q—Q5, B—K3. 7. Q—B6 ch., B—Q2. 8. Q—Q5, B—K3 with repetition of moves. Steiner, only too anxious to obtain a draw from Capablanca, played the line indicated and was horrified when Capablanca played in answer to the second Q—Q5, not B—K3, but P—B5—a move not hard to see.

So much for authority: and so much for recollection.

A more sophisticated example is in the diagram position (No. 223) reached by Pachman, who had relied on book-learning and found it inferior as a weapon to ordinary Chess ability.

## ROSSOLIMO

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PACHMANN

223.

*Learning in Chess*

White allowed himself to follow the book and played :

9. Q—K4.

There followed :

9. . . . B×Kt ch.

10. P×B. Q—Q8 ch., which is quite easily intuitable if one does not rely on learning.

It should, however, be added, that the knowledge of a piece of play like this may be useful in determining choice of opening, e.g. (here), Nimzovitch Defence with P—Q3 (allowing P—K5, etc.).

So much for recollection. Recollection is important to the Chess player as knowledge is important to the man of culture in whatever activity he is engaged. Knowledge freshens the mind, and gives raw material to imaginative process, to wit, to constructive argument, to creative work.

But more important than the consciously recollected is that set of mental habits which smooths the action of the mind. This is the third kind of memory mentioned above—the memory which is a scholar's knowledge of a language ; the equipment which enables him to use it without conscious effort.

In Chess, and in many sciences, this kind of memory is Technique.

Technique is something difficult to define, existing as it does between objective vision and recollection of method. It is the more difficult to define because method itself is hard to describe in a game of Chess, where one sees, or does not see, a process by an intuitive act.

But just as the musician has methods of play which are consistent with objective reading of the score, so the Chess player has methods of carrying out particular tactical operations, like forcing


a Pawn to the back row, which he does not require to think about when contemplating an approaching ending.

This technique ranges from a full familiarity with the functions of the pieces (as distinct from their mere legal powers) to an acquaintance, acquired through vision or through learning, with methods of play which are at once specific and difficult.

The repository of Chess technique, par excellence, is the endgame. The conception of the Opposition is a piece of technique which, in most players, is a habit of mind, an element in the knowledge of the moves of the pieces. So, too, the theory of the remote passed Pawn—which is the obvious truth that the King which is required to move away from the centre of operations is disadvantageously placed. Again, a conception like triangulation is something that can either be seen or learned. So, too, the conception of the distant opposition. These are too well known to require illustration here.

But going further into the endgame we discover processes so hard that they require learning by most players. They are technical, as specific methods are technical. They are also as difficult as hard pieces of middle game analysis.

In point is the following fundamental endgame study (diagram 224). Here there are two factors in the defence. First is the



224.


*Endgame Position*

Black must check on KB file and so play as to prevent White moving the Rook to Kt file while the White King is near KR7. When the white King eventually retreats to the K file the Black Rook switches to the R file and the King places itself on KKt2 as soon as the white Pawn reaches a7.

curious fact that the Rook must operate on the King's Bishop's file until the hostile King has been driven back. The second is that when White has been obliged, *faute de mieux*, to advance his Rook's Pawn to the seventh, the Black King must station itself at KR2 or Kkt2, and nowhere else. This is not easy to see with the unaided vision, but, being learned, it is something that does not require to be consciously remembered. Had Tartakower's opponent been conscious of the endgame difficulties (or the possibility of solving them) he would have played differently from the diagram (225).

TARTAKOWER

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SOLER

225.

*An Ending of Technical Importance*

White played 43. K—Q5 and lost.

The King must stay on the King's side.

Not, of course, 43. K—B3, because of R×P and if:

44. R×P. R—R6 ch.

But 43 K—B5!.

There might follow :

43. . . . R—Kt6.

44. K—B4. R—R6.

45. K—Kt4. R×P ch.

46. K×P. R—R8.

47. K—Kt2. P—R5.

48. R—R6. P—R6.

The White King must then remain in one move reach of QKt2.

Black's process is now, not P—R7, after which White draws easily, but to endeavour to bring the King to Kkt2, thence down the file to QKt5, releasing the

Rook, then into QR7, etc. (a sort of Lucena manoeuvre). Against this, White's best method is to switch the Rook to the KB file as soon as the Black King reaches the Queen's file, and dislocate the Black plan by checking etc. This procedure, properly executed, draws.


The next diagram (226) shows a tactical situation in which the technical point is implied.

Other endgame devices that may be described as technical include methods of winning or drawing Rook and Pawn endings, some instances of King and two Pawns against King and one, the principles of mating with Bishop and Knight, and other



## ZNOSKO-BOROWSKI

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


(WHITE)

SPIELMANN

processes both difficult and easy. Not the least difficult is the position R and two Pawns *v.* Rook—which has been the subject matter of research (diagram 227).

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226.

*Tactical Play in the Ending*

Actually played was :

1. R—R6. K—Q2.

(Not :

1. . . . R × P ch.

2. K—Q4. R—QR5.

3. P—R7! wins the Rook.)

2. P—K6 ch. K—Q3.

3. K—B4. R—R5 ch.

4. K—Kt5 R—B5.

5. P—K7 dis. ch.

K × P.

6. R—R8 wins.

Black's 4th was bad (R—R4 being better). But White's 3rd was not good. Quite simply

3. P—K7 ch. K × P.

4. P—R7 followed by

R—R8 wins.

227.

*Technique*

K—R3 has been played.

1. . . . R—R7.

If :

2. R × P. R—R8.

3. K—R2. K—Q6.

4. R—R8. P—B6

5. R—Q8 ch. K—B7 wins.

E.g.:

6. R—Kt8. K—B8.

7. R moves. P—B7, etc.


1. KR3 was, therefore, an error. K—R1 draws.

Very interesting is the next diagram (228). If White can bring his R Pawn to the fifth, so as to exchange Black's KKtP,



he can create winning chances. Therefore, Black must play P—KR4. Capablanca won 2 endings against strong opponents who did not appreciate this. The temptation to do nothing is very strong for Black, and fatal.

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(WHITE)


228.

*Technique*

This is a position which is drawable.  
Black must play P—KR4.  
Capablanca won two endgames of this type through his opponent not doing so.

Somewhat easier is diagram 229, which shows a useful method of salvation by a Knight.

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

229

*Point of Technique*

White Draw

Not :

1. Kt—Q3 ch. K—Q7.
2. Kt—K5 K—K6 wins.


But :

1. Kt—B2 ch. K—Q7.
- If 1. . . . Kt—Q4!.
2. Kt—Q4!.
- If 1. . . . K—Q8.
2. Kt—K3 ch. K—Q7.
3. Kt—Kt2, etc.

By way of contrast, the next diagram (230) shows one of the hardest processes in endgame play—achieved by Rubinstein. Clearly, such a process is worth studying, because it would be hard to find in practical play by the light of nature.

RUBINSTEIN

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

SALWE

230.

*An Extremely Difficult Win*

- |            |          |
|------------|----------|
| 1. . . .   | R—B2.    |
| 2. B—R6.   | R—B6 ch. |
| 3. K—Kt2.  | R—Q6.    |
| 4. B—Kt5.  | K—B4.    |
| 5. K—B2.   | K—Kt5.   |
| 6. K—K2.   | R—KB6.   |
| 7. B—R6.   | K—Kt6.   |
| 8. B—Kt5.  | R—B1.    |
| 9. K—K3.   | R—K1 ch. |
| 10. K—Q3.  | K—B6.    |
| 11. K—Q4.  | R—K3.    |
| 12. K—Q5.  | R—K5.    |
| 13. B—B6.  | K—B5.    |
| 14. B—Q8.  | K—B4.    |
| 15. B—Kt5. | R—KKt5.  |
| 16. B—K7.  | R—Kt2.   |
| 17. B—B8.  | R—Q2 ch. |
| 18. K—B6.  | R—Q5.    |
| 19. B—K7.  | K—K3.    |
| 20. K—B5!  | R—Q4 ch. |
| 21. K—B4.  | R—KB4.   |
| 22. B—Q8.  | K—Q2.    |


and now the Pawn falls. Rubinstein's process is extremely hard to see "by the light of nature" and is therefore an important contribution to technique. This is one of the most difficult of practical endgames.

By way of corrective to any desire for exclusively technical equipment, the next diagram (231) shows an instance where technique was not enough.

For the rest, the endgame holds no monopoly of technique. The player who realises that he needs four moves to force a Pawn to QKt4 against a Pawn at QR4, with Rooks on the file, is to that extent a technician. That excellent player Canal described his play as technically wrong when, instead of recapturing at Q4 with his Knight from KB3, he recaptured with Pawn and allowed a pin of his Knight (by a Queen against his Pawn at KB7). Diagram 232 shows a technical error in the earlier opening.

MOLL

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

EDWARD LASKER

3. P—B4, K—Q5. 4. P—Kt5, BP×P. 5. P×P, K—K4. 6. P×P, K—B3.  
7. K—B2! wins.

231.

*Technique not Enough*

White is threatening P—Kt5, to be followed by a well-known break-through (P—Kt6, etc.). Black is aware that with Pawns at R3 and B3 he would be technically impregnable. But technique was insufficient to show the right move.

Correct is :

1. . . . P—B3.

If then :

2. P—B4. P—R3.

If instead :

2. P—R6. P×P.

3. P—B4. P—R4!.

4. P—Kt5. P—R5.

winning.

Black played, however,

1. . . . P—R3.

There should have followed (but White did not see it)

2. P—B6. P×P.

232.

*Technical Error*

In this position (after the moves :

1. P—Q4. Kt—KB3.

2. P—QB4. P—K3.

3. Kt—KB3. P—Q4.

4. Kt—B3. P×P.

5. Q—R4. QKt—Q2).

6. Q×P has been described by Alekhine as a technical error. The recapture can wait until after P—KKt3, etc., and until Black threatens to defend c4.

If 6. Q×P, Black is able to play :


6. . . . P—QR3,

knowing that P—QKt4 is going to be playable.

If 6. P—KKt3, probably Black has nothing better than B—K2.

This position shows, however, the difficulty of distinguishing the technical from the tactical. There is nothing in this line of thought that cannot be seen. The technician would spend less time on it than the analyst.


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LASKER

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(WHITE)

PILLSBURY

232(a).


*A Technically Bad Position*

White's Queen is tied to R4  
very awkwardly.

Of the game between Pillsbury and Lasker (see Illustrative Games) it can be said that Pillsbury, by allowing his Queen and Bishop to be held in a difficult situation at KR4 and KKt5,

VON GURETZKI CORNITZ

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
NEUMANN

233.

A technically won position  
with Q at R4.

against a battery and a Pawn attack, was committing a technical error, exposing himself to a battery (232(a)). Pillsbury's difficulty is so clearly a result of the functions of the pieces, rather than of any combinative attack, that few players of experience would need to analyse the situation in order to avoid it. In contrast diagram 233 shows a technically good position for the Queen and Bishop (after a sacrifice of the exchange).

That the danger can be analytically seen, is, of course, a consideration that detracts from the argument of any advocate who urges the advisability of learning technique as such. One player's technique is another player's vision. Theorists are always hard put to it to determine whether any systematic development of an attack from an advantageous position was technical or tactical.



234.

*Middle Game—Some Technical and Tactical Points*

Black has to consider P—K4. The technical method is P—K4 followed by Kt—Kt5.

The present position is, however, full of tactical points.

1. . . . . P—K4.
2. P×P. Kt—Kt5.
3. P—K6 (also a technical device). Kt×B.
4. P×P ch. K—R1.
5. P×Kt. Q—Kt3.
6. Q—Q2.

(If Q—Q3. Kt—B4)

and White has insufficient. Other technical features of the position are that P—K5 for White yields Black the square d5; that P—Kt3 for Black

gives White the opportunity (for what it is worth) of Q—Kt2 and BR6 (P—R5 is also to be considered).


Diagram 235 shows the value of "learning" in a complex opening. In a position such as this the technique is "regulative" only, the play that matters is tactical.

In our own day, players have been made "technique-conscious" through the efforts of Aron Nimzovitch. Certainly that great theorist has shown a great number of players what



KUSSMAN

(BLACK)



(WHITE)

ALEKHINE

12. O—O, P×P. (A desperate attempt not to lose more tempo.) 13. Kt×P, R—Q1: 14. Q—K2, Kt—K4. 15. Kt—KB5, P—Kt3. 16. Q—Kt5 ch. and wins.

235.

*Point of Learning and Technique*

Black's P—QB4 (after his Kt—KB3) is a different form of the Tarrasch Defence from the Defence without Kt—KB3.

5. BP×P. KP×P.

A mistake which is due to lack of vision and lack of learning.

Alekhine suggests : Kt×P, because without it B—Kt5 is good for White (had Black's Kt been on QB3 the method would have been P—KKt3).

There followed :

6. B—Kt5. B—K3.

7. B×Kt. Q×B.

8. P—K4. P×KP.

(Weak play, but the position is compromised. P×QP was the least of evils).

9. B—Kt5 ch. B—Q2.

10. Kt×P. Q—Kt3.

11. B×B ch. Kt×B.

they should be thinking about when they think about the centre ; that, for example, control of K5, against the French Defence, is more important than the occupancy of that square or the defence of the Pawn at d4.


Nimzovitch has also named and classified, and thus made players more conscious of, processes like Blockade, Over-protection, etc., which all good players have carried out, but which are important enough to be thought about at the level of consciousness.

The main criticism that can be made of the work of Nimzovitch is that he is an orator pointing to the form of his oration. When the orator spoke the form followed the subject-matter, not the matter the form. When Nimzovitch played, the technique was part of the vision. Lesser players than Nimzovitch have played " technique " all their lives without knowing it.

That is at once the justification and the final criticism of any effort to exploit memory in Chess. Memory can assist the Chess player by saving time and effort, and by enriching the mind with

experience in the way that the practice of speaking and writing enhance literary and oratorical skill. Practice, in Chess, as in other mental functions, assists to perfection so long as it does not induce staleness. The danger of staleness is the secret of the relative strength of amateurs in Chess performance. Usually their minds are fresh. Given freshness of mind there is no technical problem, and no important imaginative idea, that cannot be intuitively apprehended. And there is an almost infinity of Chess situations to the solution of which no effort of memory would avail.\*

The essence of Chess remains the "Idea". Technique is an easy idea formalised, or a difficult idea crystallised. Without stating dilemmas, it is reasonable to lay it down that the former is not necessary, the latter rarely applicable in practice. Thus



236.

*Study by Philidor*

White Wins

1. R—B8 ch. R—Q1.
2. R—B7. R—Q7.
3. R—QKt7. R—Q8.
4. R—KKt7. R—KB8. (A)
5. B—Kt3. K—B1. (B)
6. R—Kt4. K—K1.
7. R—QB4. R—Q8. (C)
8. B—R4. K—B1.
9. B—B6. R—K8 ch.
10. B—K5. K—Kt1.
11. R—KR4 wins.

(A)

- If 4. . . . K—B1.
5. R—KR7. R—KKt8.
  6. R—QB7. K—Kt1.
  7. R—B8 ch. K—R2.
  8. R—KR8 ch. and wins the Rook next move.

(B)

- If 5. . . . R—B6.
6. B—Q6. R—K6 ch.


7. B—K5, R—KB6. (If 7. . . . K—B1. 8. R—KR7.) 8. R—K7 ch., K—B1. (If K—Q1. 9. R—QKt7.) 9. R—QB7, K—Kt1. 10. R—KKt7 ch., K—B1. 11. R—Kt4, KK1. (If R—K6. 12. R—KR4.) 12. B—B4! wins.

(C)

7. . . . K—B1. 8. B—K5, K—Kt1. 9. R—KR4 wins.

\* In the last analysis, reliance on memory is due to lack of confidence in vision. Cognate is the preference for the White pieces and for quick attacks. The good player who is not lazy is quite as happy and dangerous with Black and knows when to be patient with either colour.

Philidor discovered a beautiful method of winning with Bishop and Rook against Rook from a certain position (diagram 236). A German commentator has pathetically said that "it is only a question of getting that position"! Lasker, with Rook and



237.

*Creative Endgame Idea*

(Troitsky)

White can win a piece. Can he hold it, since two will remain attacked? But there is a clever method of exploiting the recapture.

1. R—QKt5 ch.

Kt—Kt3

(otherwise mate ensues).

2. B×Kt. R—R7 ch.

3. K—Kt4!. R×B.

4. B—Kt1 dis. ch.

K—B2.


5. R—Kt1 and now Black's King must be forced onto a Black square.

5. . . . K—B3 (if K—Q2, R—K1).

6. R—Q1. K—Kt4.

7. R—QB1. K—R5.

8. R—Kt1 wins.



238.

*A Fine Point*

(Study by Moravec)

White Wins

1. K—R7! (N.B. not K×P).

1. . . . P—R5.

2. K—Kt6. P—R6.

3. K—Kt5. P—R7.


4. K—Kt4. P=Q.

5. K—Kt3 wins (because Black's Pawn at g7 prevents the Q from covering the square a1).

Bishop against Tarrasch's Rook, failed, after many hours of struggle to bring that position into being.

Diagrams 237 to 245 are illustrations of the perennial freshness of Chess. They also have an aesthetic value, which is irrelevant to play, yet so often accompanies—in any science—the clear statement of an important theme.

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(WHITE)

239.

*Ending by Reti*

White to win.

1. R—Q3 ch. K—K8.


2. R—B3. K—Q7.

3. B—B1! wins.

If 2. . . . K—Q8.

3. B—Kt4 wins.

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240.

*An Unexpected Zugzwang*


White to play and win.

1. R—B7 ch. R—Q2.

2. Q—B5 ch. K—Q1.

3. K—R6 Zugzwang.






241.

*Endgame by Reti*

White wins.

1. B—B5 ch. K—Q1.
  2. R—Q4 ch. K—K2.
  3. R—K4 ch. K—Q1!.
- (so that if 4. R×P, P=Q! draws).
4. B—Q7! P=Q.
  5. B—Kt5 forces mate.

Diagram 246 (a study by the present World Champion) reveals that even the realm of technique can produce new beauty.



242.

*Going Upstairs*

Ending by Czechower

White to draw.

1. Kt—Q4 ch. K—Q6.
  2. Kt—K6. R—B3.
  3. Kt—B5 ch. K—B5.
  4. Kt—Q7. R—Q3.
  5. Kt—Kt6 ch. K—Kt1.
  6. Kt—B8. R—Q1.
  7. Kt—R7 ch. K—R3.
- and now the King can capture the Bishop, and, after exchanges, stop the Pawn.


### ORIGINALITY IN CHESS

If the reader has followed the argument of this essay he will have no difficulty in appreciating that Chess is still an activity



for original minds. We have seen that the Chessboard is too severe a system to tolerate flights of fancy. Nevertheless, it lends itself to capture by imagination and intuitive clarity. The player who achieves this control is original in some degree. His is the originality of the mind that uses words which it has been taught in order to express its free apprehensions. All the teaching of

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
243.

Ending by Amelung

White to Draw

- |             |        |
|-------------|--------|
| 1. P—R5.    | R×P.   |
| 2. P—R6!.   | R×R.   |
| 3. P—R7.    |        |
| If 2. R×R.  | K×R!.  |
| 3. P—R6.    | K—R4.  |
| 4. P—R7.    | K—Kt3. |
| 5. K—Kt8.   | R—KR1. |
| 6. P=Kt ch. | Kt B6. |
- wins.

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
(After BOEK DRUKKER)

244.

Figure in Endgame Marble

White wins quickly

- |                         |       |
|-------------------------|-------|
| 1. P—B7!.               | B×P.  |
| 2. R×P ch!.             | K×R.  |
| 3. B—Kt6! and after the |       |
| Bishop moves 4. B—K8    | wins. |




245.

White to play and win  
(Endgame by Van Vliet)

1. Q—Kt4. Q—R8 (best).
2. Q—R3 ch. K—Kt3.
3. Q—Kt2 ch. K—B2.
4. Q—R2 ch. wins.

If 1. . . . Q—Kt7.  
2. Q—R3 ch. K moves.  
3. Q—Kt2 ch., etc.



246.

*New Point of Technique*  
Study by Botvinnik

White to play and win.

1. K—B2. K—B4.
2. K—B3. K—K4.
3. P—Kt4. P×P ch.
4. K×P. K—K5.
5. P—R5. P—B4 ch.
6. K—R3!. The only move to win.
6. . . . P—B5.
7. P—R6. P—B6.
8. P—R7. P—B7.
9. K—Kt2 wins.

At move 6 White must not play K—Kt3 met by K—K6, after which Black has gained a tempo.

technique, all the self-consciousness which is strategy, fail to amount to a capacity for that self-expression. So the teaching of literature, by itself, teaches nobody to write. But given spontaneity of understanding, Chess experience, like literature, is inspiration for the mind that can create. In these and other realms there is always left abundant scope for all the degrees of creativity. After a century of intensive exploration the

Chess Board still offers the rewards which are success to those who can discover—or invent—its more difficult ideas. And though it may be objected that imaginative players do not invariably defeat unimaginative ones, yet we know that in the vast majority of cases they achieve higher standing in the world of Chess mastery than do those whose minds are adequately instructed and relatively uninspired.

The technician, for example, can do much ; but can he always know when his technique is sufficient, or which technique to adopt ? Thus the Capablanca who gave us an object lesson of exploitation against Nimzovitch along conventional lines was said by Reti to be original and incisive in his methods above all other masters. He knew when to put a Bishop on Kt5 and when not to do so. But his methods always seem peculiar to the specific situations. In his game against Canal, we see at the end an exploitation along different lines than might have been technically anticipated (see Illustrative Games). The underlying truth is that he was controlling the situation, and the technique ; not following mechanically a reasonably obvious method.


That example is useful to show the place of learning, experience and technique in Chess. Do they become absorbed into the mind as part of the equipment that enables it more easily to apprehend, or do they merely come into the possession of the mind as pieces of knowledge and as mechanical instruments ? The answer is that, by the best standards of Chess achievement, there is little scope in Chess for the mechanical. It is notorious that when Chess players begin to rely (as is usually said) on technique, then they are stale and no longer achieve the best results.

It follows that the Chess player must always aim at emancipation from anything that suggests routine. The player who has found the best move once can find it again. In the rigours of tournament play routine is helpful and economical, but in the effort that leads to improvement—the improvement that makes a player stronger than those who previously defeated him—the only factor that matters is the increasing strength of the effort that can be made at any moment of time by the completely independent mind.

In the concluding positions, scope for recognisable originality is found by a famous Russian master.

## RABINOVITCH

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
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## BELAVIENETZ

shape of White's game remains unpromising.  
(stage).

## RABINOVITCH

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(WHITE)

## BELAVIENETZ

28. KR—KB1. Kt—Q2. (bound for Kt3) and now, quite remarkably, all Black's pieces are mobilized for attack, and White has no future. 29. Kt—Q1, Q—Q1. 30. K—R3, Kt—Kt3. 31. Kt—K3, Q—Q2. 32. K—Kt2, R—QKt1. 33. R—B2, P—KB5. 34. Kt—B4, Kt×Kt 35. Q×Kt, B—B1. 36. R—QR1, B—K2. 37. K—R1, Q—R6. 38. Resigns.

247. *Originality*

In answer to

5. B—K3. Kt—R3!

(threatening

6. . . . P—B4.

The capture of the Knight  
would lose tempo).

But a long tactical line is also  
involved.

6. Q—Q2. Kt—Kt5.

7. B—KKt5. P—B3.

8. B—R4. B—Kt2.

9. P—B3. B—R3!.

with unexpected plans.

10. KB—Kt5 ch.

K—B2.

11. Q—K2. Kt—K6

and remarkably this Knight  
cannot be attacked except by  
P—KR3, R—R2 and B—B2  
which takes too long.

Black has now achieved a  
strange position from which  
he can develop ingeniously  
but unimpeded, while the  
(See next diagram for a later

248. *Originality*

(From the same game as diagram

247).

16. . . . P—QKt4!.

(An unusual sacrifice, which,  
if accepted allows Black  
complete mobilisation).

17. P×P. R—R2!.

18. P—Kt6

(if P×P. Q—Kt3! or  
Kt×P.)

18. . . . Q×P.

19. P—B3. B—Q2.

20. Kt—R3. R—KB1.

21. K—K1. K—R1.

22. K—B1. P—B4!.

23. K—Kt2. R—Kt2.

24. QR—QKt1.

Q—B2.

25. P—Kt5. B—Kt2.

26. Kt—B2. B—Kt4.

27. B×B. R×B.

(Black's slow process is under-  
standable now).

# ILLUSTRATIVE GAMES

## 1. RUBINSTEIN—CAPABLANCA.

*White*

RUBINSTEIN

1. P—Q4.
2. KKt—B3.

3. P—QB4.

3. . . .
4. BP×P.
5. Kt—B3.
6. P—KKt3.

6. . . .

7. B—Kt2.
8. O—O.

9. P×P.
10. Kt—Kt5.
11. Kt×B.
12. B—R3.

12. . . .
13. B—Kt5.

15. B×Kt.

*Black*

CAPABLANCA

- P—Q4.
- P—QB4.

- P—K3.
- KP×P.
- Kt—QB3.

- B—K3.

- B—K2.
- R—QB1.

- B×P.
- Kt—KB3.
- P×Kt.

- Q—K2.
- O—O.

- Q×B.

A vigorous line that can involve Black in the difficulties of the Tarrasch Defence. Not a move for the cautious. The only effective way of exploiting any weakness created by Black's second move.

Since Rubinstein's day this has become the accepted method of exerting pressure on the weakened centre. 6. . . . B—Kt5 would involve Black in a Counter Attack before he has developed. Preferable to the text seems to be 6. . . . Kt—KB3 followed by B—K2 and O—O.

Preventing Kt—Kt5. Premature and illogical. If Black refrains from Kt—KB3 because of the danger of Kt—KKt5, then P—KR3 was an advisable move at this stage. If he thought that Kt—KKt5 followed by Kt×B strengthened the QP, then why not Kt—KB3?

Commencing a rapid (and not premature) exploitation of the new weakness.

Castling into a combination. But Black is in difficulties created by his 8th move. White is threatening Kt×QP. It is possible that Black has nothing better here than R—Q1. That would imply the waste of a tempo but there would be no serious weakness. It is possible that Capablanca thought he saw the refutation of Rubinstein's attack after the text.

See p. 19. Here P×B is forced, as Rubinstein's subsequent play demonstrates. It is evident that Capablanca missed the significance of Rubinstein's



16. Kt×P!.

15. . . . Q—R3!.  
16. K—Kt2!. QR—Q1.  
17. Q—B1!.

17. . . . P×Kt.

18. Q×B. Q—Q7.

19. . . . Kt—Q5.  
20. Q—Q3. Q×Q.  
21. P×Q. KR—K1.

22. B—Kt4. R—Q3.  
23. KR—K1.

23. . . . R×R.  
24. R×R. R—QKt3.

25. R—K5.

25. . . . R×P.  
26. R×P. Kt—B3.

27. B—K6 ch. K—B1.

28. R—B5 ch. K—K1.

28. . . . K—Q2.

29. B—B7 ch.

31. R—B7 ch. K—Q3.  
32. R×KKtP. P—Kt4.  
33. B—Kt8. P—QR4.  
34. R×P. P—R5.

17th move, and was relying on his own Q—R3 and R—Q1 as a sufficient defence to the threat of Kt×P.

One of the few spectacular moves that are praiseworthy as initiating, rather than completing, a destructive process.

The complete answer to Black's clever defence.

There is nothing better. Obviously, if

17. . . . R×Kt.

18. Q×Q. P×Q.

19. B×P ch.

Black decides that in this disadvantageous position the retention of a Queen is advisable.

After the text the game is very hard for White to win. Black has an open game to compensate for the loss of a Pawn.

Best. P—Q5 allows P—QKt4.

Safer than B—K6 ch. followed by QR—Q1; and forcing a simplification.

Black has little alternative.

Black fights well. His idea is to meet KR—K1 with R×R followed by Kt—B7 with plenty of play for the Knight.

A critical decision resolving the game into an ending.

Virtually forcing the liquidation of White Queen's side Pawn position.

A move, the consequences of which had to be seen when White played KR—K1.

26. . . . Kt—B7 is adequately met by (*inter alia*) R—K5!.

28. R—Q7 would be met by Kt—K4!.

K—K2 would be exploited by B—B4.

Now, since White's Rook must reach KB7, Black elects to play his King forward. He still has counter chances. *Inter alia* to avoid Rook exchanges, but mainly to develop the Queen's side attack.

35. P—R4.

36. R—R6 ch.

37. R—R5 ch.

38. B—Q5?

P—Kt5.

K—B4.

K—Kt3.

There is no advantage in too rapid a rush to the Queen's side.

Rubinstein's only error in a superb game. Best was B—B4. Under fatigue both he and his opponent overlooked that now Black can play R×RP! after which White cannot play B×R. Nor is it easy to see what White can do.

39. R—R6 is evidently too slow. Suggested has been :—

38. . . . R×P.

39. B—B4. R—B7.

40. R—Kt5 ch. K—B2.

41. B—Kt8 with a difficult win. But if in this variation Black plays :

39. . . . Kt—Q5 the matter is not so easy. If :

40. B×R. P—Kt6.

41. B×P. P×B.

42. R—R8. K—Kt2 draws.

42. R—K5 with a view to 43. R—K1 is met by Kt—B7.

White's best line appears to be :

40. R—Q5. Kt—B7.

41. P—R5!, but there are other possibilities such as :

40. . . . P—Kt6.

41. R×Kt. K—B4, which are not easy to exhaust.

Black misses the chance.

Good, though B×P also wins. The text makes the ending very pretty.

38. . . . P—Kt6?

39. P×P.

39. . . . P—R6.

40. B×Kt!.

Neat. White can meet :

40. . . . P—R7 with :

41. R—Kt5 ch. If then K×B,

42. . . . R—R5 wins. If :

41. . . . K—R3,

42. R—Kt8 wins.

40. . . . R×QKtP.

41. B—Q5!.

42. R—R6 ch. Resigns.

If K—Kt4, 41. B—B4 ch., followed by R—R6 wins. If K—R2 or K—R4, 41. R—R8 wins.

## 2. RUBINSTEIN—LASKER.

*White*

RUBINSTEIN

1. P—Q4.

2. Kt—KB3.

3. P—B4.

*Black*

LASKER

P—Q4.

Kt—KB3.

P—K3.

4. B—Kt5.

P—B4.

A compromising, but not a bad, move. A better move, that purports to refute White's fourth (the move of the Queen's Bishop before the Queen's Knight) is :

4. . . . P—KR3.

Then :

5. B×Kt. Q×B yields Black a free game ; whereas :

5. B—R4 allows a strong counter attack by :

5. . . . P—KKt4.

6. B—Kt3. Kt—K5.

7. P—K3. P—KR4.

8. P—KR3. Kt×B.

9. P×Kt. B—Q3, *et seq.*

5. BP×P.

KP×P.

6. Kt—B3.

P×P.

7. Kt×P.

Kt—B3.

8. P—K3.

A trifle vigorous for the defender.

Black is reluctant to allow White the powerful, slow development of P—KKt3. But the text is dangerous.

P—KKt3 would be met by B—B4. But White's sharpest move is 8. B×Kt.

If then Q×B, White can play, not

9. Kt×P. Q×Kt!, but

9. KKt—Kt5! Black then has

nothing better than KB—Kt5. After

which Kt—B7 ch., followed by

Kt(B7)×QP wins a Pawn. Therefore

Black must recapture the Bishop with

the Pawn. But it is possible that

the resultant position is a tenable one,

allowing counter play to Black in

compensation for a bad Pawn struc-

ture.

8. . . .

B—K2.

Contemplating complications that might be averted by the (paradoxically) safer move B—QKt5. Lasker is anxious for the counter attack which White eventually invites.

9. B—Kt5.

B—Q2.

10. B×KKt.

B×B.

11. Kt×P.

B×Kt.

12. P×B.

Q—Kt4!.

The move on which Black has been relying and which seems to give compensation for the sacrificed Pawn. Obviously 13. Kt—B7 ch. comes to nothing.

13. B×Kt.

B×B.

14. Kt—K3.

O—O—O.

Over incisive. At this stage Black underestimates White's defences, and fails to see the precise effect of White's 16th, 17th and 18th moves. Had he seen this process he would have equalised with :

14. . . . B×KtP. If then :  
 15. R—Kt1. Q—R4 ch.  
 16. Q—Q2. Q×Q ch.  
 17. K×Q. B—K5! and Black stands well.
15. O—O. KR—K1.  
 16. R—B1!. R×Kt?.
- Overlooking White's 18th. Best was probably K—Kt1. But thereafter White with R—B2 or R—B5 seizes the initiative.
17. R×B ch.!. P×R.  
 18. Q—B1!.. R×P.
- A choice of evils.  
 18. . . . R—K4.  
 19. Q×P ch. K—Kt1.  
 20. P×R. Q×P.  
 21. R—B1 leaves White splendidly placed.  
 Much better than Q×P ch.  
 Another choice of evils. R—Q3 is followed by 20. R×P.
19. P×R!. R—Q2.  
 19. . . .
20. Q×P ch. K—Q1.  
 21. R—B4!.
- Threatening a mating attack (Q—R8 ch.).  
 In order to prevent a check on White's K4.  
 Attacking a Pawn and threatening a different mating attack (Q—B8 ch.).  
 Only ; therefore best. If R—Q8 ch.,  
 23. K—B2. R—Q7 ch.  
 24. K—K1. Q×P.  
 25. Q—R5 ch., *inter alia*.  
 Obviously better than R×Q.
21. . . . P—B4.  
 22. Q—B5!.
22. . . . Q—K2.
23. Q×Q ch. K×Q.  
 24. R×P. R—Q8 ch.  
 25. K—B2.  
 25. . . . R—Q7 ch.  
 26. K—B3. R×QKtP.  
 27. R—QR5. R—Kt2.  
 28. R—R6!.. K—B1.  
 29. P—K4. R—QB2.
- Very exactly calculated.
30. P—KR4. K—B2.
- Black can only wait for White to make a mistake.  
 There is now no chance of a successful foray among the White King's side Pawns.
31. P—Kt4. K—B1.  
 32. K—B4. K—K2.  
 33. P—R5.
- White's process is most instructive. An immediate K—B5, R—B4 ch.; P—K5, R—B2, leaves a more difficult position. White takes advantage of a developing tension.
33. . . . P—R3.
- Necessary, perhaps, to prevent the further pressure of P—Kt5, P—Kt6, but not good, because of the weakness on g6.
34. K—B5. K—B2.  
 35. P—K5. R—Kt2.

36. R—Q6.

### Threatening :

37. P—K6 ch. K—K2.

38. R—Q7 ch!.

36. . . . K—K<sub>2</sub>.

37. R—QR6. K—B2.

38. R—Q6.

A repetition probably in order to gain  
on the Clock.

38. . . . K—Br.

A tempo loser in the good sense. Black must now move to his disadvantage.

39. . . . K—B<sub>2</sub>.

40. P.—R<sub>3</sub>!. Resigns.

White's 40th move creates a zugzwang and allows, on the King's retreat, K—Kt6, because R—Kt5 is now impossible for Black.

### 3. CAPABLANCA—SPIELMANN.

*White*

## CAPABLANCA

*Black*

SPIELMANN

1. P—Q<sub>4</sub>.

2. Kt—KB<sub>3</sub>.

3. P—B<sub>4</sub>.

- P—Q<sub>4</sub>.

- P—K<sub>3</sub>.

- $$K_t - \bar{Q}_2.$$

An experimental move of Lasker's calculated to delay B—Kt5 but causing, here, nothing more than transposition into the normal.

4. Kt—B
- <sub>3</sub>
- .

5. B—Kt5.

- KKt—B
- <sub>3</sub>
- .

- B—Kt<sub>5</sub>.**

Not a bad move, but involving more strategic difficulties than does the normal B—K2. The text move is better if played in conjunction with Kt—QB3.

- ## 6. $\mathbf{P} \times \mathbf{P}$ .

- $P \times P.$

White exchanges so that Black cannot later divert his plan with  $P \times BP$ .

More restrictive of Black than 7. Q—Kt3, played by Capablanca in an earlier round. There followed then :

7. . . . P—B<sub>4</sub>.

8.  $P-QR_3$ .  $B \times K_t$  ch.

9.  $Q \times B$ . P—B<sub>5</sub>.

10. Q—K<sub>3</sub> ch. Q—K<sub>2</sub>.

11.  $Q \times Q$  ch. and a draw resulted.

Bad strategy. Spielmann is tempted by a dislocation of White's Pawn position which proves anything but disadvantageous to the first player.

7. . . . P—B<sub>4</sub> was quite play-  
able. If then :

8.  $P \times P$ .  $B \times Kt$  ch. (*inter alia*)  
is a good move.

Also playable is :

7. . . . P—QR<sub>4</sub> preparing to fight on the Queen's side.

7.  $B \times K_t$  ch.



7. . . . . Q—K2 is also playable, since White has more to lose than to gain by :  
 8. B×Kt. B×Kt ch., etc. The text move is also to be condemned on first principles, since it is a loss of the tempo represented by the Bishop's development.
8. P×B. O—O.  
 9. P—K3. P—B4.
10. B—Q3.
10. . . . P—B5.
11. B—B2.
11. . . . Q—K2.
12. O—O. P—QR3.  
 13. KR—K1.
13. . . . Q—K3.  
 14. Kt—Q2. P—QKt4.
15. Q—R5. Kt—K5.

Vigorous but less effective now.

Alekhine suggests the clever Q—K1 so as to hinder B—Q3, viz.:

9. . . . . Q—K1.

10. B—Q3. Kt—K4!.

White might reply to this, however, with :

10. P—QB4 or

10. B—QKt5.

(10. . . . . P—QB3.

11. B—Q3).

Development is necessary before an adventure like Kt—K5.

This is a critical point of the game. Black is intending to consolidate with P—QR3, P—QKt4, Kt—K5, etc. White's play demonstrates that this can not be done, for a reason which does not appear clearly until move 18. A move suggestive of wonderful judgment or vision on the part of Capablanca. Had Capablanca not anticipated some remarkable possibilities for his Queen on the Queen's wing he might have played B—Kt1.

Alekhine suggests R—K1 followed by R—K3 and R—R3, but the text seems quite satisfactory, within the limits of the position. The immediate P—QR3 might have been met by Kt—K5.

White threatens P—K4 and compels Black to fight for the square Q4. To do this would not have been good strategy unless White realised that he could destroy Black's position combinatively at the critical moment.

Necessary, if Kt—K5 is to be played.

14. . . . . Kt—K5.

15. B×Kt wins a Pawn.

Black does not yet know how completely he has been outplayed. Had he been aware of the danger he might have played Q—Kt5 or B—Kt2. Against

B—Kt2, 16. P—B3 forces the square e4 but the game is defensible, e.g.:

15. . . . B—Kt2.  
 16. P—B3. KR—K1.  
 17. P—K4. P×P.  
 18. P×P. Q—Kt5.

not without defensive chances.

In this variation :

15. . . . B—Kt2.  
 16. Q—B7 might be met with :  
 16. . . . KR—B1.  
 17. Q×B. QR—Kt1.  
 18. Q—R7 R—R1 draw. Black cannot play 18. . . . Q—B3 because of 19. P—K4.

16. Kt×Kt. P×Kt.  
 17. P—QR4!.

The unanswerable exploitation of Black's inferior play. Black has relied on Q—Q4 to save himself, but this is inadequate for a reason that was earlier extremely hard to see.

17. . . . Q—Q4.

A very easy mistake to make, if it is a mistake. There is nothing good available.

17. . . . P×P would leave Black's Pawn position broken.  
 17. . . . R—Kt1.  
 18. KR—Kt1. Q—Q4.  
 19. B—B4. R—Kt3.  
 20. P×P. If then :  
 20. . . . R×P.  
 21. R×R. P×R.  
 22. R—Kt1 wins a Pawn. If :  
 20. . . . P×P.  
 21. B—R4. B—R3.  
 22. B—B7 wins.

There remains the observation that Spielmann may have played Q—Q4 not having seen White's reply. Had he seen it he still could not have saved the game.

18. P×P!.  
 18. . . . Q×B.

Simple and decisive.

There is nothing better. Thus :

19. B×P. R—Kt1.

19. . . . B—Kt2.  
 20. P×P. Q×Q.  
 21. R×Q and the Pawn at R6 cannot be captured.

If :

19. . . . R—R2.  
 20. P—Kt6!. Q×Q.  
 21. P×R!. If then :  
 21. . . . Q×R.  
 22. R×Q. Kt—Kt3.  
 23. R—Kt1 wins. If :  
 21. . . . B—Kt2.  
 22. R×Q. B×B.

20. P×P.
20. . . . R—Kt4.  
21. Q—B7. Kt—Kt3.  
22. P—R7. B—R6.  
23. KR—Ktr.
23. . . . R×R ch.
24. R×R. P—B4.  
25. B—B3. P—B5.  
26. P×P. Resigns.
23. R×P with plenty of material advantage.  
It is noteworthy that the attack would not suffer diminution by reason of the exchange of Queens.  
This is very often the case, and illustrates the unwisdom of belief in simplification by the defender.  
Here Black refuses to exchange because after exchanges the Pawn cannot be stopped except sacrificially.  
The best defence.
- The most convincing of many ways of finishing the game.  
If :  
23. . . . R—Br.  
24. Q×Kt is adequate.
- If :  
26. . . . R×P.  
27. P=Q. Kt×Q.  
28. R—Kt8ch. R—B1.  
29. Q×BP ch. forces mate.

## 4. KASHDAN—RESHEVSKY.

*White*

KASHDAN

1. P—K4.  
2. Kt—KB3.  
3. P—Q4.  
4. Kt×P.  
5. B—K3.  
6. P—QB3.

*Black*

RESHEVSKY

- P—K4.  
Kt—QB3.  
P×P.  
B—B4.  
Q—B3.

Kt—Kt5 comes to nothing after :

6. . . . B×B.  
7. P×B. Q—R5 ch.  
8. P—Kt3. Q×KP.  
9. Kt×P ch. K—Q1.  
10. Q—Q6. Kt—KB3!

6. . . . KKt—K2.  
7. Q—Q2.

B—Kt5 is more usual but the text is strong.

7. . . . B×Kt.

P—Q4 is playable.  
The usual answer is :

8. Kt—Kt5. B×B.  
9. Q×B and Black sacrifices Pawns.  
The text and sequence may be the result of research. That does not detract from its value as a piece of good Chess.

8. P×B. P—Q4.  
9. Kt—B3. P×P.

10. P—Q5. Kt—K4.  
 11. Kt—Kt5. O—O!  
 12. Kt×BP.

Not B—Kt5. Q—QKt3.  
 13. B×Kt. R—K1.  
 14. P—Q6. P×P.  
 15. Q×P. Kt—Q6 ch.  
 16. B×Kt. P×B.  
 and Black recovers the piece with advantage.

12. . . . R—Kt1  
 13. B×P.

It was very hard to see that this move entailed disadvantage amounting to loss. A quite sound strategy can consist in winning material and endeavouring to cope with disadvantage. Here that strategy proves inappropriate. At this stage (before B×P) Black has excellent playing chances. Possibly that fact determined Kashdan's decision.

13. . . . B—Kt5.  
 14. B×R. R×B.  
 15. Kt—Kt5.

White is now finding it hard to discover effective moves.

If: P—Q6. Kt—B4.  
 P—Q7. Kt×QP!  
 Q×Kt. Q×KtP  
 is bad for White.

The Bishop cannot move, without allowing exchanges (at K2) and the establishment of a Knight on Q6.

15. B—Kt5 does not seriously compromise the Knight, e.g. if:

15. . . . Q—Q3.  
 16. R—B1. R—Q1.

17. O—O, surrendering the Pawn.

But the answer to B—Kt5 is B—B6!

Therefore it appears that the text is best. Difficulties are accumulating.

15. . . . Kt(2)—Kt3.  
 16. R—B1.

Kt—B3 is playable but does not attack the KP. Thus:

16. . . . R—K1.  
 17. Kt×P. Kt—B6 ch., etc.

If:

16. Kt—B3. R—K1.  
 17. Q—K3. Kt—R5!  
 18. Kt×P. Kt—B6 ch.  
 19. P×Kt. Kt×P ch.  
 20. K—Q1. Q×KtP

(threatening R×Kt).

21. Kt—B6 ch. P×Kt.

22. Q×R ch. K—Kt2 wins.

16. . . . Kt—KB5.  
 17. R—B3.  
 17. . . . Kt(4)—Q6 ch.

An ingenious but inadequate defence.

18. B×Kt.  
19. O—O.

P×B.

This loses quickly, but what can White do? P—B3 allows various unpleasantnesses such as R—K1 ch., followed by B—Q2 and R—K7 or Kt×KtP ch., etc.

But P—B3 is probably superior to the text.

Threatening Queen and King.

Forced. Threats included B—B6. If:

19. . . .  
20. P—KR4.

Q—Kt4.

20. Q—K3. B—K3!.

21. P—Kt3. Kt—R6 ch.

22. K—Kt2  
(or R1). B×P ch.!

wins the Queen.

20. . . .  
21. P×Kt.  
22. P×B.  
23. R—B4.  
24. R—Q4.  
25. R—Q1.  
26. R(4)×P.  
27. P—B3.  
28. R—QB1.

Kt—R6 ch.

Q×Q.

Q—K7.

P—Q7.

Q×Kt.

R—K1.

R—K5.

R—K7.

If:

28. P—Q6. Q—B4 ch.

29. K—R1. Q—B7.

30. R×R. Q×R.

and there is no salvation for the remaining Rook except at QR1 or K—Kt1!.

28. . . .  
29. R(B1)—B2.  
30. Resigns.

P—R4.

Q—Kt3 ch.

Black mates in four.

## 5. YATES—TAKACS.

### White

#### YATES

1. P—K4.  
2. Kt—KB3.  
3. P—Q4.  
4. Kt×P.  
5. Kt—QB3.  
6. B—K2.  
7. O—O.  
8. K—R1.  
9. B—K3.  
10. P—B4.  
11. Q—K1.  
12. P—QR3.  
13. R—Q1.

### Black

#### TAKACS

- P—QB4.  
Kt—QB3.  
P×P.  
Kt—B3.  
P—Q3.  
P—K3.  
B—K2.  
P—QR3.  
Q—B2.  
B—Q2.  
P—QKt4.  
O—O.  
Kt—R4.

Up to this point the game has been a logically played Sicilian, White developing towards the King's side, Black towards the Queen's side. Black now undertakes a series of moves



which might be thought strategically wrong on general principles the consumption of tempo and is only justified by a tactical consideration which White brilliantly demonstrates to be wrong.

14. Q—Kt3.      Kt—B5.  
15. B—B1.      KR—B1.

At this point Black has nothing more constructive than the ill-advised text. P—K4 would be met by Kt—B5; P—Q4 by P—K5 and later P—B5. The positional problem here involved reveals Black's play to have been misconceived. That, however, was hard to see. White's next move is so good and creates such a complex situation that it was easy for Black not to see it even one move ahead, a fortiori, far enough ahead to prevent the present situation from developing.

16. P—QKt3!.      Kt×RP.

The alternative Kt—Kt3 leaves White free to develop powerfully with QRP. Compare his win against Reti (diagram on p. 14).

17. P—K5!.      Kt—K1.

The point is that if 17. . . . Q×Kt,

18. Q×Q.      R×Q.

19. P×Kt wins a piece.

17. . . . P×P.

18. P×P.      Q×Kt.

19. R—Q3 gives White a winning King's side attack. If Black combines P×P with Kt—K1, the open Bishop's file is an immediate path of attack.

18. Kt—K4!.      P—Q4.

Not      Kt×P.

19. Kt×Kt.      Q×Kt.

20. B—Q3.      Q—B2.

21. P×P.      Kt×P.

22. Kt×Kt.      B×Kt.

23. B—Kt2 after which Black's King's side is indefensible.

Black has no good move. Relatively best was P—QKt5.

19. Kt—B6 ch.!

Neatly echoing the theme. This Knight cannot be captured without the loss of a piece, viz., Kt×Kt.

20. P×Kt.      B—B1.

21. B×Kt. But there is much more in this move than the above.

19. . . .      K—R1.

Now P×Kt is threatened.

20. Q—R4!.

A move that White had to appreciate fully before committing himself to Kt—B6, and that he required to see at move 16, really to justify his combination. (One cannot be sure how much a master leaves to judgment.)

20. . . . Kt×Kt. N.B.—Not P×Kt because of :  
 21. B—Q3. P—B4.  
 22. Q×B, threatening Q—B8 ch., and  
 Q×QKt, again winning a piece.  
 21. B—Q3!. P—Kt3. In answer to P—KR3, White would  
 probably play B×Kt.  
 22. P×Kt. B—B1.  
 23. Kt—B3. K—Kt1. So as to be able to reply to Kt—Kt5  
 with P—KR3. If :  
 23. . . . B—K1.  
 24. Kt—Kt5. P—R3 could be an-  
 swered by B×Kt, winning a piece.  
 However, the Knight at a3 has been  
 sufficiently exploited and the game is  
 now virtually over.  
 24. Kt—Kt5. Also possible was :  
 24. B×Kt. B×B.  
 25. Kt—Kt5. P—KR4.  
 26. Kt×BP. K×Kt.  
 27. B×P ch. K×B.  
 28. Q—Kt5 ch., etc.  
 24. . . . P—R3.  
 25. B×Kt. P×Kt.  
 26. P×P. Clever ; but unnecessarily elaborate.  
 Q×P. B×Kt.  
 27. B×KtP also wins easily, and if  
 26. . . . B—K1.  
 27. B×B is adequate.  
 27. B×B was threatened—*inter alia*.  
 Accurately worked out. Another method  
 was :  
 27. R—KB3. P—K4.  
 28. B×KtP. P×B.  
 29. Q—R6. B—K1.  
 31. R—R3, etc.  
 27. . . . P×B.  
 28. R—Q3. R—B1.  
 29. P—QKt4!. For :  
 28. . . . P—K4 see previous note.  
 Cutting off the Bishop from its K2,  
 White has let his win hang on a fine  
 thread.  
 29. . . . B×P.  
 30. R—KR3. Resigns. Because after K—B2 (forced in order to  
 save the Queen), 31. Q×B forces  
 K—Kt1, whereafter :  
 32. Q—R4. B—B3.  
 33. Q—R8 ch. K—B2.  
 34. Q—Kt7 ch., and Q×Q.

## 6. RESHEVSKY—BOTWINNIK.

White

RESHEVSKY

1. P—Q4.  
 2. P—QB4.

Black

BOTWINNIK

- P—K3.  
 P—KB4.

H★

- |            |         |
|------------|---------|
| 3. P—Kkt3. | Kt—KB3. |
| 4. B—Kt2.  | B—K2.   |
| 5. Kt—KR3. |         |
| 5. . . .   | O—O.    |
| 6. O—O.    | P—Q3.   |
| 7. Kt—B3.  | Q—K1.   |
| 8. P—K4.   | P×P.    |
| 9. Kt—B4.  | P—B3.   |

In Botwinnik's style, retaining pieces,  
instead of B—Kt5 ch.  
Reshevsky's style—tempo saving.

An important strategic decision. Black  
wants to play P—K4 without in-  
curring Kt—Q5. The effect is that  
The Pawn at Q3 is left weak. To offset  
this there are attacking chances on the  
King's file.

- |               |         |
|---------------|---------|
| 10. Kt×P(K4). | Kt×Kt.  |
| 11. B×Kt.     | P—K4.   |
| 12. Kt—Kt2.   | Kt—Q2.  |
| 13. Kt—K3.    | P×P.    |
| 14. Q×P.      | Kt—K4.  |
| 15. P—B4.     | Kt—Kt5. |
| 16. Kt×Kt.    | B×Kt.   |
| 17. R×K1.     | B—B3.   |
| 18. Q—Q3.     |         |

- |           |                            |
|-----------|----------------------------|
| 13. . . . | Kt—B3 followed by          |
| 14. . . . | P—K5 is compro-<br>mising. |

- |           |        |
|-----------|--------|
| 18. . . . | Q—R4.  |
| 19. B—Q2. | KR—K1. |

Not :

- |                             |          |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| 18. Q×P.                    | QR—Q1.   |
| 19. Q—Kt4.                  | B—Q5 ch. |
| 20. K—Kt2 (not K—R1, R×B!). |          |
| 20. . . .                   | Q—R4.    |
| 21. P—KR4.                  | R—K1.    |
- with a winning attack.

This is a critical position. Correct was  
QR—Q1, preparing to defend the  
QP. The text is made in reliance on a  
counter attack from which Botwinnik  
found himself obliged to recoil.

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| 20. QR—Kt1. |  |
|-------------|--|

If immediately :

- |            |          |
|------------|----------|
| 20. B—Kt4. | B×P.     |
| 21. R—Kt1. | B—B3.    |
| 22. B×P.   | QR—Q1.   |
| 23. R×KtP. | B—B4.    |
| 24. P—B5.  | B×B.     |
| 25. R×B.   | R×R.     |
| 26. Q×R.   | Q—Q8 ch. |
- with an attack.

- |           |       |
|-----------|-------|
| 20. . . . | R—K2. |
|-----------|-------|

It is already late for defence. P—QR4  
is probably unplayable because of  
P—QR3 followed by P—QKt4.

- |            |        |
|------------|--------|
| 21. B—Kt4. | QR—K1. |
| 22. B×P.   | R—K3.  |

Botwinnik recoils from the following :

- |           |       |
|-----------|-------|
| 22. . . . | R×B.  |
| 23. R×R.  | R×R.  |
| 24. Q×R.  | B—B4. |
- and now White can play, not Q—K1,  
B—Q5 ch., but 25. Q—K3. Then

Black cannot take the Rook (because of Q—K6 ch., etc.) and has nothing better than :

23. R—K3.      R×QB.  
 24. Q×R.      R—Q1.  
 25. Q—B7.      Q—QB4.  
 26. QR—K1.      R—QB1.  
 27. Q×KtP.      B—Q5.  
 28. K—B2.

25. . . . B—Q5.  
 26. Q×B.      B×R.  
 27. B—K5 with an excellent game.  
 Not B—B4 ; 24. B—K5. The text is a temporary sacrifice only, and a bid for freedom.

This has been described as a mistake, a move inferior to Q—Kt3, but the latter is not convincing, e.g.:

28. Q—Kt3.      R—K1.  
 29. K—Kt2 (with threat of B—Q5 ch.). If then :

29. . . . K—R1.  
 30. B—Kt6! wins.

But if :

29. . . . K—B1.  
 30. B—B5.      R×R.  
 31. Q—Kt8 ch. K—B2.  
 32. Q—B7. ch. K—B3.  
 33. R×R.      B×R.  
 34. B×B.      Q×P.  
 35. Q—Q6 ch. K—B2.  
 36. B—B3 seems inconclusive.

28. . . . B×R ch.  
 29. R×B.      Q—Q5.  
 30. Q—Kt3.      Q—Q7 ch.  
 30. . . . Q—B8 ch.  
 31. K—Kt1.      Q—Q7 ch.  
 32. K—B2.  
 33. K—Kt1.

B—B3 is not better, because of R—K1.

Draw.

## 7. DAKE—RESHEVSKY.

*White*

A. W. DAKE

1. P—K4.  
 2. Kt—KB3.  
 3. B—Kt5.  
 4. B—R4.  
 5. O—O.  
 6. B×Kt.  
 6. . . .  
 7. P—Q4.  
 8. Q—K2.

*Black*

S. RESHEVSKY

- P—K4.  
 Kt—QB3.  
 P—QR3.  
 Kt—KB3.  
 P—Q3.  
 P×B.  
 Kt×P.  
 P—KB4.

A quite sound, but not a popular defence to the Lopez.

Not as good as against the Steinitz Deferred.

9. P×P. The most promising appears to be QKt—Q2. If then Kt×Kt,  
10. Kt×Kt. P—K5.  
11. P—KB3 with an attack.
9. . . . P—Q4. Equalising. In Chess parlance that tends to mean "getting the better game."
10. QKt—Q2. B—B4.  
11. Kt—Kt3. B—Kt3. Now Black's pieces are dynamically placed.
12. B—K3. P—B4. Good. The loss of scope for the Bishop is apparent only.
13. KKt—Q2. Kt×Kt.  
14. Kt×Kt. O—O. An attacking move, as it always should be, but all too rarely is.
15. P—KB4. P—QR4.  
16. R—B3. B—R3.  
17. P—B4. A good attempt to reduce the scope of the Bishop.
17. . . . P—R5. Timely: White cannot play (even if he wishes to).  
18. P—QKt3 because of RP×P.  
RP×P. B×P!.  
R×R. B×Q.  
R×Q. R×R.
18. R—QB1. Q—K1.  
19. Q—K1. White has held the position well. Now Q—Q1 would save a tempo.
19. . . . P—Q5.  
20. B—B2. B—R4.  
21. Q—Q1. R—Kt1. Somehow Black retains the initiative. He has arranged all his pieces along freer lines than are available to any corresponding pieces of his opponent's. One feels that some moves ago, White should have started something on the King's wing.
22. P—QKt3. A move to be avoided if humanly possible.
22. . . . B—Kt2!.  
23. R—Kt3. Q—K3.  
24. B—K1. R—R1. Note how Black breaks in by quick changes of threats.
25. Kt—B3. B×B.  
26. Kt×B. P×P. A choice of evils. Possibly P×P left fewer problems.
27. Q×KtP.  
27. . . . B—K5.  
28. Kt—Q3. R—R4.  
29. P—QR3. Q—K2.  
30. R—K1. Q—K3.  
31. Kt—B2. B—B3.  
32. Q—R2. P—R3. Black can take his time. White's weaknesses are permanent. Thinking in terms of the endgame.
33. R—QB1. K—R2.  
34. Kt—Q3. KR—QR1.



35. Q—K2. The RP must be defended, if at all, by counter attack.
35. . . . B—K5.  
36. Kt—B2. B—B3. The point of the following manoeuvres is that Black wants to eliminate all weaknesses before proceeding with the attack.
37. Kt—Q3. R—QKt1.  
38. Q—R5. B—K1.  
39. Q—Q1. R—Kt3.  
40. Q—Q2. R(Kt3)—R3.  
41. Q—QB2. B—Q2.  
42. Q—Kt2. Q—QKt3.  
43. Q—K2. Q—K3. To prevent a bid for freedom with P—K6.
44. Q—Kt2. Q—K2.  
45. R—R1. B—K3.  
46. Q—B1. Now Black's regrouping forces the White Queen to assume an awkward double function.
46. . . . Q—B1.  
47. Kt—Kt2. The break-through that is now threatened is more serious than the loss of the RP.
47. . . . Q—QR1.  
48. P—QR4. Saving the Pawn but yielding most important squares.
48. . . . R—Kt3.  
49. Q—B2. R—Kt5.  
50. R—Kt3. Q—K5!.  
51. Q×Q. Forced. Everything else loses material.  
51. . . . P×Q.  
52. R×R. P×R. Now Black's advantage has to be liquidated, and this is not easy. White has succeeded in reducing the pressure to elements that he can attempt to cope with.
53. P—R3. P—R4.  
54. R—K1. P—K6.  
55. K—B1. P—Kt4. The only way to introduce the King rapidly. The game is difficult to win but Reshevsky finds some excellent lines of play.
56. R—Q1. P—B4.  
57. P×P. K—Kt3.  
58. K—K2. K×P. Threatening K—B4 as well as K×P. Not R×KP. 59. Kt—Q3.  
59. R—KB1. The move on which White has relied. One of the best endgame sacrifices on record. It contemplates the permanent loss of the piece and not a quick recapture.  
59. . . . R×RP!.
60. P—R4 ch! Very important in order to give value to the Pawn on K5.
60. . . . K—Kt5!.  
61. Kt×R. B×P ch.

- |              |           |                               |      |
|--------------|-----------|-------------------------------|------|
| 62. K—K1.    | P—Q6!     | Not                           | B×R. |
|              |           | 63. K×B with counter chances. |      |
| 63. R—R1.    | P—Q7 ch.  |                               |      |
| 64. K—Q1.    | B—Kt6 ch. |                               |      |
| 65. K—K2.    | B×Kt.     |                               |      |
| 66. P—K6.    | K—B4.     |                               |      |
| 67. P—K7.    | K—K5!     |                               |      |
| 68. R—QKt1.  | B—Kt4 ch. |                               |      |
| 69. Resigns. |           |                               |      |

This game is included because it illustrates admirably the creation and exploitation of a strategic weakness, and the winning of the subsequent endgame with the aid of original ideas.

## 8. NIMZOVITCH—CAPABLANCA.

- | <i>White</i> | <i>Black</i> |
|--------------|--------------|
| NIMZOVITCH   | CAPABLANCA   |
| 1. P—QB4.    | Kt—KB3.      |
| 2. Kt—KB3.   | P—K3.        |
| 3. P—Q4.     | P—Q4.        |
| 4. P—K3.     |              |
| 4. . . .     | B—K2.        |
| 5. QKt—Q2.   |              |
| 5. . . .     | O—O          |
| 6. B—Q3.     | P—B4.        |
| 7. QP×P.     |              |
| 7. . . .     | Kt—R3.       |
| 8. O—O.      |              |

Quite playable, but not vigorous. Aims at a slow but sure development.

With the idea of preventing the B from being deflected by P×BP.

The only way to prevent White from retaining a better control of the centre. Error of strategy number one. White is disturbed by the fact that Black can sooner or later play P×BP and P×QP followed by Kt—Q4. But the method White adopts to avoid weakening, e.g. his KB4 is worse than any evil that was impending.

Much better than B×P, which would allow :

8. P—QR3. P—QR4.
9. P—QKt3 and
10. B—Kt2.

Another error of strategy. Of two evils White chooses both ; a cramping attack and a simplification to his disadvantage later. White had no reason to be afraid of :

8. Kt—Kt3. P×P.
9. B×P. Q×Q ch.
10. K×Q. Kt×P.
11. Kt×Kt. B×Kt.
12. K—K2 with a drawn position.

At this stage White has no justification for thinking of more than a draw.

If, however, something more enterprising is required, why not :

8. P×QP. Kt×BP.
9. Kt—Kt3. Kt×B ch.

10. Q×Kt. Q×P.  
 11. Q—K2, etc., and if :  
 10. . . . Kt×P.  
 11. O—O.  
 Black will in any event have a better, but not an overwhelming, game.
8. . . . Kt×P.  
 9. B—K2. Preferable seems B—Kt1 or B—B2 but then the Black Bishop may operate on the diagonal a6—f1.
9. . . . P—QKt3. Not the most vigorous QKt—K5 looks good : Capablanca however, still develops.
10. P×P White is restricted tactically because his strategy has been of a slow order. He cannot play :  
 10. P—QKt4. QKt—K5.  
 11. Q—Kt3, because of :  
 11. . . . P—QR4.  
 10. P—QR3 is met by P—QR4. Then, however, White has P—QKt3, and the whole line may be better than the text.
10. . . . Kt×P. Black now has well placed Knights, hard to disturb without loss of the minor exchange, and Black's Bishops are much nearer than White's to control of the diagonals.
11. Kt—Kt3. B—Kt2.  
 12. Kt×Kt. B×Kt.  
 13. Q—R4. Q—B3.  
 At this stage it is still very difficult for Black to realise his positional freedom into an attack.  
 How Capablanca does this is impressive. The text move restricts White's QB and commences the process of centralising the Queen.
14. B—R6. Continuing the error of simplifying. Necessary was 14. R—Kt1 in order to make possible B—Q2.  
 There is also tactical error involved here. White does not appreciate that the next four moves do not emancipate him.
14. . . . B×B.  
 15. Q×B. Kt—Kt5.  
 16. Q—K2. KR—Q1.  
 17. P—QR3. Now R—Kt1 would lose a Pawn, and R—Q1 would be met by R×R ch., and R—Q1.
17. . . . Kt—Q6.  
 18. Kt—K1. White's method is to absorb Black's attack before it is too dangerous. Attacks often disappear through careful absorption : not so this one. At this point R—Kt1 was again White's best move.

18. . . . Kt×Kt. Black is not to be bribed with offers of Bishops for Knights.
19. R×Kt. QR—B1.  
20. R—Kt1.
20. . . . Q—K4!.
21. P—KKt3. Q—Q4.
22. P—QKt4. B—B1.  
23. B—Kt2.
23. . . . Q—R7!.
24. R—R1.
24. . . . Q—Kt6.  
25. B—Q4.
25. R—B7.  
26. Q—R6.
26. . . . P—K4!.  
27. B×KP. KR—Q7.  
28. Q—Kt7.
- At last, and too late. Just when White thinks he has solved his major problems, Black demonstrates that he holds a formidable advantage.
- White might, however, have done better by playing P—K4.
- Very strong. If now :  
21. P—Kt4. B—Q3.  
22. P—Kt3. Q—K5.  
and a major piece effectively penetrates White's half of the board.
- Black still has difficulty in converting his initiative into effective attack. The choice of the text move is most important. Q—K5 would allow B—Q2 and B—B3.
- Free at last ?
- Black's remarkable reply is the only one effective to prove that White is still not free.
- A quite remarkable finding of a "pressure point."
- A sort of Zugzwang. 24. . . . P—QR4 is contemplated and B—Q4 prevented. Alekhine suggests :  
24. QR—Q1. R×R.  
25. R×R. P—QR4.  
26. P×P. P×P.  
27. Q—R6. R—B7.  
28. R—Q8, but this fails after Q—Kt8 ch.  
29. K—Kt2. Q×B.  
Then White has no time for Q—Q6 ; nor perpetual check after R×B ch.
- QR—QB1 is met by P—QR4.  
KR—QB1 is met by R×R and P—QR4.
- Overlooking Black's reply. There is, however, no drawing line. Q—Q1 is answered, not by :  
26. . . . P—K4.  
27. R—K2!, but by :  
26. . . . Q—B5, or R—B6 and if White exchanges Black still has control of the board.
- R—B1 is met by :  
28. . . . Q×KP!.  
29. B—B4. R×KBP!.  
28. Q—B1 is better. There follows

28. . . . R×P.  
 29. P—Kt4. Q—K3.  
 30. B—Kt3. R×P!.
- Much better than Q×P; if now :  
 B×R. Q×KtP ch.  
 K—R1. Q—R6, etc.
31. Q—B3. R(R7)—Kt7 ch.  
 32. Q×R. R×Q ch.  
 33. K×R. Q×KtP.
- One of those positions in which a Queen is not disturbed by two Rooks.
34. QR—Q1. P—KR4.
35. R—Q4. Q—Kt4.
- The threat is now B—Q3 followed by P—R5.
36. K—R2. P—R4.  
 37. R—K2. P×P.  
 38. P×P. B—K2.  
 39. R—K4. B—B3.  
 40. R—KB2. Q—Q4.  
 41. R—K8 ch. K—R2.  
 42. Resigns.
- P—R5 cannot be stopped even by :  
 42. R—B4 (P—R5.  
 43. B×P. B—K4, etc.),  
 and there are other methods of winning.

## 9. CANAL—CAPABLANCA.

*White*

CANAL

1. P—Q4.  
 2. P—QB4.  
 3. Kt—KB3.

*Black*

CAPABLANCA

- Kt—KB3.  
 P—K3.  
 P—QKt3.

The Queen's Indian. An opening favoured by Capablanca late in life when he appears to have lost his confidence in his capacity to outplay his opponent from any well balanced position. Note that P—QKt3 cannot be played immediately after 3. Kt—QB3, because of 4. P—K4.

4. P—KKt3. B—Kt2.  
 5. B—Kt2. B—Kt5 ch.  
 6. B—Q2. B×B.  
 7. QKt×B.

Having developed his Queen's Bishop, Black is content to exchange his King's Bishop. White usually emerges from this kind of development with slightly better control of the centre, but insufficient pressure to turn that to advantage.

7. . . .

O—O.



8. O—O.
8. . . . P—QB4.  
9. P×P.
9. . . . P×P.  
10. Q—B2. Kt—B3.  
11. KR—Q1. Q—Kt3.  
12. P—QR3.  
12. . . . QR—Kt1.
13. QR—Kt1. KR—B1.
14. P—K4.
14. . . . P—K4.  
15. Q—Q3.  
15. . . . P—Q3.  
16. Kt—B1. Kt—Q5.  
17. Kt×Kt. KP×Kt.  
18. P—QKt4.

8. Q—B2 is more incisive, and is best met by P—Q4. The text, however, is eminently playable.

The best, on the assumption that White does not wish to play P—K3.

Aggressive, not defensive.

A good counter aggressive move, effectually preventing, if it be otherwise playable, Kt—K4, because now that will cost White the QKtP. Black holds back the "automatic" P—QR4 which may allow a White Knight to occupy QKt5.

If, immediately, P—Q4 there follows :  
14. P×P. P×P.

15. Kt—Kt3.

After the text P—Q4 will be playable because Kt—Kt3 will then be answerable by Kt—QR4.

To prevent P—Q4. Another method is :

14. Kt—K4. Kt×Kt.

15. Q×Kt. Kt—Q5.

16. Q—Q3. Kt×Kt ch.

17. B×Kt. B×B.

18. Q×B. Q—Kt2 (*inter alia*) with insufficient advantage to White.

Best. White's progress to Q5 is harder than Black's.

This proves to be waste of tempo, but not harmful at that.

Which, of course, does not allow Q×P.

The game is still very well balanced.

Black has a passed Pawn—but White can prevent the exploitation of this by defending the points K5, KKt4, and QB4 with P—KB4, P—KR3, Kt—Q2, etc., as they become necessary. The text threatens P×P and P—K5.

Capablanca takes a chance! Either this, or one of the most brilliant transitions to endgame in the history of Chess. Safe was Q—B2. The text allows White to win two minor pieces for a Rook. This results in an endgame which is more difficult for the first player but of which the result is not a foregone conclusion. If White does not attack immediately Black may play Kt—Q2 and later Q—R5.

19. P×P. P×P.

20. R×B1?.

Very hard to resist, and possibly, a winning move !

20. . . . Q×B.

21. P—K5. Q—Kt6.

22. P×Kt. Q×Q.

23. R×Q. R—Kt8.

White's game is now very difficult. Black threatening R—QB8, also the penetration of the other Rook to Kt6 winning the QRP.

24. B—Q5. R(B1)—Kt1.

25. K—Kt2. R(Kt1)—Kt6.

26. R×R.

Awkward ; yet if :

26. R—Q2. R(8)—Kt7, really costs Black no tempo in the event of exchanges. If then :

27. R—Q1. R×P.

28. R—K1. P×P.

29. R—K7. R(6)—R7 (*inter alia*).

26. . . . R×R.

27. Kt—Q2. R×P.

28. Kt—K4. P—QR4!.

29. Kt×P. P×P.

Leaving White to commit himself. Of course, P—R5 is met by B—B6, and a QP move by K—B3.

30. K—B1. P—R5.

31. K—K2. R—R8.

Threatening P—R6, P—R7, and Rook checks.

32. Kt—Q3.

Not the best ; White reconciles himself too easily to the sacrifice of the Knight. Best is 32. K—Q3.

Without attempting an exhaustive analysis, I suggest :

32. K—Q3. P—R6.

33. K—B2. P—R7.

34. K—Kt2. R—KB8.

35. K×P. R×P ch.

36. K—Kt3. R×P.

37. Kt—Q3. R—R6.

38. P—B5. R×P.

39. K—B4. K—B1.

40. P—B6. K—K2.

41. Kt—B5. K—Q1.

And now, not :

42. B×BP. R—K6.

43. Kt—K6 ch. K—B1.

44. K—B5. P—Q6.

45. B—K8. R×Kt.

46. B—Q7 ch. K—B2.

47. B×R. P—R4! wins.

But :

42. K—Kt5. R—Kt8.

43. K—Kt6. R—Kt8 ch.

44. Kt—Kt3. K—B1.

32. . . . P—R6.  
 33. P—B5. P—R7.  
 34. K—B3.  
 34. . . . R—Q8.  
 35. B×RP. R×Kt ch.  
 36. K—K4. R—Q7.  
 37. B—B4. K—B1!.

38. P—B3. R×P.  
 39. K×P. K—K2.

40. B—Q3.

40. . . . P—R4.  
 41. K—K3. R—KKt7.  
 42. K—B4. R—Kt8.  
 43. B—K4. R—QB8.  
 44. P—B6. R—B6.  
 45. P—B7?.

45. . . . R×P.  
 46. B—Q5. R—B4.  
 47. B—R2. R—QKt4.  
 48. K—K3. R—QR4.  
 49. B—B4. R—B4.  
 50. B—R6. K—K3.  
 51. K—B4. R—B3.  
 52. B—B1. P—B4.  
 53. B—R6.  
 53. . . . K—B3.  
 54. B—Kt7. R—B5 ch.  
 55. K—K3. K—Kt4.  
 56. K—B2. P—B5.  
 57. K—Kt2. P—B4.  
 58. Resigns.

45. B×P. R—K8.  
 46. B—B4. R—K2.  
 47. Kt×P. P—R4.  
 48. Kt—K6. P—R5.  
 49. P—B7. wins.

Forced. R—K8 ch. was threatened.

37. . . . R×P?  
 38. P—B6 wins.

If R—R6,

40. K—K4. R×P.  
 41. P—B6. K—K2.  
 42. B×P with drawing chances.

It is hard to find a good move now.  
 Perhaps better is P—B6, K—Q3 (the  
 check is not better),

41. B×BP. K×P.  
 42. P—KKt4 and White has drawing  
 chances in practical play. If:

40. P—KKt4. P—B4. If then:

P×P. R—R5 ch.

K—Q5. R×B.

K×R. P—R4 wins

(Remote passed Pawn). The text is  
 not bad.

Bad. But K—B5 is met by R—B4 ch.,  
 with great pressure, K—B4, R—K4!.

If K—Kt5, R—B6 is as good as any.

One process of winning is R—B7 ch.

K—R3. P×P.

K×P. P—R5 ch.

K—R3. K—B5.

followed by R—KB7 and K×P ch.

## 10. RETI—LASKER.

<i>White</i>		<i>Black</i>	
RETI		LASKER	
1.	Kt—KB <sub>3</sub> .		P—Q <sub>4</sub> .
2.	P—Q <sub>4</sub> .		Kt—KB <sub>3</sub> .
3.	P—QB <sub>4</sub> .		P—B <sub>3</sub> .
4.	Kt—B <sub>3</sub> .		P×P.
5.	P—K <sub>3</sub> .		
5.	. . . .		P—QKt <sub>4</sub> .
6.	P—QR <sub>4</sub> .		
6.	. . . .		P—Kt <sub>5</sub> .
7.	Kt—R <sub>2</sub> .		P—K <sub>3</sub> .
8.	B×P.		B—K <sub>2</sub> .
9.	O—O.		O—O.
10.	Q—K <sub>2</sub> .		
10.	. . . .		QKt—Q <sub>2</sub> .
11.	P—QKt <sub>3</sub> .		
11.	. . . .		P—QR <sub>4</sub> .
12.	B—Kt <sub>2</sub> .		P—B <sub>4</sub> .
13.	KR—Q <sub>1</sub> .		
13.	. . . .		Q—Kt <sub>3</sub> .
14.	Kt—B <sub>1</sub> .		B—R <sub>3</sub> .
15.	P×P.		

Played on the assumption that 5. . . .

P—QKt<sub>4</sub> is not good for Black. That may or may not be true; nowadays

5. P—QR<sub>4</sub> is usual.

Lasker was always prepared to make compromising moves if they created tactical possibilities.

Better, perhaps, is Kt—K<sub>5</sub>. If then :

6. . . . B—Kt<sub>2</sub> (best).

7. P—QR<sub>4</sub> cannot be automatically answered by P—Kt<sub>5</sub> because of B×P. Nevertheless, Black would have good chances (Q—B<sub>2</sub> or Q—Kt<sub>3</sub> or P—QR<sub>3</sub>).

This appears to give Black compensation for a weak centre. But White's Knight is not without a future.

Formally correct, functionally not incisive. Better is immediate P—QKt<sub>3</sub> or B—Q<sub>2</sub>. Very interesting is :

10. P—R<sub>5</sub>!. Q×P.

11. B—Q<sub>2</sub>. Q—Kt<sub>3</sub>.

12. Q—R<sub>4</sub> (*inter alia*).

Kt—R<sub>3</sub>.

13. KR—B<sub>1</sub> with a good game.

In the long run B—Q<sub>2</sub> followed by Kt—B<sub>1</sub> and Kt—Kt<sub>3</sub> might be better. Now, as often in this type of opening, White has a good centre with Queen's side weaknesses to compensate his opponent. Both players have chances.

Again, formally rather than functionally good. Better was 13. Kt—B<sub>1</sub>, if then Q—Kt<sub>3</sub>. 14. Kt—Q<sub>3</sub> can be played before Black's Bishop arrives at R<sub>3</sub>.

Embarrassing to White, who lacks the courage to play the difficult, but not unplayable move, Kt—Q<sub>3</sub>, allowing Black a passed Pawn. For the same reason P—K<sub>4</sub> is now difficult.

Solving a problem to Black's advantage.

15. . . . Kt×P.  
 16. Kt—K5. B×B.  
 17. Kt×B. Q—R3.
18. B—Q4. KR—B1.  
 19. B×Kt. B×B.  
 20. Q—B3.
20. . . . B—K2.  
 21. Kt—Q3.
21. . . . Kt—Q4.  
 22. Kt(Q3)—K5. B—B3.  
 23. P—K4. Kt—B6.  
 24. R—Q6.
24. . . . Q—Kt2.  
 25. QR—K1.
25. . . . B×Kt.  
 26. Kt×B. Q—B2!.  
 27. Kt—B4. P—K4.

Correctly appreciating that the Black Queen is a better piece than the White. Now White is in tactical difficulties. He cannot play Kt—Q3. Meanwhile Black with R—B1 will threaten Kt×KtP. Note also that the Knight on B4 is pinned. In the circumstances White's best risk may be R—Q4 with a view to R—R4 and a King side attack. Reti adopts a less risky method, which, however, leaves him with a bad weakness at QB3.

P—K4 is not playable because of P—K4 in reply followed by B—Q5. Kt—Q3 abandons c3.

In order to replace Knight at B3.

21. P—K4 seems too important to be omitted. At first sight, however, it seems to be refuted by :

21. . . . Q—Kt2.

22. R—K1. R—Q1.

with an attack. Nevertheless, with P—K4 White could save the game as follows :

21. P—K4. Q—Kt2.

22. Kt—K2. If then Q×P,

23. Q×Q. Kt×Q.

24. Kt—Kt6 wins the exchanges. If instead, Kt×P,

23. Kt—Kt3. P—B4 (best).

24. Kt×Kt with at least a drawn endgame.

Obviously not P—B3; R×Kt, etc.

This counter play amounts to very little because Black, with the aid of the Knight at B6 really controls the Queen's file.

Both players must see that this does not lose a Pawn. Black has appreciated, however, that the Rook at K1 is a useless piece.

The Bishop, having done the work, now removes a strong piece. Observe : 25. . . . R—Q1 is met by 26. Kt×RP. Not Kt×KP?. 27. R—Q7!. The text is not so answerable.

Steadily restricting White's scope, the move appears good tactically because Black has seen a clever series of moves in answer to White's apparently



28. Q—B5. Kt—K7 ch.  
 29. K—B1. Much better was K—R1, but the reason is hard to see.
29. . . . Kt—Q5.  
 30. Q×KP. Kt×P.  
 31. Kt—Kt6. Kt—Q7 ch. Had the King now been at KR1, this would not be playable. If the reader refers back to the position at Move 29 and plays K—R1, it will appear that Black has no winning line.
32. K—Kt1. Kt—B5!. A move that White may not be blamed for overlooking four moves earlier. If now 33. Kt×R. 33. . . . Q×R is good enough.
33. Kt×Kt. Q×Kt.  
 34. Q—KB5. QR—Kt1.  
 35. P—K5. If Q×QRP, 36. Q×KP may be good enough.
35. . . . P—Kt6. Simplest. But only apparently easy.  
 36. P—K6. P×P.  
 37. R(Q6)×P. R—KB1.  
 38. Q—K5. Q—B7.  
 39. P—B4. P—Kt7.  
 40. R—K7. Q—Kt3.  
 41. P—B5. Q—KB3.  
 42. Q—Q5 ch. K—R1.  
 43. R—QKt7. Q—B6.  
 44. Resigns.

A very fine game psychologically, involving the apprehension of that most difficult piece of Chess, an ingenious series of Knight moves.

## 11. LASKER—CAPABLANCA.

*White*

E. LASKER

*Black*

J. R. CAPABLANCA (Tenth game of the Match for the World Championship, 1921).

- |            |         |
|------------|---------|
| 1. P—Q4.   | P—Q4.   |
| 2. P—QB4.  | P—K3.   |
| 3. Kt—QB3. | Kt—KB3. |
| 4. B—Kt5.  | B—K2.   |
| 5. P—K3.   | O—O.    |
| 6. Kt—B3.  | QKt—Q2. |
| 7. Q—B2.   |         |

Playable, then as now. The present game, however, is largely responsible for the general reversion to 7. R—B1. In the best opinion 7. . . . P—B4 is playable after the text but not after 7. R—B1.

7. . . . P—B4.

The most vigorous reply—P—QB3 gives Black less scope. The reason why the text move is more playable here than

against 7 R—B1 is that after 7. Q—B2, P—QB4; 8. B×Kt, B×B is valid, because if White embarks on P×QP, Black with BP×P can force open the King's file. With the White Queen on Queen's square, this cannot be done. Again:

7. R—B1. P—B4.

8. QP×P, or even P×QP, commits Black to adventures which it may be wise to avoid. E.g.:

8. QP×P. B×P.

9. P×P. P×P.

10. Kt×P. Q×Kt.

11. Q×Q. Kt×Q.

12. Kt×Kt. or:

8. QP×P. Kt×P.

9. B×Kt. B×B.

10. P×P. P×P.

11. Kt×P.

The argument is, however, not conclusive tactically. E.g.:

8. QP×P. QP×P.

9. P—B6. Kt—Kt3.

If now:

8. QP×P. KP×P.

9. P×P. Kt×P,

is safe for Black.

This has been praised as the "thematic move." Nevertheless, it is good. It unpins Black's centre Pawn, pins the White Knight usefully and makes possible, in some variations, further development of the Queen.

In a previous game of the match

9. BP×P, Kt×KP led to a draw.

The text threatens B×P ch.

It is quite possible that:

9. . . . P×BP

works out to the advantage of Black.

The text is safer and does not retard development of the Queen.

Also playable is P×BP (without opening the file). 11. B×P, Kt—Kt3, or

11. . . . P—QKt3.

Of course, not:

11. Kt×P. Kt—K4.

Perhaps:

14. . . . Q—R4 is more promising, now that the White Bishop cannot reach K2.

Now White is attacking. Golombek suggests as better:

8. R—Q1.

8. . . . Q—R4.

9. B—Q3.

9. . . . P—KR3.

10. B—R4. BP×P.

11. KP×P.

11. . . . P×P.

12. B×P. Kt—Kt3.

13. KB—Kt3. B—Q2.

14. O—O. QR—B1.

15. Kt—K5.

15. Q—K2, unpinning the Knight.  
If then :

15. . . . QKt—Q4.

16. Kt—K5. B—B3.

17. P—B4. If then Kt×Kt,

18. P×Kt, and

18. . . . Q×P loses to

19. B—K1!. But the answer to

15. Q—K2 is probably Q—KR4  
which defeats (*inter alia*) the threat of  
P—Q5.

15. . . . B—Kt4.

Good from the point of view of the  
attack on the QP file, but open to the  
criticism that it allows White, without  
loss of tempo, to generate a threat.  
Both players at this stage, appear to  
have missed the possibilities of White's  
17th move.

16. KR—K1.

Not only defending the Rook, but  
threatening Kt—Kt6!, followed by  
R×KP whether the Knight be cap-  
tured or not.

16. . . . QKt—Q4.

Evidently relying on his ability to hold  
the position after :

17. QB×Kt. B×B.

Otherwise KKt—Q4 had to be played.

17. KB×Kt?.

White misses his best chance. The  
immediate combination Kt—Kt6 is  
not playable, because of :

17. . . . P×Kt.

18. R×P. B—B5! (or :

18. Q×KtP. Kt—B5). But Breyer

has demonstrated that 17. QB×Kt is  
much superior to the text, if indeed,  
the move does not force a winning line.

If :

17. . . . Kt×B.

18. Kt—Kt6 wins. E.g. :

18. . . . P×Kt.

19. R×P!, etc. Or :

18. . . . R—K1.

19. R×KP. P×R.

20. B×P ch., with a mating attack).

It seems, therefore, that in reply to  
17. B×KKt, Black must recapture  
with the Bishop. (Kt×Kt gives Rook  
and two minor pieces for White's  
Queen.)

One sequence is as follows :

17. . . . B×B.

18. B×Kt. P×B.

19. Kt—Kt4. B—Kt4 (best).

20. P—KB4. B×P.

21. Q—B5. B—Kt4.  
 22. Q×QP. P—QR3.  
 23. P—QR4. QR—Q1.

(This, according to Bogoljubow, yields a draw.)

24. Q—KB5. P—KKt3.  
 25. Q—K5. KR—K1.  
 26. Kt—B6 ch. B×Kt.  
 27. Q×B. B—B3.  
 28. R×R ch. R×R.

29. P—Q5, with chances, and, of course, White has at 24 a draw by repetition at his option. The position at Move 17 may justly be said to be one of the great historic occasions of Chess. Had Lasker avoided loss, the course of Chess history would have been very different.

17. . . . Kt×B.  
 18. B×B. Kt×B.  
 19. Q—Kt3. B—B3.

Less cramping than R3, after which White plays Kt—Q7 and Kt—QB5.

20. Kt×B. P×Kt.

The effect of these moves is that White's QP is a weakness that compensates for any weakness in Black's position.

21. R—K5.  
 21. . . . Q—Kt3.  
 22. Q—B2. KR—Q1.  
 23. Kt—K2.

A thrust into water.

In order to defend the QP (R—QB5 does not defend it).

23. Kt—R4 followed by R—QB5. seems stronger, but leads to nothing.

23. . . . R—Q4.  
 24. R×R.

White's ineffective play over the last few moves have brought about a position in which it is difficult to avoid loss. Great pressure can be brought to bear on White's QP (with Kt—KB4, etc.). Therefore White exchanges incidentally removing Black's only weakness.

24. . . . BP×R.  
 25. Q—Q2. Kt—B4.  
 26. P—QKt3.

To prevent R—B5 or eventual Kt—B5.

A good instance of progressive degeneration from slight weakness. The almost inevitable P—QKt3 (since Kt—Kt3 is met by Kt—Q3) weakens the QB file and the Black squares on the Queen's side. Lasker suggested, later, P—KKt3 as better. However, the game is not yet lost.

26. . . . P—KR4.

Not the best because it allows exchanges. Kt—Q3 seems more promising.

27. P—KR3. Inferior to Kt—Kt3. After exchanges White can mobilise his Queen and Rook sufficiently to retain the draw.
27. . . . P—R5!. Black is just achieving that slight dominance that a Capablanca can turn inevitably into victory.
28. Q—Q3. R—B3. Releasing the Queen from the duty of guarding Black's QR3.
29. K—B1. Possibly with the idea of playing P—KKt4 without eventually incurring P—K4.
29. . . . P—KKt3.
30. Q—Kt1. Recoiling from the risk of P—KKt4. After this there is no life in White's game.
30. . . . Q—Kt5.
31. K—Kt1. White marks time but he dare not attempt to advance his Queen's side Pawns.
31. . . . P—QR4. Preparing an advantageous endgame.
32. Q—Kt2. P—R5.
33. Q—Q2. 33. R—Q3. P—R6.
34. R×Q. 34. Q—Q2 creates a position that may be defensible, but Black can reply to R—Q3 with (*inter alia*) Kt—Q3 which after 34. Q—Q2, Q×Q; 35. R×Q, Kt—K5 forces the entry of the Rook to QB7.
33. . . . Q×Q.
34. R×Q. P×P.
35. P×P. R—Kt3.
36. R—Q3. Of course, 36. R—Kt2 loses a Pawn (R—Kt5).
36. . . . R—R3. Capablanca's method is unobvious, and untechnical. The Rook now arrives behind the Pawn at will. The blockade (R—Kt5) is too slow because the White King enters the game.
37. P—KKt4. P×B *e.p.*
38. P×P. R—R7.
39. Kt—QB3. The White King could try to enter the game via B2, K1 and Q1 but it would achieve nothing.
39. . . . R—QB7.
40. Kt—Q1. Kt—K2. Threatening Kt×QP. With the intention of driving the Rook from Q3.
41. Kt—K3. R—B8 ch.
42. K—B2. Kt—B3.
43. Kt—Q1. A good move albeit ineffectual. White sees that if :
43. . . . Kt—Kt5.
44. R—Q2. R—Kt8.
45. Kt—Kt2. R×Kt.



46. R×R. Kt—Q6 ch.  
 47. K—K2. Kt×R.  
 48. K—Q2 wins the Knight!  
 As White has nothing better this cannot  
 justly be called "setting a trap."  
 Capablanca does not fall into it.
43. . . . R—Kt8!.
44. K—K2.
- An error. 44. K—K1, even if it is  
 followed by loss of Pawn and exchange  
 of Rooks considerably lengthens the  
 game, and renders it difficult though  
 not impossible for Black to force a win.  
 A possible continuation is:
44. K—K1. Kt—Kt5.  
 45. R—QB3. Kt—R7.  
 46. R—B8 ch. K—Kt8.  
 47. R—QKt8. Kt—B8.  
 48. P—Kt4. R×P.  
 49. R×R. Kt—Q6 ch., etc.
44. . . . R×P.  
 45. K—K3. R—Kt5.  
 46. Kt—B3. Kt—K2.  
 47. Kt—K2. Kt—B4 ch.  
 48. K—B2. P—Kt4.  
 49. P—Kt4. Kt—Q3.  
 50. Kt—Kt1. Kt—K5 ch.  
 51. K—B1.
51. . . . R—Kt8 ch.  
 52. K—Kt2. R—Kt7 ch.  
 53. K—B1. R—B7 ch.  
 54. K—K1. R—QR7.  
 55. K—B1. K—Kt2.  
 56. R—K3. K—Kt3.  
 57. R—Q3. P—B3.  
 58. R—K3. K—B2.  
 59. R—Q3. K—K2.  
 60. R—K3. K—Q3.  
 61. R—Q3. R—B7 ch.  
 62. K—K1. R—KKt7.  
 63. K—B1. R—QR7.  
 64. R—K3. P—K4.
- Otherwise R—Kt7, and the Rook  
 operates against the KRP.
65. R—Q3.
- Note the preparation that preceded this  
 move.
- If Kt—K2 there follows Kt—Q7 ch.,  
 and P—K5 and the Knight establishes  
 itself on KB6.
65. . . . P×P.  
 66. R×P. K—B4.  
 67. R—Q1. P—Q5.  
 68. R—B1 ch. K—Q4.  
 69. Resigns.
- White cannot stop the Pawn if, e.g.
69. R—Q1.  
 69. . . . Kt—Kt6 ch.  
 70. K—K1. R—KKt7!  
 wins the Knight or the King.

## 12. RAUSER—BOTWINNIK.

White	Black
RAUSER	BOTWINNIK
1. P—K4.	P—QB4.
2. Kt—KB3.	Kt—QB3.
3. P—Q4.	P×P.
4. Kt×P.	Kt—B3.
5. Kt—QB3.	P—Q3.
6. B—K2.	P—KKt3.
7. B—K3.	B—Kt2.
8. Kt—Kt3.	
8. . . .	B—K3.
9. P—B4.	O—O.
10. O—O.	
10. . . .	Kt—QR4.
11. Kt×Kt.	
11. . . .	Q×Kt.
12. B—B3.	
12. . . .	B—B5.
13. R—K1.	KR—Q1.
14. Q—Q2.	
14. . . .	Q—B2.
15. QR—B1.	

Important: prevents P—QB4 (unless White elects for 5. P—KB3).

A curious feature of the Sicilian. If now 8. O—O. Kt—Kt5 introduces a simplification in Black's favour.

The orthodox move. Experimenters have tried 10. P—KKt4, notably Alekhine against Botwinnik at Nottingham in 1936. The game went as follows:

10. . . .	P—Q4!
11. P—B5.	B—B1.
12. P×QP.	Kt—Kt5.
13. P—Q6.	Q×P.
14. B—B5.	Q—B5!
15. R—KB1.	Q×RP.
16. B×Kt.	Kt×P.
17. B×Kt.	Q—Kt6 ch.,

forcing perpetual check. And there are other methods of meeting the attack, e.g. with B×Kt, P—K4, and P—Q4.

With the intention of B—B5 or Kt—B5. At this stage P—KKt4 seems to be a better move. The text develops Black but is not bad.

Q—Q2 threatens Kt—Q5 but does not prevent R—QB1. If then White forces the Black Queen to retreat, he does not appear to have gained anything to compensate for Black's increasing Queen's side attack.

Here there are many methods available including either Rook to QB1.

A good move preparing for a freeing movement in the centre.

Now threatening Kt—Q5 seriously, and developing.

Unpinning the pieces on the long diagonal, defending QB2, and thereby permitting the Knight to move (after Black's R—QB1). Nevertheless, the

15. . . . P—K4!.
16. P—QKt3. P—Q4.
17. P×QP.
- move is slow. 15. P—QKt3 can be followed by R—QB1 without any danger (from Kt—Kt5, e.g. because of Kt—Kt5) and prevents Black's 15th. If, however, Black's 15th be unsound, then the text is very good. The necessary preliminary to P—Q4 (otherwise P—K5 answers it), and though apparently weakening as to the Queen's file, permits White no conclusive means of exploiting that temporary defect. If, e.g., Kt—Q5, Kt×Kt, followed by P×BP unmasks the battery against White's Q—Kt2. If, again, the obvious :
16. KR—Q1. P—Q4.
17. P×P. P—K5!.
18. Kt×P. Kt×P.
- gives Black the attack. The merit of Black's last move and of his position depends on the merit of White's next (P—QKt3) threatening Kt—Kt5 or Kt—Q5 (as the Bishop moves). It so happens that White's next is not so bad as many commentators think.
- Joining battle. A typical Chess situation in which the forces are committed to engagement—because otherwise one side will hold a preponderance (not necessarily a winning one, but awkward for the other player). Thus if B—K3 ; 17. Kt—Kt5 followed by P—B4. The merit of the skirmishing move derives from the prior vision of the possibilities. It is possible that here Botwinnik had not clearly seen every variation.
- Not the best. Clearly P×B is better and it is quite probable, that, as in the case of many a sacrifice, the sacrificer has assumed that it will not be accepted ! If 17. P×B, Black has a choice of two moves :
17. . . . P×KP and
17. . . . P—Q5.
- If :
17. . . . P×KP, why not
18. Kt—Q5 ? If then :
18. . . . Kt×Kt.
19. P×Kt. P×B.
20. P—QB4, and White stands well.
- A continuation might be :
20. . . . BP×P.
21. P—QB5. Q—Q2.
22. KR—Q1. P×P.
23. B×P. Q—B4.

24. P—Q6. QR—B1.

25. P—Q7. R×P.

26. R×R. Q×R.

27. B—K3 with excellent play.  
If, in this variation (instead of :

18. . . . Kt×Kt).

18. . . . Q×BP.

19. Kt×Kt followed by either Q—K2  
or B—K2! wins a difficult piece.

If, instead :

17. . . . P—Q5.

18. Kt—Q5. P×B.

19. Q×P. Q×P.

20. P×KP with advantage.

If, in this variation :

19. . . . Kt×Kt.

20. BP×Kt. P×P.

21. Q—Kt3 with a good game (and  
20. KP×Kt is also playable). The  
moral of the story is that Chess involves  
courage, i.e. confidence in one's  
analysis, if one can analyse.

17. . . .  
18. P×B.

P—K5.

The best—but not so good now ; it is  
almost too late for good moves.

18. Kt×P is met by Kt×P (threaten-  
ing Kt×B and B—Q5). 18. B—K2  
is met by B×P. If :

18. B×P. Kt×B.

19. Kt×Kt. B×P, and here, as in  
all these variations, Black is left con-  
trolling much more of the board than  
White.

18. . . .  
19. P—B5.

P×B.

The best. The game is not lost yet, but  
White's position is hazardous, and  
requires better play for its mainten-  
ance than it is fair to expect from any  
player who has unintentionally let  
his position become compromised.

19. . . .  
20. KR—Q1.

Q—R4.

In a position where fighting is necessary.  
White fights, but not hard enough.  
The position is very exacting. Best  
appears to be Kt—K4 allowing Q×Q.

21. Kt×Q. Kt×P.

22. Kt×P. Kt×B.

23. R×Kt. R×P.

24. P—B3 with play.

If 20. P×P, Kt—Kt5! wins.

The pugnacious move, 20. P—Q6  
(threatening Kt—Q5) is also met by  
Kt—Kt5 and 21. Kt—K4 fails after  
Q×Q ; 22. B×Q, P—B7 ch.

20. . . .  
21. B—Q4.

Kt—Kt5.

White cannot contain all the threats.

21. . . . P—B7 ch. The game is still interesting. If K—R1,  
R×P!,  
23. Kt×R. P—B8=Q ch.  
24. R×Q. Q×Q.  
25. QR—Q1. Q×R (best).  
26. R×Q. B×B.  
27. R×B. R×P just achieves a  
winning endgame.
22. . . . Q—R3 ch.  
23. Q—K2. B×B.  
24. R×B. If Q×Q, Kt—K6 ch., followed by  
P=Q, wins a piece.
24. . . . Q—KB3.  
25. QR—Q1. Q—R5.  
26. Q—Q3. R—K1.  
27. R—K4. Threatening Mate.  
Again threatening Mate.  
If Q—Kt3, Kt×P ch., K×P, Kt—Kt5  
ch., wins the Queen.
27. . . . P—B4.  
28. R—K6. Kt×P ch.  
29. K—K2. Q×P.  
Resigns. If: R—B1. Kt×R.  
K×Kt. R×R.  
P×R. Q—K4.  
leaves White hopeless.

## 13. BOTWINNIK—LISITZIN.

- | <i>White</i>  | <i>Black</i> |   |
|---------------|--------------|---|
| BOTWINNIK     | LISITZIN     |   |
| 1. P—Q4.      | P—Q4.        |   |
| 2. P—QB4.     | P—QB3.       |   |
| 3. Kt—KB3.    | Kt—KB3.      |   |
| 4. P—K3.      | P—K3.        | B—B4 is more enterprising, that is not to<br>say better.  |
| 5. Kt—B3.     | QKt—Q2.      |   |
| 6. B—Q3.      | P×P.         |   |
| 7. B×P.       | P—QKt4.      |   |
| 8. B—Q3.      | P—Kt5.       | A quite playable alternative to the<br>Meran (P—QR3 followed by<br>P—B4).   |
| 9. Kt—K4.     | B—K2.        | At the moment 9. . . . P—B4 is com-<br>promising, however desirable. The<br>reply would be 10. Q—R4!  |
| 10. Kt×Kt ch. | Kt×Kt.       |   |
| 11. P—K4.     | B—Kt2.       | Quite sound. Just about playable is:<br>11. . . . P—B4,<br>against which White can attack with<br>KB—Kt5, or QB—Kt5, or Kt—K5,<br>all of which attacks can be beaten off.<br>But Black wisely apprehends that he<br>can force his Pawn to QB4 with safer<br>play. |



12. B—KKt5.      O—O.  
 13. QR—B1.      Kt—Q2.  
 14. B—K3.      Q—R4.

An object lesson now commences in the deterioration of a game. Quite playable is :

15. Kt—Q2.

14. . . . R—B1, followed by P—B4. The text move does not attack the Queen's Rook's Pawn in reality : and it gives White a gain of tempo for the transference of the Knight to an important square.

Effectively preventing all Queen moves except retreat, e.g. if :

15. . . . QR—B1.

15. . . . Q×P.

16. Kt—B4!

16. O—O.      P—QB4.

KR—B1 would endow his last move with a semblance of purpose. The text leaves the QRP eventually unguarded. Now or never. But perhaps never was better. Into consideration comes P—K4. If then :

17. Kt—B4.      Q—B2.

18. P×P.      Kt×P.

19. Kt×Kt.      Q×Kt.

20. B×P, Black, with P—B4 (*inter alia*) has much counter play for the Pawn.

17. Kt—Kt3.      Q—Kt3.  
 18. Q—K2.

And now Black is faced with an awkward problem. White is about to play not P×P.      B×P (best).

Kt×B.      Kt×Kt.

R—B2.      Q—Q3.

but 19. R—B2 threatening P×P, etc., and eventual KR—B1.

19. B—QKt5 is also to be considered.

Now :

18. . . . P×P.

19. B×P gives White a strong attack.

An apparent relief of the pressure has been suggested by the annotators : P—QR4. That deprives White of tempo for R—B2, because of P—R5, after which exchanges result in an endgame only slightly favourable to White, if at all.

The answer to :

18. . . . P—QR4 is however,

19. P×P.      Kt×P.

20. Q—B2 and now

20. . . . Kt×B results in loss of material because there is no Pawn on QR2, and if :

20. . . . R—B2.

21. Kt×Kt.      KR—B1.

22. Kt—R4! wins.

- Again, if :
18. . . . R—B2.  
19. R—B2. KR—B1.  
20. KR—B1 keeps up the pressure and P—QR<sub>4</sub> continues to be impossible because of B—KB<sub>4</sub>.
- In this situation Black looks for a good move and fails to find one. I suggest :
18. . . . P—K<sub>4</sub> as the best available.  
19. P×P. Kt×P. or  
19. P—Q<sub>5</sub>. P—KB<sub>4</sub> gives Black "play", whereas the move Black adopts only gives White play.
18. . . . P—B<sub>4</sub>. A move that loses a Pawn. Clear-sightedness was required for the apprehension of this.
19. B—QKt<sub>5</sub>. An attack facilitated by the fact that the King's Pawn no longer requires guarding.
19. . . . B—BQ<sub>3</sub>. Apparently best.  
20. B×B. R×B.  
21. KP×P. KP×P.
22. P×P. Q—Kt<sub>1</sub>. Not R×P because of P×P followed by Kt—Q<sub>4</sub>.  
The Pawn cannot be recaptured because of White's Q—B<sub>4</sub> ch.
23. KR—Q<sub>1</sub>. Kt—B<sub>3</sub>.  
24. Kt—Q<sub>4</sub>. Kt—Kt<sub>5</sub>.  
25. P—KKt<sub>3</sub>. R—KKt<sub>3</sub>.  
26. B—B<sub>4</sub>. Q—K<sub>1</sub>.  
27. R—K<sub>1</sub>. Q—Q<sub>2</sub>.  
28. Q—B<sub>4</sub> ch. K—R<sub>1</sub>.  
29. P—B<sub>6</sub>. Q—K<sub>1</sub>.  
30. P—B<sub>7</sub>. Resigns.

## 14. PILLSBURY—LASKER.

- | <i>White</i>            | <i>Black</i>         |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| H. N. PILLSBURY         | E. LASKER.           |
| 1. P—Q <sub>4</sub> .   | P—Q <sub>4</sub> .   |
| 2. P—QB <sub>4</sub> .  | P—K <sub>3</sub> .   |
| 3. Kt—QB <sub>3</sub> . | Kt—KB <sub>3</sub> . |
| 4. Kt—B <sub>3</sub> .  |                      |
| 4. . . .                | P—B <sub>4</sub> .   |
| 5. B—Kt <sub>5</sub> .  | BP×P.                |
| 6. Q×P.                 |                      |

Pillsbury's usual move was 4. B—Kt<sub>5</sub>, sometimes called the "Pillsbury attack".

Better is :

6. KKt×P with (*inter alia*) :  
6. . . . P—K<sub>4</sub>.  
7. Kt(Q<sub>4</sub>)—Kt<sub>5</sub>.  
If, then, P—Q<sub>5</sub>.  
8. B×Kt. P×B.  
9. Kt—Q<sub>5</sub>. Kt—R<sub>3</sub>.

10. Q—R<sub>4</sub>, which seems to win, e.g.  
B—Q<sub>2</sub>,  
11. Q×Kt, etc.
6. . . . Kt—B<sub>3</sub>.  
7. Q—R<sub>4</sub>.
7. . . . B—K<sub>2</sub>.  
8. O—O—O
8. . . . Q—R<sub>4</sub>.  
9. P—K<sub>3</sub>. B—Q<sub>2</sub>.  
10. K—Kt<sub>1</sub>. P—KR<sub>3</sub>.  
11. P×P. P×P.
12. Kt—Q<sub>4</sub>.  
12. . . . O—O.  
13. B×Kt. B×B.  
14. . . . Kt×Kt.  
14. Q—R<sub>5</sub>. B—K<sub>3</sub>.  
15. P×Kt.
16. P—B<sub>4</sub>. QR—B<sub>1</sub>.  
17. P—B<sub>5</sub>. R×Kt.
18. P×B. R—QR<sub>6</sub>!.  
19. P×P ch.
19. . . . R×P.  
20. P×R. Q—Kt<sub>3</sub> ch.  
21. B—Kt<sub>5</sub>.
21. . . . Q×B ch.  
1★
- "Technically" bad. It is easy to see that after B—K<sub>2</sub> and P—KR<sub>3</sub> Black will be causing great inconvenience to the White Queen.  
Better than the tempting P—Q<sub>5</sub>.  
Dangerous but consistent with the pressure and almost necessary. If P—K<sub>3</sub>, Q—Kt<sub>3</sub> more or less forces the text.  
Tying the Queen to KR<sub>4</sub>.  
If:  
11. B—Q<sub>3</sub>. P×P.  
12. B×P. R—B<sub>1</sub>.  
13. B—Q<sub>3</sub>. Kt—Kt<sub>5</sub>.  
If B—Q<sub>3</sub>, O—O wins a Pawn at least.  
B×RP comes to nothing.  
Black has now gained enormous tempo.  
A move concealing great analytic depth. Easier moves were B—B<sub>3</sub> or B—QR<sub>5</sub> followed by KR—Q<sub>1</sub>.  
Continuing a far-seen and clearly-analysed combination. There are many variations. If, e.g.:  
18. P×R. Q×P.  
19. P×B. Q—Kt<sub>5</sub> ch.  
20. K—R<sub>1</sub>. R—B<sub>1</sub> with a mating attack. If, instead of 19. P×B the White Queen returns to B<sub>3</sub>, then Q—Kt<sub>5</sub> ch. in conjunction with B×P ch., etc., gives Black (at least) value for the exchange. White finds the best available play in that it is only refuted by brilliancy.  
Anything else gives White too much time. The immediate capture of the Rook involves play differing very little from the text.  
19. P—K<sub>7</sub>. R—K<sub>1</sub> also makes no vital difference to the attack.  
Deflecting the Queen from the attack on the QP for one move. There was nothing better.

22. K—R1.

R—B2.

Threatening :

23. . . . R—B8 ch.!, but possibly not the best. Stronger appears to be Q—B5 forcing Q—Kt4, and followed by R—K2 and R—K5 (of course Black cannot play KR—K1 because of B×P ch.). The text allows White a wriggle.

23. R—Q2.

R—B5.

24. KR—Q1.

R—B6.

25. Q—B5.

If: Q—K2. R—B8 ch.?.  
R×R. B×P ch.

is not conclusive, since White is left with two Rooks; but Q—B3 would maintain the pressure sufficiently.

25. . . .

Q—B5.

26. K—Kt2.

A bad move in a bad position. But there is clearly no available relief of Black's pressure.

26. . . .

R×P1.

A very pretty finish. The process is quite hard to see.

27. Q—K6 ch.

K—R2.

28. K×R

Q—B6 ch.

Black forces mate, viz :

29. K—R4. P—Kt4 ch.

30. K×P. Q—B5 ch.

31. K—R5. B—Q1 ch., etc.

## 15. BIRD—MASON.

*White*

H. E. BIRD

1. P—K4.

2. P—Q4.

3. Kt—QB3.

4. P×P.

5. Kt—B3.

6. B—Q3.

7. O—O.

8. R—K1.

*Black*

J. MASON.

P—K3.

P—Q4.

Kt—KB3.

P×P.

B—Q3.

O—O.

P—KR3.

Kt—B3.

The exchange variation.

9. Kt—QKt5.

B—QKt5.

10. P—B3.

B—R4.

11. Kt—R3.

I prefer P—QR3 or B—K2.

A good move. White can develop as in the text, or with Kt—B2, P—QKt4, P—QR3, etc.

11. . . .

B—KKt5.

12. Kt—B2.

Q—Q2.

Black fails to see White's opportunities of vigorous development. The square Q2 should be reserved for the Kkt.

13. P—Kt4.

B—Kt3.

14. P—KR3.

B—KR4.

15. Kt—K3.

KR—K1.

P—QR4 is playable.

16. P—Kt5. White's attack is tempting but not conclusive, because Black Queen's side becomes developed. One of White's ideas is to make possible P—KKt4 at a moment when Black cannot play the risky R×Kt.
16. . . . Kt—K2.  
17. P—Kt4. B—Kt3.  
18. Kt—K5. Q—B1.  
19. P—QR4. P—B3.  
20. P×P. P×P.
21. B—R3. Kt—K5. White has now developed considerably, but Black's position is not seriously impaired.
22. Q—B2. Kt—Kt4. An effort to regain the initiative. Possibly better was P—QB4, against which 22. P—R5 is not conclusive. Vigorously played, but White has too much force arrayed on the K side.
23. B×Kt. R×B.  
24. B×B. P×B.  
25. Q×P. Kt×P ch.  
26. K—R2. Kt—B5.
27. Q—B5. Superficial: Kt—Kt4 leaves the piece better placed. Q×BP works out disadvantageously after Q×Q, Kt×Q, R—B2.
27. . . . Kt—K3. The exchange of Queen's, although awkward, was Black's best chance.
28. Kt—Kt2. Q—B2. Safer was P—QR4. At this point the game becomes intensely interesting (see diagram on p. 131). Black's move would be adequate were it not for White's excellent combination. If the Queen had to retreat at move 30, Black would gain material.
29. P—R5. A move which, by itself, seems positionally correct: in conjunction with the following play it is much more than positionally justified.
29. . . . B×P.  
30. R×B. R—KB1.  
31. R—R6!.
31. . . . R×Q. The surprise: in exchange for his Queen and a Pawn White acquires Rook, Knight and a paralysing pressure on Black's game.
32. P×R. Kt—Q1.  
33. Kt—KB4! Q—B1.  
34. Kt(B4)—Kt6. R—K1.
35. Kt×P!. If 31. . . . Q—Kt2.  
32. Q—Q3 retains the piece.
- Black cannot win a piece by R×Kt because of the subsequent mating attack.  
35. R×R. Q×R.  
36. R—K8 ch., etc.
- This is much more than "one move deep." Had Bird not seen the long



35. . . . Q—B2 ch.  
 36. Kt(B6)—K5. If Kt(Kt6)—K5, Black wins a piece with Kt×Kt, R×Kt, Q×R.
36. . . . Q×P.  
 37. R—K3. Q—Q7. White must have seen earlier that Black cannot play Q×P because of Kt—B6!. Accordingly White gains a tempo for the defence of the KBP, and makes move 39 possible.
38. K—Kt2. Q×P.  
 39. P—B6. Again far sighted. An easier move was R—Q6.
39. . . . P×P.  
 40. R×BP. Kt—K3.  
 41. R—KKt3. Kt—Kt4.  
 42. Kt—Kt4. K—Kt2.
- If:  
 42. . . . Q—K5 ch.  
 43. K—R2. K—Kt2.  
 44. Kt—B4 with a position as in the text.
43. Kt—B4. Q—K5 ch.  
 44. K—R2. Kt—R2.
- If 44. . . . Kt—B6 ch.  
 45. R×Kt wins. Now Black cannot meet all the threats. The text is the most determined defence.
45. Kt—R5 ch. K—R1.  
 46. R×P. Q—B7.  
 47. Kt(R5)—B6. R—K2.  
 48. K—Kt2. P—Q5.  
 49. Kt—K5. Q—B1.  
 50. Kt—Kt6 ch. Resigns.

White's next move cannot be prevented.

# 16. ALEKHINE—RUBINSTEIN.

White	Black
ALEKHINE	RUBINSTEIN
1. P—Q4.	P—Q4.
2. P—QB4.	P—K3.
3. Kt—KB3.	Kt—KB3.
4. Kt—B3.	B—K2.
5. B—Kt5.	QKt—Q2.
6. P—K3.	O—O.
7. R—B1.	P—B3.
8. Q—B2.	P—QR3.
9. P—QR4.	

Recommended by Alekhine. Himself, however, often played P—KR3 first. More vigorous than P—QR3 but not convincing. Alekhine had won previously with the Black pieces against Rubinstein playing the text move after the intervening moves P—KR3 and B—R4.

9. . . . R—K1. Playable but not incisive.  
 9. . . . P—B4 has its merits.
10. B—Q3. P×P.  
 11. B×P. Kt—Q4.  
 12. B—B4. A good move which would have been less attractive had the Black Rook been at KB1.
12. . . . Kt×B.  
 13. P×Kt. P—QB4. A compromising move, redeemed only by some tactical possibilities, that White avoids. The subtler Q—B2 is less incisive because after it P—QB4 does not force P×P. Much better would have been the continuation of the policy inaugurated by the earlier moves, viz., Kt—Kt3 or Kt—B3, and so (in conjunction with Q—B2 or K2) to Q4. (The fact that White's B—Q3 may cause Black to play P—KKt3 is not serious now that White's black-square Bishop has gone.) In effect, Black's defence in the text opens up the game for White rather than for Black.
14. P×P. Good and necessary; if, e.g. 14. O—O, Black can play P×P, followed by Kt—Kt3.
14. . . . Q—B2. This move would be rendered good if White were to defend the KBP with P—KKt3. Then:  
 15. . . . Q—B3 would make possible P—K4; it is not clear, however, whether B×P (e.g.) is better than the text.
15. O—O!. Revealing the inadequacy of Black's previous play. The Pawn sacrifice is hard for White to avoid: but it is very good, nevertheless.
15. . . . Q×KBP. Perhaps the last point at which Black could maintain equilibrium (Q×QBP with a view to Q—KR4).  
 Alekhine's exploitation from now on constitutes one of the great masterpieces of Chess.
16. Kt—K4. Kt×P. 16. . . . B×P would allow the initiation of a strong attack with QKt—Kt5 (forcing P—KKt3) and quick development of the KR.
17. Kt×Kt. B×Kt. Obviously White cannot reply 17. B×KP or RP, because of B×P ch.
18. B—Q3. P—QKt3. An awkward move; B—Q3 would be met by B×P ch. and KR—Q1, followed by R—Q4. Other Bishop moves leave the square unguarded.
19. B×P ch. K—R1. How many errors to lose? According to Alekhine this is the losing move.

- Certainly Black seems to overlook the combinational movement culminating in White's 25th move. K—B1 gives White a harder task, but his position is superior.
20. B—K4. R—R2. Better is R—QKt1. Even so, White develops an almost certainly decisive attack. After :  
20. . . . R—QKt1.  
21. P—QKt4. B—B1. Not B×KtP. 22. Q×B.  
22. Q—B6. R—Q2. The only move to save both the Rook and the QKtP.  
23. P—Kt3. Q—Kt1. Q—Q3 was a little better. White can continue the attack with Q—B4 or with KR—Q1, more or less forcing Q×R after which White's well-placed Queen works havoc. It is quite probable that Black failed to see White's winning sequence from the text.
24. Kt—Kt5. R(K1)—Q1. In order to relieve the pin on the Rook defending KB2.  
25. B—Kt6!. An "Alekhine".
25. . . . Q—K4. P×B would be met by 26. Q—K4 with a mating attack.
26. Kt×P ch. R×Kt.  
27. B×R. Q—KB4.  
28. KR—Q1. R×R ch.  
29. R×R. Q×B.  
30. Q×B. K—R2.  
31. Q×RP. Q—B6.  
32. Q—Q3 ch. Resigns.

## 17. TARRASCH—BOGOLJUBOW.

White	Black
TARRASCH	BOGOLJUBOW
1. P—Q4.	Kt—KB3.
2. Kt—KB3.	P—K3.
3. P—B4.	P—QKt3.
4. B—Kt5.	
4. . . .	B—Kt2.
5. P—K3.	
5. . . .	P—KR3.
6. B—R4.	
6. . . .	B—Kt5 ch.

Not bad, but less useful before the centre has crystallised than later.

An attempt to prepare P—K4 would have been more consistent with the last move.

Vigorous and good.  
B×Kt is better.

7. QKt—Q2.

A mistake. Tarrasch overlooks the quick loss of a piece. Thereafter, however, he plays superlatively to reduce his opponent's advantage.

7. . . . P—KKt4.  
8. B—Kt3. P—Kt5.

9. P—QR3.

The best ; if Kt—K5 (etc.) then

9. . . . Kt—K5 wins the piece more unpleasantly.

9. . . . P×Kt.  
10. P×B. P×P.  
11. B×P. B×B.  
12. R—Kt1. B—Kt2.  
13. B—R4.

A position illustrating the chances of the Chess board. After losing a piece White has nearly as much play as if he had sacrificed it. An instance, also, of the proposition that any successful attack that does not finish the game can develop the mobility of the opponent in compensation for the latter's loss of material.

13. . . . P—Q3.

Black has to complete his development and face an impending attack (P—K4, P—K5, etc.).

14. P—K4. QKt—Q2.

15. Q—B3.

Also promising is 15. R—Kt4. Then :

15. . . . Q—B1 is unplayable because of R—B4, allowing Q—R5. But if 15. R—Kt4,

15. . . . Q—K2.

16. R—B4. R—Kt1, followed by R—Kt3. Possibly, also :

15. . . . P—K4 is more playable against R—Kt4 than against the text (e.g., if now :

15. . . . P—K4.

16. Q—B5, followed by R—Kt3 and B3).

15. . . . Q—K2.  
16. R—Kt4. P—K4.  
17. P—Q5. O—O—O!  
18. K—K2!. QR—Kt1.  
19. QR—Kt1. R×R.  
20. R×R. P—KR4.  
21. R—Kt3. K—Kt1!.

A clever defence. If R—Kt5, Q—B1!.

A move of great merit. This move (with the last) is part of a plan to relieve the pressure in an ingenious way.

22. Q—B5. B—B1.  
23. B—Kt5.

Calculated to prevent R—R3 and to make possible P—R4. Black however surprises his opponent by not playing the apparently necessary R—Kt1.

23. . . . P—R5!  
24. R—KB3. Q—B1!  
25. B×Kt. Kt×B.

26. Q×Kt. B—Kt5. The point. Black will enter the endgame with material advantage after all.
27. P—R3, Q—R3?. At the end of a great struggle an error worse than that which commenced it. Bogoljubow was ill at the time. He had in mind :  
28. Q×BP. B×R ch., followed by R—KB1 and overlooked the fact that after P×B, P—R6 is adequately met by Kt—Br. White gives up the Knight and is left with two Pawns to the good.
28. P×B. Resigns.  
A superlative example, notwithstanding errors, of the need in Chess for clever play in order to retain easily gained advantages.

## 18. CAPABLANCA—ALEKHINE.

*White*  
CAPABLANCA

*Black*  
ALEKHINE

- |            |         |
|------------|---------|
| 1. P—Q4.   | P—Q4.   |
| 2. P—QB4.  | P—K3.   |
| 3. Kt—QB3. | Kt—KB3. |
| 4. B—Kt5.  | QKt—Q2. |
| 5. P—K3.   | B—K2.   |
| 6. Kt—KB3. | O—O.    |
| 7. R—Br.   | P—QR3.  |

More usual is P—QB3. The text however, is good, and in some variations saves a tempo in the advance of the QBP.

It is possible that P—QB5 is a good reply to the text, because Black's P—QKt3 is less effective.

Capablanca's simplifying style.

- |          |      |
|----------|------|
| 8. P×P.  | P×P. |
| 8. . . . |      |

Apparently :

8 . . . . Kt×P is less reliable here than if :

7. . . . P—QB3 had been played. Thus :

8. . . . Kt×P.

9. Kt×Kt. B×B.

10. Kt×QBP. R—QKt1, and both players have problems to solve.

- |             |        |
|-------------|--------|
| 9. B—Q3.    | P—QB3. |
| 10. Q—B2.   | P—KR3. |
| 11. B—R4.   | Kt—K1. |
| 12. B—Kt3.  | B—Q3.  |
| 13. O—O.    | B×B.   |
| 14. RP×B.   | Kt—Q3. |
| 15. Kt—QR4. |        |

In order to free the Knight.

Black's only weakness—and that not fatal—is on the Black squares. This White endeavours to exploit.

- |           |       |
|-----------|-------|
| 15. . . . | R—K1. |
|-----------|-------|



16. R—K1. Kt—B3. Not bad in itself, but indicative of a tactical-strategic decision which is wrong, and which is manifested in the next few moves.  
Better, perhaps, is Kt—B1.
17. Kt—K5. Kt(B3)—K5. A very good move—giving White many lines of development, and tactically accurate.
18. . . . B—K3.
19. Kt—B5. Kt×Kt. Alekhine describes this as the losing move. Better was R—Kt1, or even, Q—B3.  
The text does not imply a failure to see a specific point—indeed Black has seen that White cannot win a Pawn. But the text allows White to remain with a better integrated game. Black, in other words, either missed a strategic point, or took a bad risk.
20. P×Kt. Kt—Kt4.
21. P—QR4. Kt—B2. White cannot capture the QKtP because of the reply B—B1.
22. B—Kt1. B—B1.
23. Kt—B3. Kt—K3.
24. P—K4. Assuming the initiative. Black cannot play P—Q5 without weakening his position further.
24. . . . P×P.
25. R×P. R—K2.
26. QR—K1. B—Q2.
27. Q—B2. P—Kt3.
27. . . . A brilliant reorientation.
28. B—R2. Q—B1.
28. . . . Black's last few moves have constituted a strong effort to hold his game together.
29. Kt—K5. Q—Kt2. He now defends the KtP and indirectly his Q2. White, however, is able to break in.
30. Kt×B. R×Kt.
31. B×Kt. P×B.
32. R—KKt4. K—R2. P—KKt4 would be answered by P—KB4, Black's check being unimportant.
33. R×KP. R—KKt1.
34. Q—K4. R—KB2.
35. P—B4. Q—B1.
36. R(Kt4)×P. A last wriggle.  
If not now, then R—KKt2 strengthens Black slightly.
36. . . . Q×P ch.
37. K—B1. Q—B8 ch.
38. K—B2?. Q—Q7 ch. Draw.

White's 38th move is a bad mistake.

Probably White, under, or immediately after, time-pressure, was conscious of not having analysed Black's counter as carefully as he should—and played hastily, nervously.

38. K—K2! would prevent the perpetual check and retain the victory.

If then Q×P ch., 39. K—B3.

If then Q—B6 ch. or Q—R6 ch., 40. K—Kt4.

If instead 39. . . . Q—Kt6 ch., 40. K—B2.

If then 40. . . . Q—Kt7 ch., 41. K—Kt1.

If instead 40. . . . Q—Kt3 ch., 41. K—B1 wins.

(An element of Chance is worth considering here. If White's Pawn were at QR3, there would be a draw in every variation.)

### 19. EUWE—ELISKASES.

<i>White</i>	<i>Black</i>
EUWE	ELISKASES
1. P—Q4.	P—Q4.
2. P—QB4.	P—K3.
3. Kt—QB3.	Kt—KB3.
4. B—Kt5.	B—K2.
5. P—K3.	P—KR3.
6. B—R4.	O—O.
7. Kt—B3.	Kt—K5.
8. B×B.	Q×B.
9. P×P.	
9. . . .	Kt×Kt.
10. P×Kt.	P×P.
11. Q—Kt3.	

Lasker's Defence—improved by the interpolation of move 5.

The only way to retain tempo.

With a view to 12. P—QB4. There is, however, much to be said for the immediate B—Q3, yielding White a control of some important squares.

Giving a square to the QKt. This move is at least as good as R—Q1, which has been played in tournament games, e.g.:

- |            |                   |
|------------|-------------------|
| 11. . . .  | R—Q1.             |
| 12. P—B4.  | Kt—B3.            |
| 13. P×P.   | Q—Kt5 ch.         |
| 14. Kt—Q2. | Q×Q.              |
| 15. Kt×Q.  | Kt—Kt5.           |
| 16. R—B1   | with a good game. |

12. P—B4.	P×P.
13. B×P.	Kt—B3.
14. Q—B3.	
14. . . .	B—Kt5.
15. O—O.	

In order to prevent Kt—R4 and to exert pressure on K5.

A strategic decision. Eminently playable is R—QB1, followed by a Bishop move. Slower is 15. Kt—Q2. To this there follows :

- |            |        |
|------------|--------|
| 15. . . .  | QR—Q1. |
| 16. R—QB1. | Kt—K2. |

- If then :
17. O—O. P—QB4!.
18. Kt—K4. P×P! with at least equality.
15. . . . B×Kt. A better strategic decision. Black's QKt is the piece that matters.
16. P×B. QR—Q1. Black plays well in concentrating on the central files. He can hold White's Queen-side attack (R's to Kt1 and B1) with P—QKt3, Kt—K2 and P—QB3. What he plays to prevent is the advance of the centre Pawns.
17. K—R1. Q—B3.
18. B—K2. Losing tempo. P—B4 is playable but presents targets to Black's P—KKt4. This may, however, be to White's advantage.
18. . . . KR—K1.
19. QR—K1. Kt×P was threatened.
19. . . . R—Q2.
20. R—KKt1. Kt—K2.
21. R—Kt2. Kt—B4. This knight is doing better work than White's Bishop.
22. QR—KKt1. K—R1. Not. 22. . . . Kt×QP.
23. R—Kt4. P—KKt3. 23. B—Q1!.
23. . . . Now, if : Kt×QP.
24. R—B4. 24. R×KtP is good.
- Now commences a series of tactically difficult moves on both sides. White wishes to stop Kt—Q4 and play B—Q3, but is afraid of the reply Kt×KP.
24. . . . P—KKt4.
25. R—K4. R(2)—K2.
26. R(1)—Kt4. P—B3. Black is now well defended.
27. R×R. B—Q3 is still not playable.
27. . . . R×R.
28. P—B4. Aggressive but compromising. Safe was R—K4. White seems to have missed a tactical point.
28. . . . Kt—Q3. Very good ; preventing P×P and threatening Kt—K5, transforming (after exchanges) Black's Rook into an attacking piece.
29. B—B3. At this point it is probable that Euwe realised that he had missed a point. Just not playable is :
29. B—Q3. Kt—K5.
30. Q—B2. Q—B4.
31. P—B3. Kt—B7 ch.
32. Q×Kt. Q×B.
33. P—K4, because of :
33. . . . P—B4 with a vigorous attack.
- Thus, neither B—Q3, nor the text-

29. . . . Kt—K5.  
 30. B×Kt.
30. . . . R×B.  
 31. Q—B5.
31. . . . R—K1!.
32. K—Kt2.
32. . . . P—Kt3!.
33. P×P.
33. . . . Q—K3.  
 34. Q—K5 ch. Q×Q.  
 35. P×Q. R×P.  
 36. P×P. R—QR4.
37. P—QR4.
- move, saves White from the melancholy necessity of giving up a Bishop that has become valuable, for a Knight that has done its work.
- If Q—QB2, Q—Kt3, with many threats including (not least) P—KB4. In this variation 31. P—B5 does not help White because Black can simply capture the Pawn.
- A good move, were it not for Black's excellent reply. If P—B3, R—K2 (or K1) and White has the greatest difficulty in preparing the advance P—K4, which, when made, may prove to be of as doubtful value as the Charity Boy's mastering of the alphabet.
- An exceedingly good move (albeit not forcing a win). If now White plays 32. P×P Black has time for Q×BP.
33. P×P. Q×KP with a much better endgame position.
- If:  
 32. Q×RP. Q—B4.  
 33. P—KR3. P×P.
- If:  
 32. P—KR4. P—QKt3.  
 If then RP×P, Q—Kt3! wins.
- I prefer 32. P—Q5. If then Q—B4,  
 33. Q—Q4 ch., followed by P×P makes Black inclined to play for perpetual check.
- Sacrificing a Pawn on the King's side for an excellent endgame chance.
- Forced. If the Queen retreats:  
 33. . . . P×P, either breaks White's Pawn position or allows dangerous checks on the file.
- Forcing exchanges.
- We now have an endgame in which Black's superiority depends from a fine thread.
- At first sight the move 37. R—Kt7 seems better. Thus:  
 37. . . . R×P.  
 38. R×P. P—R4.  
 39. P—K4. P—R5.  
 40. K—B3. R—R8.  
 41. P—K5. R—K8.  
 42. K—B4, etc. But Black can reply to 37. R—Kt7 with R—B4 gaining tempo.

37. . . . P—Kt4.  
 38. P×P. P×P.  
 39. R—Kt7?.

Missing a new cleverness not very far ahead. White's position is not easy; though, failing the text, he should not lose. If he plays R—Kt4 the Black King becomes a fighting piece. If he starts a King movement then he is in danger of losing his KBP while Black still holds his Queen's side Pawns.

39. K—B3 is probably best. If, then :

39. . . . R—R5.

40. R—Q4!.

39. . . . P—Kt5.  
 40. R×P. P—R3!.

Excellent. If White saw this, then he must have failed to see that he cannot force the Black King on to its third rank so as to enable White to capture the QRP. (The text wins, because it creates the resource R—Kt4 for Black against White's R—QKt8.)

41. R—B8 ch. K—R2.  
 42. R—B7 ch. K—Kt1.  
 43. R—Q7. P—Kt6.  
 44. R—Q1. R—Kt4.  
 45. K—B3. P—Kt7.  
 46. R—QKt1. P—R4.  
 47. K—K2. P—R5.  
 48. K—Q3. P—R6.  
 49. K—B2. P—R7.  
 50. R×P. R—B4 ch.  
 51. Resigns.

Not K—Kt3 ; 43. P—R7!.

An excellent example of a closely fought tactical engagement resolving itself into an endgame from which delicacy of treatment should have extracted a draw. In other words, a good example of Tournament Chess.

## 20. KERES—ELISKASES.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <p><i>White</i><br/>         KERES<br/>         1. P—K4.<br/>         2. Kt—KB3.<br/>         3. P—QKt4.</p> | <p><i>Black</i><br/>         ELISKASES<br/>         P—QB4.<br/>         P—Q3.</p> |
|--|---|

An old favourite of the Author's, who has always held that this move is good as a positional sacrifice, but should not be followed by P—QR3, which is an attack on the wrong lines. The move can also be played earlier.

3. . . . P×P.  
 4. P—Q4.

When P—QKt4 is played on move 2, B—Kt2 is the best continuation ; but with the black Pawn on Q3, the text is desirable, in order to allow B—Q3 on the next move.

4. . . . Kt—KB3.



5. B—Q3. P—Q4.  
6. Kt—Q2.
6. . . . P×P.  
7. Kt×P. QKt—Q2.
8. QKt—Kt5.
9. . . . Q—B2.  
9. P—B4.
9. . . . P—KR3.  
10. Kt—R3. P—KKt4.  
11. QKt—Kt1.
11. . . . B—Kt2.  
12. Kt—K2. P—K4.
13. Kt—Kt3. O—O.  
14. O—O. P—K5.
15. Kt×P. Kt×Kt.  
16. B×Kt. Q×P.  
17. B—Q3.  
17. . . . Q—Q4.  
18. R—K1. P—Kt5.
19. Kt—R4. Kt—Kt3.
- Apart from the undesirability of :  
6. P—K5. Kt—K5.  
7. QKt—Q2. Kt—B6!, the text is good, because White's advantage is in open lines and tempo. He therefore does not wish to close the game or to avoid exchanges.
- Not the most useful.
- Functionally well placed. If :  
8. . . . P—KR3.  
9 Kt—K6 is playable.  
But even if the Knight is eventually driven to KR3, that too is a strangely good square in this particular game.
- Well timed. If :  
9. . . . P×P *etc.*  
10. Q—Kt3. P—K3.  
11. Kt×BP!.
- Weakening, but tempting.  
Most unusual (for the QKt to reach KKt1 so quickly!) and instructive. This is the type of game in which White's lines of play are so good (owing to early gain of tempo) that a time consuming manoeuvre can be played without loss of initiative.
- An effort for freedom (and a defence of e5) but in an already compromised position, and inconsistent with the King's fianchetto. A better plan might be Kt—KB1, K9, KB5.
- The fulfilment of Black's plan, but when it is worked out White still has the open lines necessary for attack.
- Conceivably not the best.
- Weakening. The idea is to remove the threat to K5 and so free the Black Knight. There are, however, merits in 18. . . . Kt—B3 allowing the square e5 to be occupied.  
Black cannot capture the QP with safety. Not with the Bishop, because *inter alia* of Q×P ch., and not with the Queen, because if :  
19. . . . Q×P.  
20. Kt—B5.

If then :

20. . . . . Q×R.  
 21. Q×P. Kt—B4.  
 22. Kt×P ch. K—R1.  
 23. Q—R5 threatening Kt—B5 ch.,  
 and Kt—K7 mate.

If :

20. . . . . Q—B3,  
 White's attack continues vigorously  
 with Q×P.

Some players would regard

19. . . . . Kt—B3 as an im-  
 provement on the text.

At this stage, with Black developing, this  
 move seems slow (unless the idea is  
 R×P).

Admittedly, this is a game in which  
 White's pieces are so well placed that  
 time is not vital; nevertheless, it cannot  
 be wasted. This game, it may be  
 added, is a good example of an attack  
 being played "positionally".

20. R—Kt1.

20. . . . . B—Q2.  
 21. R—K4. KR—K1.  
 22. R—B4. Q—Q3.

Making a place for his QKt. But at this  
 stage, it is possible that Black was  
 guilty of tactical error.

If :

22. . . . . B×P, White cannot  
 reply :

23. R×B Q×R.  
 24. B—R7, ch., etc., because of the  
 mate at K1. Nor does

23. Kt—B5 appear convincing.

23. . . . . B×Kt.

24. R×B. Q—K3.

25. Q×P ch. Q—Kt3!, or :

25. B×RP with an indeterminate  
 game. Black was probably afraid of :

23. R×P ch. B×R.

24. Q×B ch., followed by B×RP.  
 This, however, seems defensible.

23. B—Q2. Kt—Q4.

Positionally good ; but here inadequate.  
 Of course, B×P is now unplayable  
 because of 24. R×P ch., and White  
 has time for Kt—B5, since there is no  
 longer any mate at K1.

24. R×KKtP.

Showing Black that the latter has not  
 equalised.

24. . . . . B×R.

25. Q×B.

25. . . . . Q—BK3.

26. Kt—B5. K—B1.

27. Kt×B. Q×Kt.

28. Q—R5.

Threatening *inter alia* Q×B ch.

Forced. The attack now moves with a  
 nice clarity and simplicity.

With a double threat.

28. . . . Kt—B3.  
 29. Q—R4. P—KR4.  
 30. R×P. QR—B1.

A good move threatening Q—Kt5. If, e.g.

30. R×P. Q—Kt5.  
 31. Q×Kt. R—B8 ch.  
 32. B×R. R—K8 ch.  
 33. B—B1. R×B ch.  
 34. K×B. Q—Q8 mate.

31. P—KR3. R—B2.

Better was :

31. . . . P—QR3 to stop  
 R—Kt5. Thereafter R×P leaves  
 White with advantages.

32. R—Kt5. R—K3.  
 33. R×RP. Resigns.

If Kt×R, 34. Q—Q8 ch., etc.

An excellent example of well balanced attacking play, from an unbalanced position, against a defence that was adequate at most stages.

## 21. ALEKHINE—EUWE.

*White*

ALEKHINE

1. P—Q4.  
 2. P—QB4.  
 3. Kt—QB3.  
 4. P—K4.

*Black*

EUWE

- P—Q4.  
 P—QB3.  
 P×P.

A move that sets too fast a tempo for most Players. It is, however, perfectly sound : and subject only to the criticism that it can lead, against best play to an early draw. Some players, who, like Alekhine, do not expect play as good as their own from their opponents are apt to play this kind of Chess. Other players sharing that confidence feel that they do not need to force the pace. The latter, perhaps, are those whose confidence is deeper rooted.

4. . . . P—K4.

If :

4. . . . P—QKt4.  
 5. P—QR4. If then :  
 5. . . . P—Kt5.  
 6. Kt—R2 yields a game quite promising for White if well handled. But in this variation  
 5. . . . P—K4.  
 6. P×KtP. P×QP.  
 7. B×P. B—QKt5!.  
 8. R—R4. P—QR4 seems to win for Black.

5. B×P. P×P.  
 6. Kt—B3!.

6. . . . P—QKt4.

On the principle that there are no miracles in Chess, this move does not win. But it makes Black's task hard. Other moves (P—QB4, e.g.) make the sacrifice correct by not accepting it.

The text is intrinsically bad. (Black overlooked White's reply). Best is acceptance.

6. . . . P×Kt.  
 7. B×P ch. K—K2.  
 8. Q—Kt3. P×P!.
- (Alekhine admits having relied upon  
 8. . . . Kt—B3.  
 9. P—K5. Kt—K5.  
 10. O—O with a vigorous game.)  
 9. B×P. Q—Kt3.  
 10. B×Kt. R×B.  
 11. Q×R. Q—Kt5 ch.  
 12. Kt—Q2. Q×B.  
 with advantage to Black (of course,  
 11. B—R3 ch., is met by P—B4 and  
 later Q—R4 ch.).  
 If P×Kt, 8. B—Q5.

7. Kt×KtP B—R3.

8. Q—Kt3. Q—K2.

Black's position is desperate. If :

8. . . . B×Kt.  
 9. B×P ch. K—Q2.  
 10. Kt×P!, or 10. Q—Kt6 ch.

9. O—O. B×Kt.  
 10. B×B. Kt—B3.  
 11. B—QB4. QKt—Q2.  
 12. Kt×P.

P—K5 allows Black to develop his Bishop (after :

12. . . . Kt—P.  
 13. Kt×Kt. Q×Kt.  
 14. B×P ch. K—Q1 but White's  
 attack is very vigorous.

12. . . . R—QKt1.  
 13. Q—B2. Q—B4.  
 14. Kt—B5. Kt—K4.

A trap, in effect. This is :

15. Kt×KtP ch. K—Q1.  
 16. R—Q1 ch. K—B2, leaving two  
 White pieces *en prise*.

15. B—B4!. Kt—R4.  
 16. B×P ch. K×B.  
 17. Q×Q. B×Q.  
 18. B×Kt. R—Kt4.  
 19. B—Q6. B—Kt3.  
 20. P—QKt4!. R—Q1.  
 21. QR—Q1. P—B4.  
 22. P×P. B×P.  
 23. R—Q5. Resigns.

So as to answer P—QR4 with R×Kt.

## 22. EUWE—ALEKHINE.

White

EUWE

1. P—Q4.  
 2. P—QB4.

Black

ALEKHINE

- Kt—KB3.  
 P—K3.

3. Kt—KB3. P—QKt3.  
 4. P—KKt3. B—R3.
5. Q—R4.
5. . . . B—K2.  
 6. B—KKt2. O—O.  
 7. O—O. B—Kt2.
8. B—B4. P—QB4.  
 9. Kt—QB3. P×P.  
 10. Kt×P. B×B.  
 11. K×B. Q—B1.  
 12. KR—Q1. Q—Kt2 ch.  
 13. P—B3. R—B1.  
 14. Kt(Q4)—Kt5. Q—B3.
15. QR—B1.
15. . . . Kt—K1.
16. Kt—Q5.
16. . . . B—B1!
17. Kt—Kt4. Q—Kt2.  
 18. B×Kt. Q×B1.  
 19. R×QP. P—QR4.  
 20. Kt—B2.  
 20. . . . Q—K4.  
 21. Kt—B3. Kt—Q3.
- An experiment in Alekhine's style. The move proves not to be good : but games are not generally lost by indifferent moves at pre-critical stages of the opening.
- Exerts pressure. But Q—B2 or even P—QKt3 seems more consistent with White's central development.
- Safe since 7. Kt—K5 leads nowhere.
- A tempo has been lost, but the move gained (Q—R4) is not of the greatest importance. White can play R—Q1 more quickly : but will still not have an overwhelming position.
- Preventing the immediate Kt—Q6. The move, however, is profounder than that, as the sequel shows.
- If Kt—Q6, Q×Q followed by exchanges and R×BP.
- Not :
15. . . . Q×P.  
 16. Q×Q. R×Q.  
 17. Kt—B7.
- A beautiful but ineffectual move, introducing one of the half-heard melodies of Chess.
- Defence in depth ! If :
16. . . . P×Kt.  
 17. P×P. Q—Kt2.  
 18. R×R. Q×R.  
 19. R—B1. Q—Kt2 (best : if Q—Q1, P—Q6 followed by Kt—B7 and the Knight cannot be exchanged).  
 20. Q—K4. P—Q3.  
 21. Kt×P. Kt×Kt.  
 22. B×Kt. B×B.  
 23. Q—K8 ch. wins.
- After the text, White's seemingly formidable attack comes to nothing.
- Alekhine has seen a clever reason why this is better than Q—B4.
- R×B would allow Kt—R6 with a strong hold on the Queen's side.
- Initiating a very good counter-attack.
- Kt—Q3 would involve the Rook in difficulties after Kt—KB3.



22. Kt—R3.      Kt—B4.      Observe how the sacrifice of the Pawn at Q7 has given Black an attacking mobilisation.
23. Kt—B2.      Kt—Q3.
24. Kt—R3.      Q—QB4.      In effect, refusing the offer of a draw by repetition.
25. R—Q1.      P—Kt3 would cramp White hopelessly.
25. . . .      Q—Kt5!.      Increasing pressure before regaining the Pawn.
26. Q—Kt3.      Kt×P.      Black has nothing better than this transition to a drawn endgame.
27. Kt×Kt.      R×Kt.
28. R—Kt7.      The resources of the Board provide Euwe with a draw. Note that :
28. R—Q8 loses.
28. . . .      R×R.
29. R×R.      Q×Q.
30. P×Q.      R—Kt5.
- and Black consumes the Pawns while the White Knight is unable to enter the game.
28. . . .      Q×Q.
29. P×Q.      R—Kt5.
30. Kt—R4.      R×P.      P—Kt4 is met by the very strong Kt—Kt6.
31. R×KtP.      R×R.
32. Kt×R.      R—Kt1.
33. Kt—B4.      P—R5.
34. R—Q2.      P—Kt3.
35. Kt—K5!.      B—Kt2.
36. Kt—Q3.      R—QB1.
37. K—B1.      B—Q5.
38. R—Q1.      P—K4.
39. R—QR1.      R—B5.
40. R—R3.      P—B4.
41. P—QKt3.      Draw.
- If P×P :
42. R×P.      P—K5.
43. R—Kt4! is adequate.

An excellent example of tactical battle, in which very little sufficed to turn a disadvantage into an advantage.

## 23. ALEKHINE—EUWE.

- | <i>White</i> | <i>Black</i> |
|--------------|--------------|
| ALEKHINE     | EUWE         |
| 1. P—Q4.     | P—Q4.        |
| 2. P—QB4.    | P—QB3.       |
| 3. Kt—KB3.   | Kt—KB3.      |
| 4. P×P.      | P×P.         |
| 5. Kt—B3.    | Kt—B3.       |
| 6. B—B4.     | B—B4.        |

These exchanges give White a very slight shade of advantage. Interesting is :

4. . . . Kt×P, inviting a possibly premature attack.

A move for which Black may not have time.

7. P—K3. P—QR3. Revealing the nature of the problem.  
If :  
7. . . . P—K3.  
8. B—QKt5. It may, however, then  
be possible for Black to play :  
8. . . . B—QKt5 and if, e.g.,  
Kt—K5. O—O.  
Also playable are other moves, including :  
8. . . . Kt×Kt.  
9. P×Kt. Kt—K5.  
10. Q×P. Kt×Kt.  
11. Q×Q ch. R×Q.  
12. P×Kt. R—B1.  
13. R—B1. P—K3 with chances.  
9. P—KKt4. A "bayonet attack" (Schlechter's  
phrase) played *ad hominem*.
9. . . . B—Q2. Timid. Best was :  
9. . . . Kt×Kt.  
10. P×B. Kt—QB5!  
From now on, however, we see Black  
under relentless pressure.  
Not P—Kt5, Kt—K5!.
10. B—Kt2.  
10. . . . P—K3.
11. O—O. A typical Alekhine decision. Where  
others castle early Alekhine would  
castle late, and make of it an attacking  
move. White does not make the  
mistake of P—Kt5, forcing Black to  
Kt—Kt1 and a better regrouping.
11. . . . P—KR3. An effort to fight back. Black has very  
little scope at this stage. The text is  
indifferent.
12. B—Kt3. Rendering Black's last move useless.  
If now :  
12. . . . P—KKt4.  
13. P—KB4.
12. . . . P—KR4. This is not loss of tempo. This move  
was not playable until P—KKt5  
could be met with P—KR5 attacking  
a piece.
13. Kt×B. Kt×Kt. Black would be even more restricted  
after Q×Kt.
14. P×P. Kt—B3. If :  
14. . . . Q—Kt4.  
15. B—B3. Kt—B3.  
16. P—KR4. Q—R3.  
17. B—B4 is not decisive. But :  
15. Kt—QR4 is also to be considered.  
The square K2 is required for the  
Knight.  
Necessary if the QKt is to be freed.  
Perhaps a bad decision, but Black is  
removing a powerful piece.
15. B—B3. B—Kt5.
16. R—B1. K—B1.
17. P—QR3. B×Kt.
18. R×B. Kt—K2.

19. Q—Kt3. R×R. There is danger of White capturing the QB file.
20. P×R. Planning to liquidate the QBP and win one of the Q-side Pawns. This is typical "minority" theory.
20. . . . Q—Q2.  
21. Q—Kt6. Strong and far-sighted.  
21. . . . Kt—B1. Q—B3 is met by R—Kt1.  
22. Q—B5ch. K—Kt1.  
23. R—Kt1. P—QKt4. Not Kt×RP because of :  
24. Q—B7. Q×Q.  
25. B×Q. P—QKt4.  
26. P—QR4!.
24. P—R6!. P×P. R×P would render 25. P—QR4 decisive.
25. B—K5. K—Kt2. A horrible move to have thrust upon one.  
26. P—QR4. P×P. *Faute de mieux.*  
White now opens all the lines.
27. P—QB4. Kt—K2. Virtually forced but White has seen very far.
28. P×P. Kt×P.  
29. K—R1. B×Kt followed by R—Kt6 allows a perpetual check!
29. . . . R—B1.  
30. R—KKt1 ch. K—R2!.
31. Q—R3!. If K—R1; 31. B×Kt(d5).  
If 31. B×Kt(d5) the answer Kt×B is adequate.  
The text threatens B×Kt(d5). If :  
31. . . . R—B6, then  
32. B×Kt(f6) wins. (If R×Q,  
33. B—K4 mate).  
A piece must be lost here.
31. . . . R—KKt1.  
32. P—K4. R×R ch.  
33. K×R. Q—Kt4.  
34. P×Kt. Q—Kt8 ch.  
35. K—Kt2. Q—Kt3 ch.  
36. K—B1. Q—Kt8 ch.  
37. K—Kt2. Q—Kt3 ch.  
38. B—Kt3. Kt×P.  
39. B×Kt. P×B.  
40. Q×P. P—KR4.  
41. P—R4. Resigns.
40. . . . Q—K5 ch.  
41. P—B3. Q—K7 ch.  
42. B—B2. Q—Q6.  
43. P—KR4 leaves Black with nothing.

## 24. BREYER—ESSER.

White

G. BREYER

1. P—Q4.  
2. P—QB4.  
3. Kt—QB3.  
4. P—K3.

Black

DR. ESSER

- P—Q4.  
P—K3.  
P—QB3.  
Kt—KB3.

5. B—Q3.      B—Q3.      Not a good move. If Black is not playing a stone wall defence, the Bishop is better at K2.  
In any event :  
5. . . . QKt—Q2, with a view to P×P and Kt—Kt3 is superior to the text.
6. P—B4.      White plays the Stonewall with a tempo in hand.  
Into the attack !
6. . . . O—O.  
7. Kt—B3.      P×P.  
8. B—Kt1.
- A luxury that can rarely be afforded : but White has already a formidable array of force drawn up against the Black King.
8. . . . P—QKt4.      An irrelevant move. Perhaps the best is :  
8. . . . Kt—Q4.  
9. P—K4.      Kt×BP.  
10. P—K5.      Kt×KtP ch.  
11. K—B2.      Kt—R5.  
12. P×B.      Kt×Kt.  
13. Q×Kt.      Q×P, with plenty of Pawns for the piece and some defensive chances.
9. P—K4.      B—K2.  
10. Kt—Kt5.      P—KR3.
- If P—KKt3,  
15. P—KR4.      Kt—R4.  
16. P—K5, etc.
- The text is weakening but White has already a winning attack. In the circumstances a move that enables White to go wrong is K—Kt1.  
Obviously the Knight cannot be taken while the Queen can go to R5.
11. P—KR4.      P—KKt3.
12. P—K5.      RP×Kt.
- Bad. But if :  
12. . . . Kt—R4.  
13. P—KKt4.      Kt—Kt6.  
14. R—Kt1 gives White everything he requires.
13. P×P!.      Kt—Q4.  
14. K—B1.
- A most remarkable move—the point of which only becomes apparent nine moves later, when the Knight's Pawn advances to Kt6 and Black cannot check at KR5. Other variations show how easily an attack can be mis-handled.
- Thus if :  
14. Kt—K4.      K—Kt2.  
15. Kt—B6.      R—R1.  
16. R—R6.      Kt×Kt.  
17. P×Kt ch.      B×P.  
18. P×B ch.      Q×P.  
and White's attack is at least not con-

clusive. The text has the further advantage of keeping open a strong reply to K—Kt2.

14. . . . Kt×Kt.

15. P×Kt. B—Kt2.

K—Kt2 leads to similar play to that which follows move 16. But on principle the B should stay at B1 to defend f5 (see note to move 25).

Threatening R—R6 and Q—R4.

16. Q—Kt4.

16. . . . K—Kt2.

17. R—R7 ch.! K×R.

18. Q—R5 ch. K—Kt2.

19. Q—R6 ch. K—Kt1.

20. B×P. P×B.

21. Q×P ch. K—R1.

22. Q—R6 ch. K—Kt1.

23. P—Kt6.

The point of 14. K—B1 is now clear. Had Black the tempo B—R5 ch., then Q—K2 would save the game.

23. . . . R—B2.

24. P×R ch. K×P.

25. Q—R5 ch. K—Kt2.

K—B1 is not better. Nor is K—Kt1 but the presence of a Bishop on c8 would have rendered this hard to exploit.

26. P—B5. P×P.

27. B—R6 ch. Resigns.

Because :

27. . . . K—R2.

28. B—B4 ch. K—Kt2.

(If K—Kt1.

29. Q—Kt6 ch. K—R1.

30. K—K2, etc.).

29. Q—R6 ch. K—Kt1.

30. Q—Kt6 ch K—R1.

31. K—K2, etc.

## 25. EUWE—RETI.

*White*

EUWE

1. P—K4.

2. Kt—KB3.

3. B—B4.

4. P—Q4.

5. O—O.

6. R—K1.

7. B×P.

8. Kt—B3.

9. Kt×P.

*Black*

RETI

P—K4.

Kt—QB3.

Kt—B3.

P×P.

Kt×P.

P—Q4.

Q×B.

Q—QR4.

## A MODERN IMMORTAL GAME.

A speculative but tempting departure, which, however, Black brilliantly refutes.

9. . . . Kt×Kt.

10. Q×Kt. P—KB4.



- |              |           |  |
|--------------|-----------|--|
| 11. B—Kt5.   | Q—B4!.    | Initiating a sacrificial counter-attack, which also appears to be Black's only defence ! |
| 12. Q—Q8 ch. | K—B2.     |  |
| 13. Kt×Kt.   | P×Kt.     |  |
| 14. QR—Q1.   |           | 14. R×P seems to be completely answered by B—B4.   |
| 15. . . .    | B—Q3!.    |  |
| 16. Q×R.     | Q×B.      | Threatening QB—R6.   |
| 17. P—KB4.   |           | Resourceful, but inadequate.   |
| 17. . . .    | Q—R5.     |  |
| 18. R×P.     |           | 18. P—KKt3 is met by B—B4 ch., and B—KKt5!.  |
| 18. . . .    | B—KR6!.   |  |
| 19. Q×R.     | B—B4 ch.  |  |
| 20. K—R1.    | B×P ch.   |  |
| 21. K×B.     | Q—Kt5 ch. | Forcing mate.  |

The ideas in the above game are interesting, because they are original, yet not without parallel. The diagonal mate at the end has been seen in other games (e.g. one won by Keres against Sir George Thomas from a completely different setting). The double Rook sacrifice is also familiar, having been played by Canal within the last 20 years, but the outstanding example of it is in Anderssen's Immortal Game (a century ago) against Kieseritsky (quoted below). The reader comparing the examples will realise that knowing the precedent would not be helpful towards the intuition of the possibility of such a combination in such different circumstances.

## 26. ANDERSSSEN—KIESERITSKY.

*The "Immortal Game."*

- | <i>White</i>   | <i>Black</i> |                            |
|----------------|--------------|----------------------------|
| ANDERSSSEN     | KIESERITSKY  |                            |
| 1. P—K4.       | P—K4.        |                            |
| 2. P—KB4.      | P×P.         |                            |
| 3. B—B4.       | Q—R5 ch.     |                            |
| 4. K—B1.       | P—QKt4.      | Fashionable in those days. |
| 5. B×KtP.      | Kt—KB3.      |                            |
| 6. Kt—KB3.     | Q—R3.        |                            |
| 7. P—Q3.       | Kt—R4.       | Premature.                 |
| 8. Kt—R4!.     | Q—Kt4.       |                            |
| 9. Kt—B5.      | P—QB3.       |                            |
| 10. P—KKt4.    | Kt—B3.       | Better is P×B.             |
| 11. R—Kt1.     | P×B.         |                            |
| 12. P—KR4.     | Q—Kt3.       |                            |
| 13. P—R5.      | Q—Kt4.       |                            |
| 14. Q—B3.      | Kt—Kt1.      |                            |
| 15. B×P.       | Q—B3.        |                            |
| 16. Kt—B3.     | B—B4.        |                            |
| 17. Kt—Q5.     | Q×KtP.       |                            |
| 18. B—Q6!.     | Q×R.         |                            |
| 19. K—K2.      | B×R.         |                            |
| 20. P—K5.      | Kt—QR3.      |                            |
| 21. Kt×KtP ch. | K—Q1.        |                            |
| 22. Q—B6 ch.!  |              | Forces mate.               |

## 27. MORPHY—MAURIAN.

<i>White</i>		<i>Black</i>	
MORPHY		MAURIAN	
(White gives odds of QKt.)			
1.	P—K4.		P—K4.
2.	Kt—KB3.		Kt—QB3.
3.	B—B4.		B—B4.
4.	P—QKt4.		B×P.
5.	P—B3.		B—B4.
6.	O—O.		P—Q3.
7.	P—Q4.		P×P.
8.	P×P.		B—Kt3.
9.	P—Q5.		Kt—R4.
10.	P—K5.		
10.	. . .		Kt×B.
11.	Q—R4 ch.		Q—Q2.
12.	Q×Kt.		Kt—K2.
13.	R—K1.		P×P.
14.	Kt×P.		Q×P.
15.	Q—R4 ch.		B—Q2.
16.	Kt×B.		Q×Kt.
17.	R×Kt ch!.		K×R.
18.	B—R3 ch.		K—K1!.
19.	R—K1 ch.		B—K6!.
20.	Q—Kt3!.		
20.	. . .		K—Q1!.
21.	Q×KtP.		R—QB1.
22.	P×B.		Q—Q6.
23.	B—Kt4.		P—KB4.
24.	R—K2!.		
24.	. . .		R—K1.
25.	R—Q2.		R×P.
26.	R×Q ch.		R×R.
27.	B—K7 ch.		K—K2.
28.	Q—Kt5 ch.		Resigns.

White has no time for conventional moves. He is opening lines.

Better is B—Q2, even though it allows an early P—K6. The Bishop develops on QB3.

Boldly played. If White exchanges and follows with Kt—Kt6 ch., Black emerges with two Pawns for the exchange, and the prospective gain of a Knight. White, however, has seen further, or has a resource.

In conjunction with the next, ingeniously played, in order to save the Queen.

Now the Queen is attacked again.

Thinking that he has found freedom. He has (understandably) failed to anticipate one of Morphy's most brilliant manoeuvres.

Unexpected and unexpected. If  
 24. . . . Q×R.  
 25. Q—Q5 ch. forces mate.

The question is often asked whether the old masters stand comparison with the new. The present game is included to show that, so far as vision is concerned, a master like Morphy could see ideas beyond the reach of ordinary contemporary master-strength—ideas suggestive of the world championship class.

## 28. RESHEVSKY—BEAUMONT.

*White*  
RESHEVSKY

*Black*  
BEAUMONT

If the previous game shows that period is irrelevant to Chess, this one shows that the age of the performer can also be irrelevant. When this game was played (simultaneously!) White was eight years old. From his present eminence, Reshevsky regards the games he played thirty years ago as quite meritorious.

- |               |          |
|---------------|----------|
| 1. P—K4.      | P—K4.    |
| 2. P—KB4.     | P×P.     |
| 3. Kt—KB3.    | P—Q3.    |
| 4. B—B4.      | B—K3.    |
| 5. B×B.       | P×B.     |
| 6. P—Q4.      | P—KKt4.  |
| 7. O—O.       | P—KR3.   |
| 8. Q—K2.      | P—QR3.   |
| 9. Kt—K1.     |          |
| 9. . . .      | Q—K2.    |
| 10. P—KKt3.   | P—K4.    |
| 11. Kt—QB3.   | Kt—KB3.  |
| 12. P×KP.     | QP×P.    |
| 13. Kt—Q3.    | Kt—QB3.  |
| 14. Kt—Q5.    | Kt×Kt.   |
| 15. P×Kt.     | Kt—Q5.   |
| 16. Q—R5 ch.  | K—Q1.    |
| 17. B—Q2.     | Q—KB3.   |
| 18. Kt×KP.    | R—R2.    |
| 19. QR—K1.    | B—Q3.    |
| 20. P×P.      | B—B4.    |
| 21. K—R1.     | P—B3.    |
| 22. P×KtP.    | Q—Q3.    |
| 23. Kt—B7 ch. | R×Kt.    |
| 24. Q×R.      | Q×P ch.  |
| 25. Q×Q.      | P×Q.     |
| 26. P×P.      | K—B2.    |
| 27. P—R7.     | R—R1.    |
| 28. R—B7 ch.  | K—Kt1.   |
| 29. B—B4 ch.  | K—R2.    |
| 30. B—K5.     | Resigns. |

“Provincial.” Black should develop his King’s side and let the QKtP fall.

A very interesting plan for breaking Black’s Pawn position.

An error of order. Kt—Q5 first gains a tempo.

A nineteenth-century Russian masterpiece. It must be remembered that Russia was a formidable Chess power during most of the last century. Great names include Jaenisch and Petrov (military engineers both). The greatest was Tchigorin—all but world champion.

## 29. PILLSBURY—TCHIGORIN.

*White*  
PILLSBURY

*Black*  
TCHIGORIN

- |           |         |
|-----------|---------|
| 1. P—Q4.  | P—Q4.   |
| 2. P—QB4. | Kt—QB3. |

Not so bad as it looks.

- |              |          |   |
|--------------|----------|---|
| 3. Kt—KB3.   | B—Kt5.   |   |
| 4. P×P.      |          | Better is Q—R4.   |
| 4. . . .     | B×Kt.    |   |
| 5. P×Kt.     |          | P×B is better.  |
| 5. . . .     | B×P(c6). |   |
| 6. Kt—QB3.   | P—K3.    | Compromising.   |
| 7. P—K4.     |          |   |
| 7. . . .     | B—Kt5.   |   |
| 8. P—B3.     | P—B4!.   |   |
| 9. P—K5.     | Kt—K2.   |   |
| 10. P—QR3.   | B—R4.    |   |
| 11. KB—B4.   | B—Q4.    | Subtler than Kt—Q4.   |
| 12. Q—R4 ch. | P—B3.    |   |
| 13. B—Q3.    | Q—Kt3!.  | A very fine manoeuvre.  |
| 14. B—B2.    | Q—R3!.   | Black has seen that his Bishop on a5 cannot be embarrassed by P—Kt4 now or later.         |
|              |          | If P—QKt4, Q—B5 is a complete answer.   |
| 15. B—Q1.    |          |   |
|              | B—B5.    |   |
| 15. . . .    |          | To force exchanges, with P—QKt4, would leave Black in control of all the important lines. |
| 16. P—B4.    |          | Black is now attacking vigorously.  |
|              | O—O—O.   |   |
| 16. . . .    | Kt—Q4.   |   |
| 17. B—K3.    | Kt—Kt3.  |   |
| 18. B—Q2.    | R×P.     |   |
| 19. Q—B2.    | B—Q6.    |   |
| 20. R—QB1.   | Kt—B5.   |   |
| 21. Q—Kt3.   |          | A desperate attempt to breathe.   |
| 22. K—B2.    |          | And wins.   |
| 22. . . .    | Kt×B     |   |

The next four games are masterpieces from contemporary Russian masters.

### 30. BOTWINNIK—SZABO.

- |              |              |
|--------------|--------------|
| <i>White</i> | <i>Black</i> |
| BOTWINNIK    | SZABO        |
| 1. P—Q4.     | P—Q4.        |
| 2. Kt—KB3.   | Kt—KB3.      |
| 3. P—B4.     | P—K3.        |
| 4. Kt—B3.    | P—B4.        |
| 5. BP×P.     | Kt×P.        |
| 6. P—K3.     | Kt—QB3.      |
| 7. B—B4.     | Kt×Kt.       |
| 8. P×Kt.     | P×P.         |
| 9. KP×P.     |              |

A most interesting move (see p. 93). Black has played, in effect, a Tarrasch Defence, without incurring an isolated Pawn. If White plays the normal move, 9. BP×P, preserving his end-game "shape", then Black, with B—Kt5 ch., will have solved all his

9. . . . B-K2.  
 10. O-O. O-O.  
 11. B-Q3. P-QKt3.
12. Q-B2. P-KKt3.
13. B-R6. R-K1.  
 14. B-QKt5. B-Kt2.  
 14. . . . P-R3.  
 15. P-B4. B×B.  
 16. B×Kt. QR-B1.  
 17. Kt-K5. B-R1.  
 18. Q-Kt2. P-QKt4.  
 19. QR-B1.
20. P-B5. Q-Q4.  
 21. P-B3. P-B3.  
 22. Kt-Kt4. KR-Q1.
23. KR-Q1. P-Kt4.
24. Kt-K3. Q-B3.  
 25. P-KR4. Q-K1.  
 26. P×P. P×P.  
 27. Kt-Kt4. Q-Kt3.  
 28. R-K1. B-KB3.
29. QR-Q1. R-Q4.
30. R×P. B×P ch.  
 31. Q×B1. Resigns.

problems. White decides that he can incur an apparent disadvantage, and rid himself of it with ultimate benefit. A deep conception.

Here Black fails to find the best line, whatever that is, and incurs weaknesses. Perhaps B-B3, or Q-R4, or a combination of both is required to exploit White's Pawn formation.

Perhaps P-KR3 is better, since White cannot lightly play 13. P-KKt4 (13. . . . P-KB4 is to Black's ultimate advantage).

But Black, a very far-sighted player, has the idea of isolating White's Bishop. This proves to be a misconception.

Solving the Pawn problem.

Doubtful; leaving a weakness at b6. White's Knight is as good as Black's Bishop.

In order to remove the weakness at b6. But once again White is prepared to place his Pawns in an unexpected way. (Of course, if 20. P×P, Q-Q4.)

At this point, Black has his last speculative chance.

22. . . . P-K4.  
 If 23. KR-Q1. P×P.  
 24. R×P. Not  
 24. . . . B×P, because of Kt×P ch. But simply a safe Queen move, and the game is tenable. Black pursues a different idea which White cleverly refutes.

A possibility entertained early by Black, but coming to nothing.

If this unlikely move is best, then the game is bad. B-Q4 seems called for. Omitting to see that the "trap" is no longer effective.

An excellent study in the retention of advantage, reminiscent of Botvinnik's predecessor, Capablanca.



## 31. KERES—KOTOV.

<i>White</i>	<i>Black</i>
KERES	KOTOV
1. P—K4.	P—QB4.
2. Kt—KB3.	P—Q3.
3. P—Q4.	P×P.
4. Kt×P.	Kt—KB3.
5. Kt—QB3.	P—QR3.
6. B—K2.	Q—B2.
7. B—KKt5.	QKt—Q2.
8. O—O.	P—K3.
9. B—R5.	
9. . . .	Q—B5.
10. Kt×P!.	Q×Kt.
11. Kt—Q5.	K—Q1.
12. B—Kt4!.	Q—K4.
13. P—KB4.	Q×KP.
14. B×QKt.	B×B.
15. Kt×Kt.	P×Kt.
16. B×P ch.	K—B2.
17. B×R.	B—B3.
18. Q—Q2.	B—R3.
19. QR—K1.	Q—Kt3.
20. R—K7 ch.	K—Q1.
21. KR—K1.	P—R4.
22. B—Q4.	R—R3.
23. Q—B2.	B—B1.
24. B—Kt6 ch.	K—B1.
25. R—K8 ch.	B×R.
26. R×B ch.	K—Q2.
27. R×B.	Resigns.

At this stage P—KKt3 seems in order : but the text seems sound. P—K4 has been tried.

An astonishingly strong move, to which Black does not find the best answer. Seemingly adequate, but refuted by White's sacrifice. Best was Kt×B, followed by Kt—K4 or Kt—B3.

If 10. . . . Kt×B.

11. Kt×B leaves White with a Pawn to the good.

Most uncomfortable, but something had to be done about the threat. If :

11. . . . Kt×Kt.

12. P×Kt. Q—B4.

13. R—K1ch. Kt—K4.

14. P—KB4 initiates great violences.

K×B (met by B×Kt) is evidently no better.

Q—R5 ch. was threatened. Black never succeeds in playing B×BP.

## 32. ZAGOROWSKI—MEZHGAILIS.

<i>White</i>	<i>Black</i>
ZAGOROWSKI	MEZHGAILIS
1. P—Q4.	P—Q4.
2. P—QB4.	P—QB3.

Played in the Championship of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces, 1949-50.

- |            |          |
|------------|----------|
| 3. Kt—QB3. | Kt—KB3.  |
| 4. Kt—B3.  | P—K3.    |
| 5. B—Kt5.  | P×P.     |
| 6. P—K4.   | P—QKt4.  |
| 7. P—K5.   | P—KR3.   |
| 8. B—R4.   | P—KKt4.  |
| 9. P×Kt.   | P×B.     |
| 10. Kt—K5. | Q×P.     |
| 11. P—Kt3! | Kt—Q2.   |
| 12. P—B4.  | P×P.     |
| 13. Q—B3.  |          |
| 13. . . .  | R—QKt1.  |
| 14. O—O—O. | B—QKt2.  |
| 15. Kt—K4! | Q—B4.    |
| 16. B—R3!  |          |
| 16. . . .  | Q×B.     |
| 17. P×P.   | Q×R.     |
| 18. Q×Q.   | P—QB4.   |
| 19. Q—R5.  | Resigns. |

A compromising but playable defence. Compare the game Breyer—Esser as an illustration of the helplessness into which Black can drift if he lingers. A plan that does not fit in well with the Q side development. Black should play hard for P—QB4.

With plenty of play, and contemplating a clever attack.

Black's attack is much slower than White's.

A beautiful move.

If 17. . . . Q—B4.  
18. P—Kt4. Q—R2.  
19. Kt×Kt wins.

### 33. KOTOV—GELLER.

- | <i>White</i> | <i>Black</i> |
|--------------|--------------|
| KOTOV        | GELLER       |
| 1. P—Q4.     | Kt—KB3.      |
| 2. P—QB4.    | P—KKt3.      |
| 3. Kt—QB3.   | B—Kt2.       |
| 4. P—KKt3.   | O—O.         |
| 5. B—Kt2.    | P—Q3.        |
| 6. Kt—B3.    | QKt—Q2.      |
| 7. O—O.      | P—K4.        |
| 8. P—K4.     | P×P.         |
| 9. Kt×P.     | Kt—B4.       |
| 10. P—B3.    |              |
| 10. . . .    | KKt—Q2!      |
| 11. B—K3.    | P—QB3.       |
| 12. Q—Q2.    | P—QR4.       |
| 13. QR—Q1.   | Kt—K4!       |
| 14. P—Kt3.   | P—R5!        |

Sound, but slow. 10. P—QKt4 is not to be dismissed, although it weakens the diagonal.

Bold, but confident about d6.

Inviting the pressure (and pin) on the QP, Black is already contemplating a remarkable combination, in which he sacrifices a piece for Queen's side Pawns.

15. Kt(Q4)—K2. P×P!.  
 16. B×Kt. Kt×P.  
 17. Q—B1. P×P!.

Letting this Pawn go. After

17. . . . P—Kt7.

18. Q—B2, Black can only continue with the sacrificial P×B which is not convincing.

18. Kt×P. Q—R4.  
 19. Q×Kt. B—K3.  
 20. Q—B1. P×B.  
 21. Kt(R2)—B3. P—QKt4.

In this Pawn array, Black seems to have ample compensation for a piece.

22. Kt—Kt1. P—Kt5.  
 23. Kt—B4.

R—Q6 seems better. The Knight should stay at K2 in order to sacrifice itself.

Inviting a Rook excursion.

23. . . . B—Kt6!.  
 24. R—Q6. P—B5.  
 25. R×BP. P—B6.  
 26. Kt—Q5.

White is assuming that the win of a Pawn by Black on d5 is too dangerous. Black, however, has time to win the Pawn. It is hard to see any constructive line of play for White at this stage. The Rook is about to be attacked.

26. . . . B×Kt.  
 27. P×B. Q×P.  
 28. P—B4. Q—Q5 ch.  
 29. K—R1. R—R7.

A King's side attack! R×B is threatened.

30. B—B3. R—Kt7.  
 31. P—B5. B—K4.  
 32. Q—K1. R—Q1.  
 33. B—K4. K—Kt2.  
 34. P—B6 ch. K—Kt1.  
 35. R—R6. P—R4!.  
 36. R—R5. P—R5!.

Threatening R×P ch.

Ignoring White's threat, and finishing beautifully.

37. B×P. R×P ch.  
 38. K×R. B×P ch.  
 39. Q×B. P×Q ch.  
 40. K—R3. P×B.  
 41. Resigns.

An excellent specimen of sacrificial play for long term advantages, and those hard to assess. (Black, at his first attempt, finished 2nd in the Championship of the U.S.S.R.)

### 34. ABRAHAMS—ZUCKERMAN.

*White*  
 G. ABRAHAMS

*Black*  
 J. ZUCKERMAN

1. P—Q4. Kt—KB3.  
 2. P—QB4. P—QKt3.

A move that has been played by the great, but is now in (a possibly deserved) disfavour.

- |            |         |
|------------|---------|
| 3. Kt—QB3. | B—Kt2.  |
| 4. P—B3.   | P—B4.   |
| 5. P—Q5.   | P—Q3.   |
| 6. B—Kt5.  | QKt—Q2. |
| 7. P—K3.   |         |

Much better than P—K4, because the White Queen and King's Bishop can be used to exploit the White squares on the King's side, while Black's QB waits for a Q-side break-through; and there are other reasons.

- |            |        |
|------------|--------|
| 7. . . .   | P—Kt3. |
| 8. KKt—K2. | B—Kt2. |
| 9. P—KR4.  | P—QR3. |

Black shows indecision and waits for the attack (which he underestimates) while preparing a slow Queen's side operation, for which he never finds time.

- |             |        |
|-------------|--------|
| 10. Kt—Kt3. | P—KR4. |
|-------------|--------|

Admitting that White's attack is dangerous and making it no weaker.

- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| 11. B—K2. |  |
|-----------|--|

A move that contemplates the winning combination; otherwise B—Q3.

- |           |        |
|-----------|--------|
| 11. . . . | Kt—R2. |
|-----------|--------|

- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| 12. P—B4! |  |
|-----------|--|

Initiating a sacrifice that lasts for ever and wins!

- |           |         |
|-----------|---------|
| 12. . . . | P—B3.   |
| 13. Q—B2. | KKt—B1. |

Observe that :

13. . . . K—B2 is met by Q×P ch.! My opponent did not see this: but thought that the text was a better move on general grounds. QKt—B1 is quite as cramping.

- |                |        |
|----------------|--------|
| 14. B—Q3.      | K—B2.  |
| 15. O—O.       | Q—K1.  |
| 16. P—B5.      | P×B.   |
| 17. P×P d. ch. | K—Kt1. |
| 18. R—B7.      | Kt—K4. |
| 19. QR—KB1.    |        |

In keeping with the original idea and better than :

19. R×B ch. K×R.

20. Kt—B5 ch., which merely regains material. But now that is one of the threats.

- |           |       |
|-----------|-------|
| 19. . . . | B—B1. |
| 20. B—B5. | P×P.  |

If 20. . . . Kt×R.

21. P×Kt ch. Q×P.

22. B×B. Q×R ch.

23. K×Q. R×B.

24. Q—B5 with a good attack. If, in this variation,

22. . . . Q—K1.

23. R×Kt ch. K×R.

24. B—K6. P×P.

25. Q—B5 ch. B—B3.

26. KKt—K4. R—R3.

27. Kt×B. R×Kt.

21. B×B. P×Kt. The alternative is R×B, which leaves the Knight very powerful and R×B ch. playable.  
Forced.
22. B—K6. Kt×B.  
23. P×Kt. R—R3.  
24. Kt—Q5. R—QR2. Against Kt×KtP I had intended Q—B5 followed, if necessary, by Q—Kt5 and Kt—B4.  
The Rook *qua* Rook is no better than Black's Knight (apart from the principle that if you sacrifice you must be prepared to sacrifice again. Your opponent deserves it).
25. . . . K—R1.  
26. Q—B5. Q—QB1. If 26. . . . Kt×R.  
27. KtP×Kt. Q—KB1.  
28. Kt—Kt6 ch. R×Kt.  
29. Q×R with R—B5 to follow.
27. Kt×P. Kt×R.  
28. KtP×Kt. Q—B1. Kt×B was threatened; and evidently he cannot capture the KP: e.g. R×P, 29. Q—R3!.
29. Kt×B. K×Kt.  
30. R—B4. R—Kt3. 30. . . . K—R1.  
31. R—R4. R—Kt4. R—R1.  
32. Q—R5. R—R1. 32. R×P with R—Kt8 ch. to follow.  
K—B3. Best.  
The threat was :—  
33. Q—R7 ch. K—B3.  
34. R—B4 ch. forcing a quick mate.  
If Q—B1.  
34. Q—B3 ch. K—Kt2.  
35. Q—B3 ch. R—B3.  
36. Q×KtP ch. R—Kt3.  
37. Q—QB3 ch. R—B3.  
38. Q—KR3. Q—R1 (forced).  
39. P—K5!.
33. P—K4!. K—Kt2. Now if :—  
39. . . . R—Kt3.  
40. R×Q or 40. P×P wins. If  
39. . . . R—R3.  
40. R×R. Q×Q.  
41. Q×Q ch. K×Q.  
42. P×P wins. If  
39. . . . P×P.  
40. Q—Kt3 ch. R—Kt3.  
41. Q×P ch. R—B3.  
42. R—Kt4 ch. K—B1.  
43. Q—Kt5 wins. If  
39. . . . Q×R.  
40. Q×Q. R×KP (best).



34. Q—R7 ch. K—B3.  
 35. R—B4 ch. K×P.  
 36. Q—R3 ch. and mates in 6. (With Black's King at White's K1.)

41. Q—Kt5 ch. K×P.  
 42. Q—B5 ch.

## 35. KONDRATIEV—ORLOV.

(Exploit of a Russian sailor, watched by the Author).

[Same Tournament as No. 32].

- | <i>White</i> | <i>Black</i> |
|--------------|--------------|
| KONDRATIEV   | ORLOV        |
| 1. P—K4.     | P—K4.        |
| 2. Kt—KB3.   | Kt—QB3.      |
| 3. B—Kt5.    | P—QR3.       |
| 4. B—R4.     | Kt—B3.       |
| 5. P—Q4.     |              |
| 5. . . .     | P—QKt4.      |
| 6. B—Kt3.    | Kt×P.        |
| 7. P×P.      | Kt—B4.       |
| 8. B—Q5.     | B—K2.        |
| 9. Kt—Q4.    | B—Kt2.       |
| 10. Kt—B5.   | B—B1.        |
| 11. O—O.     | P—R3.        |
| 12. B—K3.    | P—Kt3.       |
| 13. Kt—Kt3.  | P—Q3.        |
| 14. P×P.     | B×P.         |
| 15. R—K1.    | K—B1.        |
| 16. Kt—B3.   | R—QKt1.      |
| 12. Q—Q2.    | K—Kt2.       |
| 18. QR—Q1.   | Kt—Q2.       |
| 19. QKt—K4.  | Kt(Q)—K4.    |
| 20. P—KB4.   | Kt—Kt5.      |
| 21. B×Kt.    | Kt×B.        |
| 22. Q×Kt.    | B×B.         |
| 23. Q—B3 ch. | Resigns.     |

Unusual but playable.

5. . . . B—K2.  
 6. O—O. P×P.  
 7. P—K5. Kt—K5.  
 8. Kt×QP. Kt—B4.  
 9. Kt—B5. O—O.  
 10. Q—KKt4 with advantage.  
 (Abrahams—Michell 1929).

A horrible expedient.

In order to make playable P—Kt3.

In order to free the Kt at c6.



